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INTRODUCTION

In July 1990, the annual Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws approved and recommended for enactment in all the states
a substantially revised version of Article 2 of the Uniform Probate
Code (UPC).' One of the major innovations is a provision permitting
defective wills executed with testamentary intent to be admitted to
probate through application of a dispensing power2 modeled on the
South Australian harmless error rule and other similar provisions.3
The comment to new UPC section 2-503 states that the provision
"unifies the law of probate and non-probate transfers" by extending

1.

UNIF. PROB. CODE art. 2 (1990).

2. Id. § 2-503 (creating a harmless error rule).
3. See id. § 2-503 comment. For discussion of these harmless error rules, see Miller, Will
Formality, JudicialFormalism,and LegislativeReform: An Examination of the New Uniform
Probate Code "HarmlessError"Rule and the Movement Toward Amorphism - PartOne: The
Wills Act Formula, the Rite of Testation, and the Question of Intent: A Problem in Search of
a Solution, 43 FLA. L. REv. 167, 311-39 (1991).
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to the wills act "the harmless error principle that has long been applid
to defective compliance with the formal requirements for nonprobat

transfers. "4
Of course, adoption of a harmless error rule to cure defective wills
does nothing to resolve the logical and practical inconsistencies of
acknowledging two separate systems of passing property at death.
Adoption of a harmless error rule resolves only the very narrow issue,
specific to documents characterized as wills, of whether the rule of
strict compliance with the formal requirements serves any policies
that justify the refusal of courts to give effect to intent in cases in
which the wills act requirements have not been observed. It does not
address the issue of whether and to what extent requiring a higher
level of formality to transfer property by will than is required to
transfer property by various will substitutes serves any useful purpose. Further, it does not logically resolve the inconsistencies in the
subsidiary law, such as the availability of assets transferred by will
substitute (rather than by will) to claims of creditors or the spouse. 5
Perhaps understandably, the Commissioners yielded to the temptation to "pay more attention to bandaging small wounds [and] making
'6
small adjustments" than to "expound[ing] grand principles.
Nevertheless, the development of a logical, internally consistent system for transferring property at death is highly desirable. Further,
this development requires a rethinking of the doctrinal foundations of
the present system, as opposed to the use of piecemeal "solutions"
such as the incorporation of a harmless error standard into the wills
act to solve the problem of wills act formality and judicial formalism.
Part one of this article, which was in a previous issue of the Florida
Law Review, 7 reviews the substantial body of scholarly commentary,
case law, and legislative history from which the new UPC section
2-503 has developed. In particular, part one focuses on John Langbein's
seminal work on harmless error rules" in general and on the 1975

4. UNIF. PROD. CODE § 2-503 comment (citing Annot., Change of Beneficiary in Old Life
InsurancePolicy as Affected by Failure to Comply with Requirements as to Manner of Making
Change, 19 A.L.R. 2d 5 (1951)).
5. See Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1125-40 (1984) (discussing the lack of unity in the probate and nonprobate
systems) [hereinafter Langbein, Nonprobate Revolution].
6. See Friedman, The Law of the Living, the Law of the Dead: Property, Succession, and
Society, 1966 Wisc. L. REV. 340, 373.
7. Miller, supra note 3.
8. E.g., Langbein, Crumbling of the Wills Act: Australians Point the Way, 65 A.B.A. J.
1189 (1987) [hereinafter Langbein, Crumbling Wills Act]; Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors
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innovation in South Australian probate law 9 that provides the model

for the UPC harmless error rule. In addition, part one examines in
depth the problem of wills act formalism and the policies which support
or perpetuate formalism. Finally, part one discusses proposed and
adopted solutions to the problem and focuses on various forms of

harmless error rules.
Part two of this article analyzes the UPC harmless error rule and
scrutinizes the two principal influences on its development: Langbein's

functional substantial compliance doctrinelo and the South Australian
dispensing power statute., Differences in scope and probable application are considered. The purpose of the inquiry is to consider whether
and to what extent a harmless error rule is an appropriate solution

to the problem of wills act formality and judicial formalism. The UPC
harmless error rule is considered both in the broad context of the law

of succession generally and as a solution to the present disunity between the law applicable to probate and nonprobate transfers.
II.
A.

THE HARMLESS ERROR SOLUTION

Substantial Compliance, the South AustralianDispensing
Power, and New Uniform Probate Code Section 2-503:
Variations on a Theme
1.

The Functional Nexus

As the preeminent advocate of reform in American probate law,
John Langbein12 has been instrumental in the rethinking of the law

of wills and of succession generally.

3

As a member of the committee

in the Execution of Wills: A Report on Australia's Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 48 (1987) [hereinafter Langbein, HarmlessErrorRules]; Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARv.L. REV. 489 (1975) [hereinafter Langbein, Substantial Compliance]; Langbein, Nonprobate Revolution, supra note 5.
9. Wills Amendment Act [No. 2] of 1975, § 9 (amending Wills Act of 1936, § 12(2), 8 AUSTL.
STAT. 665 [hereinafter South Australian Wills Act § 12(2))). For discussion of this provision,
see Miller, supra note 3, at 311-19.
10. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supranote 8; for discussion of "functional analysis,"
see Miller, supra note 3, at 255-89; for discussion of Langbein's doctrine, see id. at 302-11.
11. South Australian Wills Act § 12(2), supra note 9.
12. Chancellor Kent Professor of Law and Legal History, Yale since 1990. A.B., 1964,
Columbia; LL.B., 1968, Harvard; LL.B., 1969, Ph.D., 1971, Cambridge University.
13. E.g., Langbein, CrumblingWills Act, supra note 8; Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules,
supra note 8; Langbein, Living Probate: The Conservatorship Model, 77 MICH. L. REV. 63
(1977) [hereinafter Langbein, Living Probate]; Langbein, Nonprobate Revolution, supra note
5; Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8; Langbein, The Twentieth Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86 MIcH. L. REV. 722 (1988) [hereinafter Langbein,

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 4 [1991], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

that drafted the revisions to article 2 of the UPC, 14 he has been to

all appearances one of the prime movers behind certain of the specific
reforms. The revisions to article 2 are described by the drafters as
an attempt to unify the subsidiary law of probate and "nonprobate"
transfers, an objective that Langbein has long favored. 15 In addition,
the revisions to the UPC version of the wills act 16 bring the enforcement of wills and will substitutes ("nonprobate" transfers) closer to
parity, a change Langbein recommends because he considers such
7
transfers functionally equivalent.1
Functional analysis is fundamental to Langbein's consideration of
the formalities of transfer, whether applied to disposition by will or
to disposition by will substitute. 8 As current "dean" of the so-called
"functional school,"' 19 Langbein treats the formal requirements for the

Family Wealth Transmission]; Langbein & Waggoner, Redesigning the Spouse's Forced Share,
22 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 303 (1987) [hereinafter Langbein & Waggoner, Spouse's Forced
Share]; Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills on the Ground of Mistake: A Change of
Directionin American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521 (1982) [hereinafter Langbein & Waggoner,
Reformation].
14. UNIF. PROB. CODE (1990) (Joint Editorial Board/Conference Representatives).
15. See Langbein, Nonprobate Revolution, supra note 5, at 1134-40; Langbein, Substantial
Compliance, supra note 8, at 503-09, 520, 523-24. The comment to UPC § 2-503 specifically
cites Langbein's 1987 article on South Australia's harmless error rule and obviously heavily
relies on its interpretation of the South Australian dispensing power. See UNIF. PROB. CODE
§ 2-503 comment (1990) (citing Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8). Langbein and
Waggoner's article on reformation of wills containing mistaken terms, another ground-breaking
article, is cited as the basis for the revision to § 2-601. Section 2-601 was intended to eliminate
a potential obstacle to judicial adoption of a general reformation doctrine for wills. See UNIF.
PROB. CODE § 2-601 comment (1990) (citing Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation, supra note 13).
16. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (1990); id. pt. 7 general comment.
17. See Langbein, Nonprobate Revolution, supra note 5, at 1109, 1131, 1134-40; Langbein,
Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 503-09, 520, 523-24.
18. See Langbein, Nonprobate Revolution, supra note 5, at 1110-14, 1131-33; Langbein,
Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 491-98, 515-24.
19. For discussion of functional analysis and the so-called "functional school," see Miller,
supra note 3, at 255-74. See, e.g., Langbein, Crumbling Wills Act, supra note 8, at 1194;
Langbein, Nonprobate Revolution, supra note 5, at 1110-14, 1131-33; Langbein, Substantial
Compliance, supra note 8, at 491-98.
Other commentators have routinely incorporated Langbein's interpretation of functional
analysis into their work. See, e.g., Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement, 68 N.C.L.
REV. 541, 544-45 (1990); Love, Imperfect Gifts as Declarations of Trust: An Unapologetic
Anomaly, 67 Ky. L.J. 309, 338-44 (1979); Maxton, Execution of Wills: The FormalitiesConsidered, 1 CANT. L. REV. 393, 394-95 (1982); J. Miller, Substantial Compliance with the Execution
of Wills, 36 INT'L & COmIP. L.Q. 559, 564-66 (1987) [hereinafter J. Miller, Execution of Wills];
Nelson & Starck, Formality and Formalism: A Critical Look at the Execution of Wills, 6
PEPPERDINE L. REV. 331, 347-54 (1979).
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disposition of property by will as meaningful only to the extent that
they effectively serve (1) to effectuate the testator's intentions, (2) to
obviate issues respecting the nature of the document, its authenticity,
and its finality; and (3) to facilitate the disposition of property in the
probate courts.2° Of these three purposes, Langbein treats only the
first two as having major substantive importance to the application
of the substantial compliance doctrine.21 His 1975 article proposes that
the courts permit defectively executed wills to be deemed in substantial compliance with the wills act if the form of the will, despite the
defect, satisfies the purposes served by the formalities and the circumstances surrounding the making of the will.establish testamentary
intent.2 2 This proposal is founded on the assumption that the specific
requirements of the wills act need not be strictly construed as such.
Instead, the requirements may be deemed to be effectively met if the
testator's failure to achieve literal compliance with the requirements
does not raise any unresolvable issues that strict compliance with the
wills act would have avoided.23 In effect, Langbein argues that the
proper question with respect to formalities of transfer is not whether
the requirements have been strictly fulfilled, but whether the purposes
or policies underlying the statutory standard have been served.2
Langbein's functional view of the wills act formalities demonstrably
carries over into his interpretation of the South Australian dispensing
power and, as the subsequent discussion will show, appears to a certain
extent to have colored his account of that harmless error rule. His

In addition, law reform commissions in a number of Canadian and Australian jurisdictions
have extensively considered Langbein's functional analysis of the wills act in determining whether
to recommend harmless error rules. See, e.g., New South Wales Law Reform Commission,
Report on Wills - Execution and Revocation 34-36, 68-71 (1986) [hereinafter New South Wales
Report]; Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, Report No. 52 on the Making and
Revocation of Wills 24-25 (1981) [hereinafter British Columbia Report]; Manitoba Law Reform
Commission, Report on the "Wills Act" and the Doctrine of Substantial Compliance 14-16 (1980)
[hereinafter Manitoba Report].
20. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 513-26. For discussion, see
Miller, supra note 3, at 302-11.
21. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 513-26. For discussion, see
Miller, supra note 3, at 302-11.
22. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 513-16. It is not completely
clear whether Langbein meant to treat these two requirements for application of the substantial
compliance doctrine as independent criteria which must both be established in every case. See
id. at 513-26.
23. For discussion, see Miller, supra note 3, at 302-11.
24. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 515-16. For discussion of the
purposes of formality (functional analysis), see Miller, supra note 3, at 258-74 (attested wills);
id. at 274-89 (holographic wills).
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interpretation of the South Australian model has in turn been incorporated into the comment to the UPC dispensing power.? As a result,
although the UPC adopts a harmless error rule essentially based on
South Australia's broad dispensing power, there are intimations of
functional analysis in the comment to the rule.? If legislatures adopt
the new UPC harmless error rule based upon the interpretation provided in the comment, the legislative history will inevitably reflect
the influence of Langbein's functional interpretation of the South Australian provision and case law, rather than the interpretation of the
South Australian courts themselves. Courts construing the provision
will likewise be influenced - perhaps without recognizing the source
- by Langbein's conception of the appropriate scope and application
of the dispensing power. Langbein's functional interpretation of the
South Australian model may thus develop into a gloss on the UPC
provision, with functional analysis providing the nexus between substantial compliance and the broadly worded UPC rule. Predicting application of the UPC rule therefore requires analysis and comparison
of the relative scope and application of Langbein's functional substantial compliance doctrine, the South Australian dispensing power, and
UPC section 2-503.
B.

Application of the Rules to Defects in Attestation
1. Defects in the Attestation Ceremony
a.

Langbein's Substantial Compliance Doctrine

In his 1975 article, Langbein states that a major purpose of the
functional substantial compliance doctrine is to mitigate the harsh
consequences that result when testators fail to comply with the minor
formalities that contribute to the ceremoniousness of attestation, such
as presence and publication.27 Langbein argues that if a will has been
signed and witnessed, the failure of the testator or witnesses to comply
with the presence and publication formalities does not prevent the
will from establishing testamentary authenticity.? According to Langbein's functional interpretation of the wills act formalities, presence

25. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (1990). For discussion, see Miller, supra note
3, at 339-44.
26. For discussion, see Miller, supra note 3, at 339-44.
27. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 521. "A principal achievement
of the substantial compliance doctrine should be to relieve against the invalidation of wills in
whose execution some of the minor formalities surrounding the attestation ceremony have been
omitted or deficiently performed." Id.
28. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss4/1
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and publication contribute incrementally but not indispensably to the
intent-verifying and authenticating purposes.2 Defective compliance
with these minor formalities therefore raises no unresolvable, issues
that strict compliance would have obviated. Consequently, compliance
with the presence and publication requirements is considered by Langbein to be relatively unimportant compared to compliance with more
"fundamental" formalities such as attestation, signature, and the requirement that the will be in writing 0°
Langbein argues that the presence and publication formalities were
originally implemented to serve the so-called protective function, 31'' a
policy which Langbein characterizes as "an historical anachronism. 32
Like most proponents of functional analysis, Langbein considers the
minor formalities associated with attestation to be mere vestiges of a
policy adapted to the circumstances of a period when wills were frequently made by testators who, because they were on their deathbeds,
were particularly susceptible to imposition.3 Langbein argues that
concern with protecting the testator from imposition does not justify
strict construction of the technical requirements for attestation, because compliance with the presence and publication formalities does
not in fact prevent fraud. Because these requirements do not bear
directly on testamentary intent or the authenticity of the writing,
Langbein characterizes presence defects as "the most innocuous of the

29.

Id. at 516-17, 521.

30. See id. at 515-22.
31. Id. at 516-17, 521. For discussion of the protective function served by the various
formalities for attested wills, see Miller, supra note 3, at 271-74.
32. Langbein, SubstantialCompliance, supranote 8, at 496. For discussion of the presence
and publication requirements, see Miller, supra note 3, at 265 n.502, 273 nn.520-21 (presence)
and at 265 n.503 (publication).
33. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 497; cf. Lindgren, supra note 19,
at 554-56. For discussion of the historical development of the attestation requirements, see
Miller, supranote 3, at 199-204; for a comprehensive discussion of the development of formalities
for both attested and holographic wills in historical context, see id. at 187-221.
34. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 496, 517.
The attestation formalities are pitifully inadequate to protect the testator from
determined crooks, and have not in fact succeeded in preventing the many cases
of fraud and undue influence which are proved each year ... Protective formalities
do more harm than good, voiding homemade wills for harmless violations ...
[They] are not needed. [Since] fraud or undue influence may always be proved
notwithstanding due execution, the ordinary remedies for imposition are quite
adequate.
Id. at 496 (citing Gulliver & Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1,
9-13 (1941)).
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recurrent execution blunders" and publication blunders as 6qually
peripheral and innocuous 36 (although publication blunders are less likely
as a practical matter to create problems, since so few jurisdictions
today require publication. )37
One issue that arises when applying functional analysis to the presence and publication requirements is to what extent extrinsic evidence
would be necessary to establish final testamentary intent and authenticity in a case in which a noncomplying will appears valid on its face.
In most cases, as Langbein points out, "the presumption of due execution that arises from a seemingly regular attestation clause forecloses
inquiry into the actual circumstances of due execution." 38 Such defects
may come to light, however, if the will itself "exhibits indicia of irregularity" or if the will does not contain an appropriate attestation clause.39
In his 1975 article, Langbein states that substantial compliance "would
permit the proponents to prove that in the circumstances of the case
the testator executed the will with finality and that the execution is
adequately evidenced notwithstanding the defect. '' 40 Arguably, however, a truly functional approach to the wills act would as a matter
of logic abolish the presence and publication requirements as meaningful substantive requirements for an enforceable will, since neither
formality serves any indispensable, fundamental wills act policy. 41 It
is therefore not clear why application of the functional substantial
compliance doctrine would require extrinsic evidence to establish
either the testator's intent or the authenticity of the document if the
only defect in execution were noncompliance with one of the "anachronistic" protective formalities. Even under current law, a will signed
by the testator and the requisite number of witnesses may be admitted
to probate in instances in which the witnesses are not available to
testify concerning the execution of the document.4 Under a functional
construction of the wills act, a signed and attested will ought to be

35. Langbein, Crumbling Wills Act, supra note 8, at 1194; see Langbein, Harmless Error
Rules, supra note 8, at 45.
36. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 521.
37. For jurisdictions requiring publication, see Miller, supra note 3, at 207-08 n.191.
38. Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8, at 17 n.66.
39. Id.
40. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 521.
41. See id. at 516-17, 521; Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 16-18, 40;
cf. Lindgren, supra note 19, at 569-70.
42. See Bates, A Case for Intention, 124 NEw L.J. 380, 381 (1974) (quoted in Miller, supra
note 3, at 268-69 n.509); Lindgren, supra note 19, at 570-71 (quoted in Miller, supra note 3, at
268-69 n.509).
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sufficient to establish finality of intent and the authenticity of the
document (in the absence of evidence of fraud or imposition) because
such a document substantially serves the wills act purposes.
b. South Australia's Dispensing Power Provision
The South Australian wills act does not require publication. 43 The
wills act does require that the testator sign the will in the presence
of two witnesses and that the witnesses both sign in the testator's
presence,4 but does not require that the witnesses sign in each other's
presence.45
According to Langbein, 'the basic architecture" of South Australian
probate procedure derives from nineteenth century English probate
practice, when the ecclesiastical courts had jurisdiction over probate
matters. 46 In contemporary common form probate, the registrar of
probate '"processes routine estates."47 The registrar of probate may
refer to the court of general jurisdiction for resolution of issues that
arise during the process.48 If such resolution requires factfinding, the
9
court does not hear evidence but relies on affidavits of the witnesses.4
Such common form probate 's the norm," but is available only for
uncontested cases.5 "[W]hen the validity of the will is in dispute probate must be in solemn form," with "ordinary adversary procedure"
and examination of witnesses. 5' Very few of the section 12(2) cases
have been contested cases. 2
The court of general jurisdiction for section 12(2) cases is the South
Australian Supreme Court, though Langbein explains that the court

43.

See Wills Amendment Act (No. 2) of 1975, § 5 (amending Wills Act of 1936, § 8(b), 8

S. AUSTL. STAT. 665 [hereinafter South Australian Wills Act § 8]).
44.

Id.

45. Id. According to Palk, the South Australian Law Reform Committee that recommended
§ 12(2) mistakenly thought that the South Australian Wills Act included a requirement that the
witnesses sign in the presence of each other. Palk, Informal Wills: From Soldiers to Citizens,

5 ADELAIDE L. REV. 382, 389 (1975) (citing Twenty-Eighth Report of the South Australian
Law Reform Committee to Attorney General: Reform of the Law of Intestacy and Wills 10
(1974) [hereinafter South Australian Report]). For discussion of the legislative history of § 12(2),

see Palk, supra; Miller, supra note 3, at 311-14.
46.

Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 12. For discussion of ecclesiastical

jurisdiction over probate matters, see Miller, supra note 3, at 197-98.
47.

Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 12.

48. Id.
49. Id.
50.

Id.

51. Id. at 12-13.
52. Id. at 13.
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has delegated its section 12(2) dispensing power to the registrars of
probate in cases involving small estates., On first instance, the judges
sit singly,- though any three of the fourteen judges may participate
on a three-judge panel called the Full Court for cases on appeal,- and
a first-instance judge may "refer a case of exceptional importance to
a three-judge first-instance panel." The section 12(2) case law is,
however, "overwhelmingly the product of single-judge decisions ren'57
dered by a nonspecialist bench.
In the first case decided under the section 12(2) dispensing power,
Estate of Graham,58 the defective execution resulted from the testator's failure to comply with the South Australian presence requirements. 59 At the time of execution, the testator had signed her will,
then given it to her nephew, the principal beneficiary, with the request
that he "get it witnessed."- The nephew had taken the document to
two of the testator's neighbors for attestation, and had then returned
the attested document to the testator.6 1 Despite noncompliance with
the presence requirements, the Graham court was satisfied by the
evidence of the circumstances surrounding execution that the document had been executed with testamentary intent. 62
The Graham court declined to read into section 12(2) any requirement that the proponent of a defective will show attempted compliance
with the wills act.6 Although the court specifically stated that the
testator had not attempted to comply with the presence requirements,6 the court was nevertheless satisfied beyond a reasonable

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. See, e.g., Estate of Kelly, 34 S.A. St. R. 370, affg 32 S.A. St. R. 413 (1983)
(discussed infra in text accompanying notes 102-17).
56. Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8, at 13. See, e.g., Estate of Williams,
36 S.A. St. R. 423 (1984) (discussed infra in text accompanying notes 311-28).
57. Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 13.
58. 20 S.A. St. R. 198 (1978).
59. Id. at 199, 201.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 201.
63. Id. at 205. For discussion of a proposed harmless error rule based specifically on "attempted compliance," see Miller, supra note 3, at 335-37 (discussing Law Reform Commission
of Tasmania, Report No. 35 on Reform in the Law of Wills 9-10 (1983) [hereinafter Tasmania
Report]).
64. Graham, 20 S.A. St. R. at 205 ("She herself signed the document in the absence of
witnesses, and made no 'attempt' to have them present when she signed; and far from attempting
to have them both sign in her presence, she arranged for them to sign in her absence.").
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doubt that the testator had intended for the document to constitute
her will.6a The court, therefore, concluded that the will was valid under
section 12(2).6 However, while Graham indicated that application of
section 12(2) does not require a showing that the testator attempted
to comply with the bungled formality, dicta in the case seems to
suggest that proof that the testator attempted to comply with the
wills act is highly relevant to the determination whether to apply
section 12(2).67
In deciding that the presence requirements could be dispensed
with under the facts of Graham,the court suggested that a consideration in applying section 12(2) to save a defective will is the degree
of the noncompliance with the requirements of the wills act. The
Graham court stated, "I do not think that I could have reached that
[required] state of satisfaction [with respect to testamentary intent]
if the deceased had done no more than sign the will herself, without
6
evidence of any other act of the kind envisaged by [the Wills Act]." 8
The court considered that the reasonable doubt standard of section
12(2) would ensure, "in most cases, [that] the greater the departure
from the requirements of formal validity.

.

. , the harder will it be

for the Court to reach the required state of satisfaction," 69 and would
thereby operate as a "significant restraint" on abuse of section 12(2).0
The court suggested that the dispensing power could not be applied
to an unattested will or even to an attested will as to which there
1
had been total noncompliance with the presence requirements 2
Cases subsequent to Graham have frequently recited its dictum
linking the degree of deviation from the wills act to the difficulty of
the proponent's burden,7 but in practice the courts have extended the
scope of section 12(2) far beyond that projected in Graham, even to
cases in which the evidence shows that the testator deliberately chose
not to comply with the wills act. 3 The South Australian courts have

65. Id. at 201. For discussion of the application of a statutory "substantial compliance"
standard to presence defects, see Miller, sWpm note 3, at 329-35 (discussing the Queensland
courts' extremely narrow application of the Queensland provision to presence defects).
66. See Graham, 20 S.A. St. R. at 205-06.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 205.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8,at 17.
73. See, e.g., Estate of Hodge, 40 S.A. St. R. 398 (1986) (discussed infra in text accompanying notes 95-101); Estate of Kelly, 32 S.A. St. R. 413, affd, 34 S.A. St. R. 370 (1983) (discussed
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not given this judicial gloss the functional interpretation suggested by
Langbein, who read into the language an implication that application
of section 12(2) depends on the nature of the specific defect and specifically on whether the defect involves a fundamental violation of the
wills act purposes. 74 Contrary to Langbein's interpretation, it seems
that the Graham court was suggesting a quantitative link between
the overall degree of departure from the statutory standard and the
ability of the proponent of the will to establish testamentary intent
beyond a reasonable doubt rather than the qualitative functional
analysis contemplated in Langbein's substantial compliance approach. 75
In any case, as the subsequent discussion will show, the South Australian courts have applied the dispensing power to excuse defects in
execution that under Langbein's functional approach would clearly be
characterized as "fundamental" and therefore outside the reach of the
substantial compliance doctrine.
c. New Uniform Probate Code Section 2-503
UPC section 2-502(a), the revised version of the 1969 UPC provision for a formal will, does not significantly change the formal requirements for an attested will under the UPC.76 The UPC has never
required publication as a part of the attestation requirement.7 7 The
comment to the revised version seems to imply that "in-person" contact
between testator and witnesses is not required. 7s Thus, strict com-

infra in text accompanying notes 102-17); Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8, at
19 (discussing unreported case, Estate of Franks, No. 10 of 1983 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Aug. 9, 1983))
and id. at 32-33 (discussing unreported case, Estate of Sierp, No. 173 of 1982 (S.A. Sup. Ct.
Dec. 13, 1982)).
74. See Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 52-53.
75. For discussion of Langbein's "functional" approach, see Miller, supra note 3, at 302-11.
76. Compare UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a) (1990) with UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502 (1969).
For text of the 1969 provision, see Miller, supra note 3, at 208-09 n.192. For history of the
UPC, see id. at 206-11. Uniform Probate Code § 2-502(a), as recently revised, requires that
every will be:
(1) in writing,
(2) signed by the testator or in the testator's name by some other individual in
the testator's conscious presence and by his [or her] direction, and
(3) signed by at least two individuals, each of whom signed within a reasonable
time after he [or she] witnessed either the signing of the will as described in
paragraph (2) or the testator's acknowledgment of that signature or acknowledgment of the will.
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a).
77. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502 (1969) (quoted and discussed in Miller, supra note 3,
at 208-09 n.192).
78. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a) comment (1990); Miller, supra note 3, at 208-11.
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pliance with the 1990 UPC attestation requirements could seemingly
be accomplished if the testator were merely to sign the will, mail it
to each of the witnesses, and acknowledge the signature to the witnesses by telephone.7 Because the ceremoniousness of attestation has
been reduced to a bare minimum under the UPC, the incorporation
into the UPC of a harmless error rule would appear redundant if the
sole purpose of such a rule is to permit courts to excuse technical
defects in attestation.
2. Unattested Wills
a. Langbein's Substantial Compliance Doctrine
Langbein initially asserted that noncompliance with the attestation
requirement is a "fundamental" error in jurisdictions that recognize
only witnessed wills, so that application of the substantial compliance
doctrine to allow enforcement of an unattested will would usually be
precluded2 Langbein argues in his 1975 article that a jurisdiction that
does not provide for the alternative unattested holographic form is
making a "clear policy choice" favoring a high level of formality to
achieve all of the wills act purposes. 1 If the wills act requires attestation,
[t]he increment which attestation adds to the cautionary and
especially to the evidentiary functions seems unlikely to be
achieved by other means. As compared with the will substitutes and the holographic will, the attestation requirement
may seem to set the level of cautionary and evidentiary
functions unreasonably high, but that is the legislature's policy choice. 2
In consequence, total failure of attestation in a jurisdiction that
does not permit holographic wills by definition falls outside the reach
of the functional substantial compliance doctrine. On the other hand,

79. See Kossow, ProbateLaw and the Uniform Probate Code: "One for the Money. .. ,
61 GEO. L.J. 1357, 1380 (1973) (suggesting that such conduct would meet the requirements of
the original version of the UPC attested wills requirement, UPC § 2-502, but that construing
the attestation requirement in this way would permit fraud); see also Estate of McGurrin, 113
Idaho 341, 743 P.2d 994 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding that Idaho's version of the UPC required
"in-person contact" between testator and witnesses; telephone communication thanking witnesses
for signing not sufficient). For discussion of this issue, see Miller, supra note 3, at 209-11.
80. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8,at 521-22.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 521.
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the experience in jurisdictions that also recognize the alternative holographic form indicates that attestation, however useful, is not essential
to any wills act policy other than the protective policy. 3 "Only where
the protective policy is still valued is it fair to characterize attestation
as indispensable to the -policies of the Wills Act. '"
Langbein argues that a legislature's decision to permit unattested
holographic wills undercuts most of the policies served by the attestation requirement.
Handwriting has but one virtue: it provides superior evidence of genuineness. It does not serve the other Wills Act
policies, all of which attestation does serve. The legislative
decision to authorize holographic wills is, therefore, a fundamental one. It represents both an abandonment of the protective policy, and an acceptance of [a] significantly lowered
level of formality for implementing the other Wills Act
policies.
Langbein concludes that since the decision to recognize unattested
holographic wills reflects the legislature's tolerance for low levels of
formality, a functional substantial compliance approach to statutory
construction of the wills act should extend the doctrine to unattested
wills in jurisdictions that permit holographic wills. 6 His argument
suggests that total failure of attestation may be essentially harmless
in a jurisdiction that has demonstrated its unconcern with the functions
served by the attestation requirement by permitting unattested holographic wills because it violates no fundamental wills act policy. 7 Total
failure of attestation in a holographic jurisdiction simply produces an
unattested will that does not serve the authenticating purpose of the
handwriting requirement, a purpose which might be fulfilled through
admission of extrinsic evidence.88

83. Id. at 498; Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 52; cf. Lindgren, supra
note 19, at 550-51, 554-56.
84. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 498.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 521.
87. See id. at 498, 521; cf. Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8, at 52.
88. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supranote 8,at 498, 521. For further discussion
of Langbein's distinction between functional analysis as applied in jurisdictions that recognize
holographic wills and jurisdictions that permit only attested wills, see infra notes 171-218 and
accompanying text.
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b.

South Australia's Dispensing Power Provision

Despite dicta in Graham suggesting that a total failure of attestation might be too great a departure from the wills act requirements
to be cured by evidence of testamentary intent, 89 the South Australian
courts have since validated unattested wills so consistently, as Langbein comments, as to have had the effect of reducing attestation "from
a requirement to an option." 9° As Langbein points out in his 1987
article, the South Australian courts have readily excused total failure
of attestation, even in cases in which the testator's noncompliance
with the wills act was apparently deliberate.9 1 Although "[a]ttestation
evidences finality," 92 as Langbein maintains, so that when the formality
is lacking the court must satisfy itself that the want of attestation
does not indicate irresolution, 93 proponents have found it easy in practice to satisfy the South Australian courts beyond a reasonable doubt
that unattested wills were intended to have testamentary effect. 94

89. See Graham, 20 S.A. St. R. at 205-06.
90. Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 23.
91. See id. at 18-23 (analyzing South Australian case law on failure of attestation); supra
cases cited note 73.
92. Id. at 19.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Estate of Smith, 38 S.A. St. R. 30 (1985) in which a signed but unattested
will was admitted to probate. Id. at 31. The testator was 91 years old at the time of her death.
Id. The printed form on which the testator had written the will provided clear instructions for
executing it. Id. at 32. The testator presumably was aware of the requirements for due execution,
since she had made a properly executed will some years before. Id. The court commented,
however,
[I]t must be acknowledged that it is odd that she did not procure the signature of
witnesses to the document which I have admitted to probate. She retained her
mental faculties until the end. She had a document which told her what to do. She
had made an earlier will. One would have thought that she would have remembered
something at least of the need for witnesses. On the other hand she was very old
and rather secretive....
Id. at 32-33. The court considered it significant that the decedent had regarded the document
as sufficiently important to take with her to the hospital and that she had apparently kept it
with her valuable papers. Id. at 33. The court decided that there was no reasonable doubt of
the testators intent, based on the facts that: (1) the testator was very old; (2) she took the will
(along with other valuable papers) to the hospital; (3) she told her grandniece that she had
written a will; and (4) she provided for those for whom such provision was normal. Id. Langbein
points out that Smith does not suggest a reasonable doubt standard equivalent to that applied
in criminal cases, see Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8, at 35 (suggesting that,
in applying § 12(2), the South Australian courts have 'Yashion[ed] an unconventional meaning
for the [reasonable doubt] standard"). Cf. Estate of Kelly, 32 S.A. St. R. 413, affd, 34 S.A.
St. R. 370 (1983) in which the first-instance judge concluded that he had 'o reasonable doubt"
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In Estate of Hodge,95 the South Australian court validated a will
that the testator had deliberately left unattested. In Hodge, the testator had written the will in the back of a booklet that he had obtained
from a "firm of funeral directors."- The testator's daughter, the sole
beneficiary under the will, testified that she had warned him that a
will must be attested by two witnesses, 97 but that the testator had
replied that "he did not want to be bothered with that, it was perfectly
plain, he had signed the document, he had dated it and all she had
to do was take it to the bank manager and the bank account would
be transferred to her. . . .. Despite the testator's willful noncompliance with the attestation requirement, the court professed itself
perfectly satisfied by the evidence that the testator had intended the
writing to be his will.9
Interestingly, Langbein questions the result in Hodge on the
ground that "[i]t is hard to say [that] a testator who deliberately sets
out to breach the governing formalities ... nevertheless intended the
instrument to be effective as his will."''o He suggests that if the evidence had shown that an "authoritative figure such as his lawyer" had
warned the testator that attestation was required to make a will valid,
the testator's deliberate failure to have the will attested might in that
case have prevented application of the section 12(2) dispensing power
to save the will.101 It is unclear, however, why Langbein considers
the deliberateness of the noncompliance relevant under a functional
approach if there is truly no issue as to the testator's intention. While
the testator in Hodge perhaps had no intention to make a proper will,
i.e., to comply with the wills act, the evidence seems unequivocal that
he intended the document he did prepare to be enforced.
In Estate of Kelly,10 2 the South Australian court applied the dispensing power to save an unattested will that had been prepared by
a physician who comparatively late in life had studied law and been
admitted to practice. 0 3 The will was prepared by the testator in Oc-

respecting the testator's intentions, while conceding that the evidence was not "entirely clear."
Id. at 417-18. For discussion of standard of proof under § 12(2), see id. at 33-37 and infra text
accompanying notes 714-31.
95. 40 S.A. St. R. 398, 398 (1986).
96.

Id.

97. Id. at 399.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 400.
100. Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 20.
101. Id.
102. 32 S.A. St. R. 413, ajf'd, 34 S.A. St. R. 370 (1983).
103. Id. at 414, 418, affd, 34 S.A. St. R. at 372.
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tober 1980 and was discovered by the testator's housekeeper in the
1°4
back of a notebook that he had given to her for her household use.
The will, though unattested and framed in "somewhat cryptical language," was signed and dated. 10 5 Following the signature and date
were the words, "Written as I have considerable cardiac pain and
irregularity at time."' The evidence showed that between 1977 and
the testator's death in 1981, he had prepared various testamentary
documents, none of which were duly executed.1 The first-instance
judge determined that the October 1980 will was intended by the
testator to be his final will, though "[t]he evidence is not entirely
clear-cut and not entirely one way,"'l s since there was testimony tending to show that the testator believed that an earlier will was still in
effect. o0

On appeal, the court dismissed the appellant's argument that the
testator had intended the document to be a conditional will that lapsed
after his recovery from the illness that prompted it.110 Although the

facts suggested that the testator may actually have forgotten about
the "will" by the time he gave the notebook to his housekeeper and
that he believed on the day of his death that another, earlier will was
still in effect,"" the three-judge panel agreed with the first-instance
court that at the time the testator made the will, he had intended for
it to take effect."2 In reaching this result, Judge Bollen remarked that
the application of section 12(2) in previous cases had been "liberal and
pragmatic, perhaps rather 'ad hoc' and that he saw "no fault in this
approach," since the section was meant to have a "very significant
practical effect" and was "a work-a-day provision.'

104. Id. at 416, affd, 34 S.A. St. R. at 372-73, 388.
105. Id. at 416, affd, 34 S.A. St. R. at 372-73.
106. Id. at 416, affd, 34 S.A. St. R. at 374.
107. See id. at 414-17, affd, 34 S.A. St. R. at 374-77.
108. Id. at 417-18, affd, 34 S.A. St. R. at 377-78.
109. Id.
110. Kelly, 34 S.A. St. R. at 383 (Zelling, J.).
111. See Kelly, 32 S.A. St. R. at 417-18, affd, 34 S.A. St. R. at 393 (Bollen, J.).
112. Kelly, 34 S.A. St. R. at 382-83 (Zelling, J.); id. at 391-92 (Bollen, J.). The appellant
argued that the proponent had failed to establish that the testator's intention that the document
constitute his will had continued to his death. Kelly, 32 S.A. St. R. at 417-18; 34 S.A. St. R.
at 382. The first-instance judge concluded that the only requirement under § 12(2) was the usual
one of testamentary intent at the time of execution, id., and the panel on appeal agreed. Kelly,
34 S.A. St. R. at 382-83, 391-92.
113. Kelly, 34 S.A. St. R. at 389 (Bollen, J.). But see id. at 380 (Zelling, J., stating that
when he wrote the report that was the basis for § 12(2), he had no idea that the section, which
was based on one of his ideas, would produce the amount of case law that it has).
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Langbein characterizes Kelly as a hard case. 114 He argues that the
handwritten document was most likely intended by the testator to be
a conditional will, especially since the testator had had legal training
and had not re-executed the will after the medical emergency subsided. 115 Langbein considers the Kelly decision particularly dubious in
light of the "reasonable doubt" standard required by section 12(2) for
application of the dispensing power. 1 6 "To say that Kelly is at best a
close case is to call into question whether it could be correctly decided
''
on so high a standard of proof. "1
The State of Western Australia, which has enacted legislation modelled upon section 12(2)," s applied its harmless error rule to save an
unattested will in Estate of Crossley.119 In that case, the testator's
daughter testified that her father had been an astute businessman
who would have known the requirements for executing a will.120 The
court concluded that the testator had in fact been aware of the attestation requirement. 121 "Such awareness, however, and failure to comply
with the requirements [does] not result in the application of the section
being inappropriate."' 1 The court was satisfied beyond any reasonable
doubt that the testator had intended the document to be his will.123
c. New Uniform Probate Code Section 2-503
Revised UPC section 2-502(a) minimizes the formalities for due
execution of an attested will. '4 Section 2-502(b) incorporates the pro114. Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8, at 20-21, 33; cf. Kelly, 34 S.A. St.
R. at 384 (Wells, J., stating that the case "has caused me considerable anxiety" but concluding
that the court should not interfere with the opinion of the trial judge).
115. Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8, at 20-21. Langbein points out that
[wihen a legally trained testator recites in the defectively executed instrument
that he is making it on account of a medical emergency, his subsequent failure to
procure evidence of attestation once events allow it is consistent with the view
that it was intended at the time of its making to be provisional. Dr. Kelly's document
is therefore open to interpretation as a conditional will, intended to take effect if
he had died of the immediate peril, but allowed to lapse when not re-executed
with Wills Act formality after the passing of the peril.
Id. at 21.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. For discussion of Western Australia's version of the dispensing power, see Miller,
supra note 3, at 323-35.
119. 1989 W.A.L.R. 227.
120. Id. at 230.
121. Id. at 231.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 232.
124. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a) (1990); supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
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vision for unattested holographic wills formerly set out in section 2503.1 Applying Langbein's analysis,1 a functional construction of the
1990 UPC wills formalities thus indicates that the drafters devalued
the intent-verifying, authenticating, channeling, and protective purposes served by the attestation requirement,m since unattested holographic wills are permitted. The comment supports this interpretation.12 Section 2-502(b) should therefore permit liberal application of
the dispensing power to unattested wills.
Applying the section 2-503 harmless error rule to an unattested
document that does not meet the UPC holographic will requirements
raises several interesting characterization problems. If the unattested
document is at least partly in the testator's handwriting, as in the
case of a will handwritten on a will form, a threshold question would
be whether the '"material" provisions (including the signature) are
entirely handwritten. If so, the document would be a valid holographic
will.m If not, the document could be construed as: (1) an unattested
will that the testator nevertheless intended to have testamentary effect, as in the Kelly case in South Australia;130 (2) an attempted but
bungled holographic will which, due to the testator's ignorance or
inadvertence, fails to meet the section 2-502(b) requirement that all
material provisions be handwritten by the testator;13 1 or (3) an unexecuted draft never intended to take effect. To determine whether such
a document was intended to be a will, the court might presumably
consider the proportion of handwritten material to printed or typed
material. The court might likewise consider where the handwriting
appears in relation to the printed or typed material. For example, if
the handwriting appears only in the blanks on the will form designed
to be filled in by the testator, this juxtaposition suggests that the

For discussion of the UPC attested will provision, see Miller, supra note 3, at 208-11; for
discussion of the UPC's '"minimalist" approach to the formalities, see id. at 289-90.
125. Compare UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(b) (1990) with UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (1969).
126. For discussion of Langbein's analysis, see Miller, supra note 3, at 302-11.
127. For discussion of the wills act functions or policies, see id. at 258-74; for discussion
of wills act functions and the attestation requirement, see id. at 262-63 n.496 (intent-verifying
function); id. at 267 n.506 (authenticating function); id. at 269-71 (channeling function); id. at
273-74 (protective function).
128.
129.

UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (1990).
For discussion of the UPO holographic will requirements, see Miller, supra note 3, at

218-21.
130. Kelly, 32 S.A. St. R. at 413, affd, 34 S.A. St. R. at 370; for discussion, see supra
notes 102-13.
131. For discussion of the UPC holographic wills requirements, see Miller, supra note 3,

at 218-21.
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testator intended to execute a form will. If the handwriting consists
of interlineations or alterations to typed or printed material, this
suggests that the document was merely a draft.132
Determining testamentary intent in order to determine whether
the harmless error rule should be applied is likely to be more complicated in UPC jurisdictions than in jurisdictions which, like South Australia, l s recognize only attested wills, because total failure of attestation under the UPC may simply signify that the testator intended to
execute a holographic will. 1 According to functional analysis, defective
compliance with the purely "evidentiary" handwriting requirement
does not raise the issue of intent.' Therefore, if a partly handwritten
document that does not meet the "material provisions" standard of
the UPC is determined to be unambiguously testamentary on its face,
logic would seem to suggest that its proponents need not adduce
extrinsic evidence of testamentary intent.136 Section 2-503 thus introduces an additional level of complexity to the familiar problem of
distinguishing an intended holographic will from nontestamentary writings. 137
The drafters of section 2-503 seem to have accepted Langbein's
conclusion that the application of a broad dispensing power must for
all practical purposes ultimately reduce the attestation requirement
to an option.- The drafters note that "[t]he South Australian and
Israeli courts 'lightly excuse' breaches of the attestation require-

132. See Miller, supra note 3, at 215-18 (discussing factors considered by courts in determining compliance with the handwriting requirement in non-UPC jurisdictions under a surplusage
theory); id. at 218-21 (discussing factors considered by courts in determining compliance with
the handwriting requirement under the UPC holographic wills provision).
133. See South Australian Wills Act § 8, supra note 43.
134. See Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 22, 47 n.234 (discussing application of a dispensing power in Manitoba, a jurisdiction that recognizes holographic wills).
135. Miller, supra note 3, at 277-80; id. at 287-88 (discussing the view of commentators
that the handwriting requirement serves only the authenticating (evidentiary) function and
arguing that the requirement may also serve the protective function).
136. Unambiguously testamentary documents that meet the holographic will requirements
are enforced as such, without any need for the court to consider whether the document was
executed with testamentary intent. Id. at 280. If the document facially complies with the requirements but is unambiguously nontestamentary, the court will refuse to enforced it. For discussion,
see id. at 280-82. If, however, a document that complies with the holographic will requirements
is ambiguous on its face, courts may admit extrinsic evidence to establish the decedent's intentions. Id. at 282. For discussion of cases, see id. at 282-86.
137. For discussion of cases distinguishing holographic wills from informal documents such
as letters or memoranda, see Miller, supra note 3, at 274-86.
138. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (1990) (citing Langbein, Harmless Error
Rules, supra note 8, at 23).
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ments." 1 9 Such a liberal application of a broad harmless error rule
seemingly makes recognition of the holographic form superfluous, since
its effect (as seen in South Australia) is to eliminate attestation as a
meaningful substantive requirement for a valid will.140 Application of
a broad dispensing power must in any case inevitably blur the distinction between the attested and the holographic forms. New section
2-503 is therefore likely to achieve indirectly the objective that
Lindgren recommends be achieved directly through a "two-tiered"
wills act that would abolish attestation as a substantive requirement
4
for a valid wil.
Lindgren argues that attestation is always dispensable, despite its
utility in creating a document readily identifiable as a will and in
ensuring an unequivocal manifestation of testamentary intent.'4 The
ease with which the South Australian courts have dispensed with the
attestation requirement tends to support Lindgren's argument. This
result should not surprise, since holographic wills and the various will
substitutes routinely are given effect without either attestation or
extrinsic evidence of intent.'4
3.

Partial Failure of Attestation

a. Langbein's Substantial Compliance Doctrine
Langbein suggests that partial failure of attestation, such as "attestation by two witnesses where the statute calls for three, or by one
where it asks for two," ought to be remediable even under wills acts
that do not permit unattested holographic wills.14 Langbein considers
partial failure of attestation a less "fundamental" defect than total
failure of attestation. According to Langbein, partial failure of attestation goes to the quantity, rather than the quality, of the evidence
of testamentary intent, 145 since in such cases there has been at least

139. Id.
140. See Langbein, HarmlessErrorRules, supranote 8, at 21-22; cf. Lindgren, supra note
19, at 569-73 (proposing that attestation be abolished as a substantive requirement for due
execution).
141. See Lindgren, supra note 19, at 546-47, 569-73.
142. See id. at 544-47, 560-73.
143. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 503-12; UNIF. PROB. CODE
§ 2-503 comment (1990). The comment states that "[Section 2-503] reduces the tension between
holographic wills and the two witness requirement for attested wills under Section 2-502(a)."
Id. Section 2-503 extends to will formalities the harmless error principle 'that has long been
applied to defective compliance with the formal requirements for nonprobate transfers." Id.
144. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 521-22.
145. Id. at 522; cf. Langbein, HarmlessErrorRules, supranote 8, at 22 (discussing partial
attestation cases in South Australia).
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one witness to the attempted execution of the will. He argues that in
most cases involving partial attestation, other evidence of deliberation
and finality of intent will readily establish that the failure to obtain
the requisite number of witnesses was harmless to the statutory purpose. 14 In ranking the wills act formalities, he therefore concludes
that failing to obtain the required number of witnesses is significantly
less serious than failing to have the will witnessed at all.147
b.

South Australia's Dispensing Power Provision

According to Langbein's 1987 article, the South Australian courts
have applied the section 12(2) dispensing power to validate partially
attested wills in several unreported cases.'4 Langbein discusses one
such case, in which the testator had failed to obtain two witnesses
due to an apparently widely held (but mistaken) belief that attestation
by a justice of the peace, with no other witness, satisfies the South
Australian attestation requirement. 4 9 These circumstances are peculiarly indicative of testamentary intent, despite the partial failure of
attestation, because they evidence an unequivocal attempt to have the
will executed, despite the testator's "mistaken reliance" on the incorrect
belief of certain South Australian justices of the peace that their attes50
tation standing alone satisfies the wills act.
In Estate of Slavinskyj,'15 the court applied section 12(2) to a partially attested will that had been handwritten by the testator in
"semiliterate" Russian on a plasterboard wall in his home.'5 2 The testator handwrote the will in the joint presence of two of his neighbors,
explaining that he was writing his will because he was going into the
hospital and wished to leave all of his estate to two nieces in the
Soviet Union. 5 3 He then placed an envelope on which he had typed
the address of one of his nieces in "a slit in the wall alongside the
writing which he had written in the presence of the two witnesses.",One of the witnesses placed his signature on the wall as requested
by the testator; the other, however, was illiterate and did not sign,
although the testator asked her to do so.'5 5 The testator died in the

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 521-22.
See id.
Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8, at 22.
Id. (discussing Estate of Phillips, No. 263 of 1983 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Feb. 13, 1984)).
Id.
53 S.A. St. R. 221 (1988).
Id. at 228-29.
Id. at 228.
Id.
Id.
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hospital without ever returning to his home. 15 Judge Legoe concluded
that the writing on the wall was a partially attested document to
which section 12(2) applied 5 7 and that this writing (in conjunction with
the envelope) was a partially attested will embodying the testamentary
intentions of the decedent. 16 Judge Legoe stated that "[in] cases of
partial attestation this Court has experienced little difficulty in finding
that the required higher standard of proof has been satisfied even
where a single signature has been placed on a single document with
the requisite animus testandi and even though the departure from the
requirements of formal validity dictated by the Act may be quite
p,159
substantial .
c.

New Uniform Probate Code Section 2-503

Consistent with the South Australian provision, UPC section 2-503
would permit the proponent of a partially attested will to establish
by clear and convincing evidence that despite the partial attestation,
the testator nevertheless executed the will with testamentary intent. ,60
C.

Application of the Rules to Holographic Wills

Some of the issues raised by the application of a harmless error
rule in a jurisdiction that recognizes unattested holographic wills are
considered in the previous section.' 6' According to Langbein, these
issues arise because of a discrepancy between the legislative policies
underlying recognition of attested and holographic wills.162 Langbein
and other proponents of functional analysis have argued that the holographic form is not designed to serve the intent-verifying and channeling functions served by attested wills. 6 3 Compliance with the attesta-

156. Id.
157. See id. at 229-31.
158. Id. at 232-33.
159. Id. at 233 (citing Graham, 20 S.A. St. R. at 198, 205).
There is no reasonable doubt that the deceased intended the writing on the wall
and the envelope combined with the writing to constitute his last will and testament.
This is a strongly compelling circumstance on the facts as established. The ceremonial calling in of the neighbours and announcements made to them, the placing of
the envelope in the slit in the wall, all truly represented these intentions and made
permanent his wishes in that regard.
Id. at 233-34.
160.

See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (1990) (suggesting that the measure may be

freely applied to breaches of the attestation requirement).
161. For discussion, see supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
162. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8,at 498, 521.
163. For discussion, see Miller, supra note 3, at 274-80.
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tion requirements calls for a "virtually unmistakable testamentary
act,"164 and many common will substitutes require as a practical matter
a relatively public, purposive act indicating the transferor's intent to
give the disposition legal effect. Compliance with holographic formality, on the other hand, does not require an objectively verifiable act
or "ritual" unequivocally identifying the document as a will or serving
the "cautionary" purpose of inducing the drafter to give careful consideration to the consequences of the disposition.166
Instead "[t]he gist of holographic formality is to dispense with
attestation when the testator handwrites the will."167 Langbein and
other advocates of functional analysis have therefore generally agreed
that holographic formality is "almost exclusively justifiable in terms
of the evidentiary [authenticating] function. '" 1 This argument is supported by many cases in which courts have given effect to dispositions
set out in holographic documents (such as letters or apparently informal memoranda) because the language used by the testator seemed
to indicate testamentary intent, even though the writing enforced as
a "will" appeared to have some purpose or purposes other than or in
addition to communicating the testator's wishes respecting the disposition of property at death.169 In many of these instances, it appears
that the inclusion of testamentary language was an afterthought rather
than the testator's primary purpose in preparing the writing.17°
1. Langbein's Substantial Compliance Doctrine
As previously discussed, Langbein argues that recognition of the
holographic form implies legislative disregard for the intent-verifying,

164. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 494.
165. See Langbein, Nonprobate Revolution, supra note 5, at 1110-13, 1131-32 (discussing
the various types of common will substitutes and the fact that most of these devices exhibit
"alternative formality" serving the purposes of requirements of transfer); Langbein, Substantial
Compliance, supra note 8, at 503-09 (describing some of the various will substitutes). Cf. Miller,
supra note 3, at 180-85 (discussing the will substitutes).
166. Miller, supra note 3, at 276-80.
167. Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 21.
168. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 34, at 13. For discussion of the functions served by
holographic formality, see Miller, supra note 3, at 274-89.
169. Miller, supra note 3, at 282-86 (discussion of cases dealing with issue of when informal
documents such as letters or memoranda are enforceable as holographic wills); see, e.g., Estate
of Blake, 120 Ariz. 552, 587 P.2d 271 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (enforcing postscript to 'thank you"
letter as will); In re Button's Estate, 209 Cal. 325, 287 P. 964 (1930) (holding that testamentary
language in lengthy letter written on day decedent committed suicide could be enforced as will);
In re Kimmel's Estate, 278 Pa. 435, 123 A.2d 405 (1924) (enforcing testamentary language in
rambling, semi-literate letter from decedent to his sons).
170. For discussion of relevant cases, see Miller, supra note 3, at 282-86.
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channeling, and protective purposes fulfilled by attestation. 171 He
therefore concludes that, by implication, recognition of the holographic
form implies legislative tolerance for the increased burden on the court
system that is necessarily entailed in requiring probate courts to give
effect to testamentary language embodied in seemingly informal documents. 172 As we have seen, Langbein seems to maintain that legislative
recognition of the holographic form actually undercuts the purposes
served by the attestation requirement, which would otherwise limit
the range of documents that could be admitted to probate to those
which have been duly signed and attested. 17 From the standpoint of
functional analysis, the legislative decision to authorize holographic
wills represents a "fundamental" policy decisionY74 For this reason,
whether the jurisdiction permits holographic wills "is a point of real
consequence in the operation of the substantial compliance doctrine"'17
in those cases in which the testator has failed to have the document
attested.176
In consequence, as previously discussed,,- Langbein apparently
considers that failure of attestation in a jurisdiction that does not
permit unattested holographic wills would impose a severe burden on
the proponent, who would have to satisfy the court that the testator
intended the unattested document to be enforced despite the testator's
noncompliance with the major formality distinguishing a will. 18 Indeed,
Langbein goes so far as to suggest that application of the substantial
compliance doctrine would be foreclosed in cases of total failure of
attestationY79 In contrast, a court in a jurisdiction that recognizes
holographic wills would presumably apply the substantial compliance
doctrine only to those unattested documents that do not meet that
jurisdiction's requirements for a valid holographic will.'8 As remarked,
such an application would appear to require several stages of
analysis.11

171. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supranote 8, at 498, 521; for discussion, see supra
notes 80-88 and accompanying text.

172. See Miller, supra note 3, at 278.
173.

See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 498, 521.

174. Id. at 498; for quotation, see supra text accompanying note 85.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 520-21.
177. For discussion, see supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
178. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 521.
179. Id.
180. See Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8, at 21-22, 47 n.234 (discussing
application of the dispensing power in Manitoba, a jurisdiction that permits holographic wills).
181. For discussion, see supra text accompanying notes 129-34.
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The first step for a court applying substantial compliance to an
unattested will would be determination whether the unattested document is in fact a valid holographic will. As we have seen, courts have
traditionally been satisfied with something less than strict compliance
with the holographic will requirements even in jurisdictions that require holographic wills to be entirely in the testator's handwriting.18
In some of these jurisdictions and in all jurisdictions with wills acts
modelled on the UPC "surplusage" provision,'8 a threshold question
in determining whether a document may be enforced as a holographic
will is whether the signature and "material" provisions of the disposition are handwritten. 184 Application of the substantial compliance doctrine to an unattested document would not be required in a jurisdiction
that has adopted or enacted the liberal "surplusage" approach unless
the document falls outside the allowable range of variation from the
strict statutory requirements.
If, however, some of the provisions deemed by the court to be
"material" are not in the testator's handwriting, the unattested document does not meet the juristiction's holographic will requirements, and
the substantial compliance doctrine comes into play. (An unattested
will obviously violates no fundamental legislative policy if it meets the
requirements for a valid holographic will.) Langbein considers that
one major consequence of applying the substantial compliance doctrine
to unattested wills that do not strictly comply with the requirements
for a valid holographic will would be to eliminate the "large and ugly
case law voiding wills which contain some innocuous printed matter"
in jurisdictions that require holographic wills to be entirely handwritten.1- Applying the doctrine "would permit the court to conclude
•.. that the handwritten portions provided a large enough handwriting
sample to satisfy the evidentiary purpose of the handwriting formality."1

In jurisdictions that require only the "material" provisions of

the will to be handwritten, the court would focus not on whether the

182. Miller, supra note 3, at 213-18 (discussing application of the intent and surplusage
theories to traditional holographic wills provisions).
183. UNIF. PROB. CODE. § 2-503 (1969). Bird describes this UPC section as "a codification
of the surplusage theory" approach. Bird, Sleight of Handwriting: The Holographic Will in
California,32 HASTINcS L.J. 605, 629 (1981). For discussion of this provision, see Miller, supra
note 3, at 218-21.
184. Miller, supra note 3, at 219-20.
185. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 519. For discussion of holographic
will provisions requiring the document to be entirely handwritten, see Miller, supra note 3, at
209-40.
186. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 519.
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typed or printed matter is material to the will, but "whether the
remaining handwriting sample is 'material' enough to evidence the
genuineness of the document."'7
Interestingly, Langbein further suggests that if the substantial
compliance doctrine were carried to its limits, courts in jurisdictions
that permit unattested holographic wills could extend the substantial
compliance doctrine to validate "the wholly typed or typed-and-printed
will, signed but unwitnessed,"'8 that is, an unattested will containing
no handwriting at all other than the testator's signature. He reasons
that in most legal transactions, the authenticating (evidentiary) function is sufficiently served by a handwritten signature. 189 Based on his
assumption that the handwriting requirement for holographic wills in
fact serves no other purpose than to establish the genuineness of the
document, Langbein suggests that a handwritten signature might be
considered sufficient under a functional harmless error rule to authenticate an unattested document once the court determines that the
signature is the testator's.'9 Whereas an unattested document would
rarely if ever be salvageable under a substantial compliance rule in a
jurisdiction that does not permit holographic wills (because such a
document violates fundamental wills act policies'91), an unattested document would be salvageable in a jurisdiction that permits unattested
holographic documents if the signature were authenticated, even in a
case in which the testator has complied with the requirements for a
valid holographic or a valid attested will.' Langbein seems to suggest
that in applying the substantial compliance doctrine to such a docu-

187.
188.

Id. at 519-20.
Id. at 520.

The really difficult question is whether this analysis can be carried to its natural
limit: the wholly typed or typed-and-printed will, signed but unwitnessed. Such
instruments are routine in transfers effected by will substitutes.., and they are
virtually never challenged for want of genuineness, that is, forgery. The substantial
compliance doctrine would achieve parity for wills if the proponents were permitted
to prove that in the particular circumstances the signature constituted sufficient
proof of genuineness. A signed, typewritten will may be better evidence of testamentary design than a fully handwritten letter of the Kimmel variety. Where
the genuineness of a signed-but-typed will is contested, it should be open to the

proponents in holograph jurisdictions to prove that the evidentiary purpose of the
handwriting requirement has been otherwise achieved.

Id.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 498, 521. For discussion, see supra notes 80-90 and accompanying text.
Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 520.
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ment, the only issue would be whether the evidentiary function of
handwriting has been otherwise achieved, 193 because the decision to
permit unattested wills reflects a deliberate decision to leave the channeling'9 and intent-verifying 95 functions of formality minimally
served. 196
One result of Langbein's functional construction of the wills act
requirements in a holographic jurisdiction would be to effectively eliminate any meaningful distinction between holographic and attested
wills. Presumably, both total failure of attestation and total failure to
comply with the handwriting requirement would be considered equally
harmless to the wills act policies under a rule of functional substantial
compliance in any case in which the genuineness of the document can
be established. Of course, the court would have to address the issue
of testamentary intent as a threshold question in every instance in
which intent is not unambiguously expressed on the face of the document. 197 As the case law shows, even strict compliance with the requirements for a holographic will does not inevitably resolve this
issue. 198

Langbein argues that permitting unattested but signed wills to be
deemed in substantial compliance with the wills act brings the wills
acts requirements into line with the requirements for will substitutes.1 99 He points out that will substitutes are typically executed on

193. See id.
194. For discussion of the channeling function served by compliance with the requirements
for an attested will, see Miller, supra note 3, at 269-71; for comparison to holographic wills,
see id. at 274-80.
195. For discussion of the intent-verifying function served by compliance with the requirements for an attested will, see id. at 259-65; for comparison to holographic wills, see id. at 274-80.
196. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 520.
197. Miller, supra note 3, at 280. For discussion of cases holding that certain documents
meeting the holographic wills requirements were unambiguously testamentary or unambiguously
nontestamentary, see id. at 281-82.
198. For discussion of cases in holographic jurisdictions addressing the issue of testamentary
intent with respect to ambiguous documents that meet the requirements of valid holographic
wills, see id. at 282-86.
199. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 520; cf. Lindgren, supra note 19,
at 556-57; Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 52; UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503
comment (1990) (suggesting that application of dispensing power to unattested will unify probate
and nonprobate transfers).
In devaluing attestation while insisting on signature and writing, the South Australian legislation and case law has brought the South Australian law of wills into a
kind of alignment with the American law of will substitutes, that is, with our
nonprobate system, where business practice has settled the forms for transfer.
Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8, at 52.
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forms that require only the transferor's signature and which are therefore analogous to an unattested but signed, typed or printed will. 2°°
This point is debatable. Except for the revocable declaration of trust, 20 1
virtually all of the will substitutes require as a practical matter that
the transferor execute a contract with a financial institution, a transaction involving the exchange of consideration as well as the transferor's signature manifesting assent to the bargain. Such third-party
beneficiary contracts do not depend only on formalities of transfer to
give substance to intention. 2 02 Moreover, will substitutes, unlike wills,
do not require court intervention in order to be effective, with the
result that the channeling function20 is of less importance with respect
to will substitutes. The problem with applying substantial compliance
or any other harmless error rule to a signed but unattested will is
that such a document is the result of the purported testator's unilateral
act and does not provide on its face any unequivocal evidence of intent
that its terms be given final legal effect. The case law in jurisdictions
that permit holographic wills effectively illustrates the problems involved in distinguishing intended wills from unexecuted drafts or even
apparently random jottings;2 signature alone, without more, is clearly
not a reliable marker of finality. For the substantial compliance doctrine (or any other harmless error rule) to be applied to a signed but
unattested document that does not meet the requirements of a valid
holograph, a probate court must decide in every instance whether the
testator intended the document to be given effect as a will.
Likewise debatable is Langbein's fundamental point that unattested
holographic wills serve no important policy other than the purely
evidentiary function of authenticating the document. Jurisdictions that
recognize the holographic form permit it only as an alternative to
witnessed wills, 205 enforceable only if all of the provisions to be given
effect by the court meet the jurisdiction's handwriting requirement.
Functional construction of holographic wills provisions does not compel
the conclusion that jurisdictions that recognize such wills "devalue"
attestation or the policies served by attestation. Instead, giving testators the option of executing a holographic will may reflect legislative

200. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 520.
201. Miller, supra note 3, at 183 n.48, 184 n.53. The declaration of trust in personalty need
not be embodied in a signed writing. Id. at 183 n.48.
202. Id. note 3, at 264-65.
203. For discussion of the channeling function, see id. at 269-71 (attested wills); id.. at
274-86 (attested wills).
204. Id. at 282-86.
205. Id. at 211-12.
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intent to permit a limited exception to the attestation requirement in
order to promote flexibility in testation and to protect the occasional
testator who is unable or unwilling to procure witnesses.2 - The ability
of testators in holographic jurisdictions to execute an unattested holographic will arguably addresses the plight of isolated or dying testators
whose circumstances prevent them from obtaining witnesses. 20 7 Similar
considerations prompted the South Australian Law Reform Commission, whose report ultimately led to the enactment of section 12(2),
to propose a dispensing power directed toward permitting unattested
wills to be given effect under certain circumstances.2°8 In addition, the
policy of allowing holographic wills makes the execution of a will a
private, unilateral act for those testators who would otherwise be
subjected to imposition or duress if not permitted to execute wills
without the knowledge of interested parties.2 - Although holographic
wills provisions may encourage homemade wills that ultimately fail to
'
meet the statutory requirements for a valid will 210
the provisions
promote freedom and flexibility in testation by expanding the range
of documents potentially enforceable as wills.
The value of requiring compliance with the handwriting requirement is precisely that holographic wills may be executed under circumstances that may leave some doubt as to their authenticity. To
the extent that handwriting reliably indicates genuineness, the handwriting requirement ensures that the probate court will enforce only
those testamentary dispositions that it can trace directly to the testator. While it may be true, as Gulliver and Tilson suggest, that a

206. Id. at 287-88.
207. Id.
208. South Australian Report, supra note 45, at 11.
A person dying of thirst in the desert or a person in the icefields of Australian
Antarctica may well scratch out what is without doubt his last will and testament
but there is no hope at all of his having or obtaining witnesses to that will and
yet there is no doubt that what is recorded is in fact his last will. The position
becomes of greater importance today as people cease to live in families and elderly
people in particular are left to fend for themselves in the cities. They too may
have no way of summoning somebody to attest their will.
Id. Palk has pointed out that the original reform contemplated by the Law Reform Commission
with respect to compliance with the requirement of having the will witnessed was apparently
intended to be narrowly limited to testators who were not able to comply. Palk, supra note 45,
at 392-93. For discussion, see Miller, supra note 3, at 312-14.
209. Bird, supra note 183, at 609. For discussion, see Miller, supra note 3, at 287-88.
210. For discussion of the problem of homemade wills, see Bird, supra note 183, at 631-32;
Report of the Justice Committee on Homemade Wills (1971) (discussing a British proposal to
adopt a holographic wills provision).
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holographic will "is obtainable by compulsion as easily as a ransom
note,"211 ransom notes -are not in fact particularly easy to procure in
the ordinary course of events. A signature to a typed or printed
document might be far more' easily procured by fraud, forgery, or
imposition than an entire document handwritten by the purported
testator. Although the finality of the testator's intent may not be
unequivocally resolved by compliance with the requirements for a
holographic will, handwriting the will both induces and evidences deliberation. 2 2 Even the liberal "surplusage approach" of the UPC's
holographic wills provision ensures that all of the "material provisions"
of the dispositive scheme - i.e., those provisions that may be enforced

as the testator's will - are unequivocally attributable to a deliberate
act of the testator. To this extent, holographic wills may establish the
authenticity of the will more effectively than duly attested wills. 2 13 In
contrast, a wholly typed or printed unattested will raises questions
about the authenticity of the dispositive scheme that the testator's
compliance with the holographic will requirements would have obviated.
According to Langbein, courts should not apply the substantial
compliance doctrine to validate a defective will if application of the
doctrine would compromise fundamental policies served by the wills
act. 214 In such cases, extrinsic evidence of testamentary intent would
normally be insufficient to justify giving effect to the defective document as a will. As mentioned above, Langbein suggests that a wholly
typed or printed will could be deemed in substantial compliance with
the wills act in a jurisdiction that permits holographic wills, on the
theory that an unattested will does not violate any policy served by
the wills act in a jurisdiction that accepts the minimal holographic
standard of formality. In so doing, Langbein appears to overlook the
protective function effectively served by the handwriting requirement.
Arguably, handwriting without more is a reliable indicator of genuineness only when there is enough of it. Under a functional standard of
substantial compliance, the proponent of a signed but unattested typed
or printed will in a holographic jurisdiction presumably ought to have
a heavy burden of establishing the authenticity of the entire dispositive
plan as well as establishing testamentary intent.
Langbein's discussion of substantial compliance as applied to holographic wills reveals the major weakness of the functional approach:

211.
212.

Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 34, at 14.
Miller, supra note 3, at 264 n.498; Nelson & Starck, supra note 19, at 349.

213.

Miller, supra note 3, at 287.

214.

See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 515-26.
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in contrast to a dispensing power permitting courts to excuse formal
defects in a will if testamentary intention is otherwise demonstrated,
a judicial doctrine of substantial compliance requires a functional reinterpretation of the wills act. 215 Because application of the substantial
compliance doctrine requires statutory construction (however unconventional), the degree to which a particular defect in compliance with
the statutory requirements is considered to undermine fundamental
wills act policies seemingly must be a central consideration in a court's
analysis of whether the doctrine ought to be applied in a particular
216
case.
As articulated in his 1975 article, Langbein's substantial compliance
doctrine seems to contemplate that the difficulty for the proponent of
meeting the burden of proof - i.e., the quantity of evidence required
to show testamentary intent - will vary depending on the nature of
the defect.2 17 If, however, a principle of harmless error is to be recognized at all, application ought arguably to depend solely on whether
the proponent can adduce sufficient evidence to establish testamentary
intent and authenticity to the satisfaction of the court. Whether the
particular defect is considered to undermine some "fundamental" purpose or policy of the wills act seems in practice only marginally relevant
to the proponent's ability to prove facts and circumstances that effectively resolve the issues raised by the defect in the will. For example,
in a jurisdiction that does not permit unattested holographic wills, a
partially attested will may be the consequence of a testator's last-minute decision not to execute the will, while a completely unattested
(and therefore, according to Langbein, fundamentally defective) document may be the consequence of the testator's inability, due to infirmity, isolation, or exigent circumstances, to obtain the necessary witnesses rather than of any lack of testamentary intent.218 In any particular case, the quality and credibility of the evidence showing testamentary intent, not the nature of the defect, should determine the outcome.
The more recent South Australian cases applying section 12(2) have

215. Miller, supra note 3, at 305-06.
216. See Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8, at 17 (stating that "purposive
approach" requires courts to distinguish between an error that impairs the wills act policies
and one that does not).
217. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 515-23; Langbein, Harmless
ErrorRules, supra note 8,at 17, 52-53 (applying a "purposive interpretation" to South Australia's
§ 12(2)).
218. For discussion, see supra notes 205-10 and accompanying text; Miller, supra note 3,
at 287-88.
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freely applied the dispensing power even to wills containing "fundamental" defects when satisfied by the evidence that the documents
were intended to be given effect.
2.

South Australia's Dispensing Power Provision

The South Australian courts' application of the section 12(2) dispensing power arguably eliminates the attestation requirement as a
219
substantive requirement for a valid will for all practical purposes.
Although South Australia's wills act does not recognize unattested
holographic wills,a ° the courts now routinely admit unattested documents to probate.22 1 Langbein remarks that the South Australian case
law implicitly devalues the function of attestation, ranking it as a
formality that is generally dispensable.12 In his 1987 review of the
South Australian cases, Langbein seems to approve the results
achieved by the courts under section 12(2).2 Langbein suggests that
the need for a dispensing power in South Australia is largely due to
4
the fact that South Australia does not authorize holographic wills.2
Manitoba, which has enacted a broad dispensing power provision inspired by South Australia's section 12(2),m does recognize the holographic form,226 with the result that many cases that would evoke the
dispensing power in South Australia are resolvable under the provision
for holographic wills.
3.

New Uniform Probate Code Section 2-503

The language of the UPC's holographic wills provision frames the
handwriting requirement in terms of an exception to the general requirement that every will be in writing, signed, and attested.m The

219. Cf. Lindgren, supra note 19, at 542, 569.
220. See South Australian Wills Act § 8, supra note 43; Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules,
supra note 8, at 19, 22.
221. Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 23, 52; UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503

comment (1990) (stating that South Australian courts "lightly" excuse breaches of the attestation
requirement).
222. Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 28, 52-53.
223. See id. at 52-53 (attestation makes "modest contribution," primarily protective, to wills
act policies, but most people do not need protecting and most legal transactions do not require it).
224.
225.

Id. at 21-22.
The Wills Act, 1982-83-84 MAN. REV. STAT. ch. 31, § 23 (1983), Cap. W150 (1983)

[hereinafter Manitoba Wills Act] (quoted in Miller, supra note 3, at 321 n.800). For discussion
of the Manitoba provision, see Miller, supra note 3, at 319-23.

226. Manitoba Wills Act, supra note 225, § 23, Cap. W150.
227.
228.

Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 22, 47 n.234.
See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (1990).
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revised version of article 2 moves the formal requirements for due
execution of a holographic will from section 2-503 (the new dispensing
power provision) to section 2-502(b), 229 so that section 2-502 now governs wills formalities for both holographic and ordinary attested
wills.2o
The UPC standard for a holographic will requires only that the
testator sign the will and write by hand all of the material provisions. 23
The comment to section 2-502(b) states that a holographic will executed
on a printed will form is valid "if the material provisions of the devises
are handwritten. ''12 New section 2-502(c) expressly allows proponents
to establish testamentary intent through "extrinsic evidence, including
for holographic wills the printed, typed, or stamped portions of the
form," 233 i.e., portions that are not in the testator's handwriting, when
the will is formally valid. A possible, if strained, construction of section
2-502(c) might permit the proponent of an unattested holographic will
executed on a will form to prove that the drafter intended the
nonhandwritten portions of the form to be incorporated into the will,
and therefore enforced, a result that would be consistent with the
Arizona court's interpretation of its version of the present UPC holographic wills provision.23
Since the UPC permits both attested and holographic wills, and
sets a de minimis standard of formality for both,2 5 Langbein would
presumably argue that functional construction of the UPC provisions
indicates a "devaluation" of the attestation requirement. In consequence, failure of attestation in a UPC jurisdiction would be harmless
to the purposes of the wills act and therefore readily curable through
evidence of testamentary intent. For this reason, even if courts adopt
the functional interpretation of the appropriate scope of a dispensing
power that is incorporated in the comment to section 2-503, section
2-503 would presumably permit liberal application of the dispensing

229. Id. § 2-502(b).
230. Id. § 2-502 comment. The new holographic will provision states: "A will that does not
comply with subsection (a) is valid as a holographic will, whether or not witnessed, if the
signature and the material provisions are in the handwriting of the testator." Id.
231. Id. § 2-502(b). "This subsection authorizes holographic wills. It enables a testator to
write his own will in his own handwriting. There need be no witnesses. The only requirement
is that the signature and the material provisions of the will be in the testator's handwriting." Id.
232. Id. § 2-502(b) comment.
233. Id.
234. See Muder v. Muder, 159 Ariz. 173, 765 P.2d 997 (1988). For discussion of this case,
see Miller, supra note 3, at 220-21, 235-36.

235.

Miller, supra note 3, at 290.
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power to unattested wills.2 Furthermore, some execution defects that
would require application of the dispensing power under a wills act
that does not permit holographic wills would presumably result under
the UPC in the document being enforced as a holographic, rather than
an attested wi, 237 so that the dispensing power would be expected
to come into play only when the document failed to meet the requirements for both attested and holographic wills.
D. Application of the Rules to Defective Compliance
with the Signature Requirement
1. Unsigned Wills
a. Langbein's Substantial Compliance Doctrine
Langbein identifies signature as the most reliable indicator that a
testator intended for a document to have final effect as a will. m
Indeed, parties to legal transactions universally recognize signature
of a document as an implementing act, the usual means by which
people signify that the document's terms are complete and intended
to be enforced as written. "The signature [on a will] tends to show
that the instrument was finally adopted by the testator

. .

and to

militate against the inference that the writing was merely a preliminary draft, an incomplete disposition, or haphazard scribbling." 239 An
unsigned writing may raise unresolvable issues regarding the testator's
final intent and the authenticity of the document.
Langbein characterizes signature as "the most fundamental of the
Wills Act formalities," the formality that "separates the preliminary
draft from the decided last 'will!" and provides "the primary evidence

236.

For discussion of the scope of § 2-503, see id. at 339-44.

237.
238.

See Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 22, 47 n.134.
E.g., Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 495 (stating that signature

requirement shows intention to adopt document as will); id. at 518 (stating that signature is
formality that distinguishes the final will from the draft); id. at 525 (stating that signature is
"all but indispensable"); Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 52 (stating that
leaving will unsigned raises grievous doubts about finality and genuineness of document; courts
excuse failure to sign only in "extraordinary cases"); Langbein, Crumbling Wills Act, supra

note 8, at 1194 (stating that signature as evidentiary and cautionary formality is "all but indispensable"). Cf. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 34, at 5-6 (stating that unsigned will does not
give impression of being finally executed). For discussion, see Miller, supra note 3, at 263 n.497
(discussing intent-verifying function of the signature requirement); id. at 267 n.507 (discussing

the authenticating function of the signature requirement).
239. Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 34, at 5.
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of the will's authenticity."' 0 Langbein's 1975 article suggests that
courts could apply substantial compliance to save an unsigned will
only under rare and extreme circumstances.
The substantial compliance doctrine would virtually always
follow present law in holding that an unsigned will is no will;
a will with the testator's signature omitted does not comply
substantially with the Wills Act because it leaves in doubt
all the issues on which the proponents bear the burden of
proof. . . . The formality of signature is so purposive that
it is rarely possible to serve the purposes of the formality
Nevertheless, there may be
without literal compliance....
rare cases where it would be appropriate to admit to probate
an unsigned will. Consider the testator who publishes the
document as his will to his gathered attesting witnesses and
takes up his pen and lowers it toward the dotted line when
an interloper's bullet or a coronary seizure fells him. In such
unique cases where there is persuasive evidence that the
testator's intention to sign the will was final, and only a
sudden impediment stayed his hand, the purposes of the
Wills Act are satisfied without signature.41
Langbein's analysis of substantial compliance applied to unsigned
wills thus seems to identify the point at which a functional interpretation of the wills act, employed as a standard for determining when a
formal defect "is harmless to the wills act policies," precludes application of the doctrine. As applied to unsigned wills, substantial compliance has a much narrower scope than a broad dispensing power.
As the subsequent discussion will show, the South Australian cases
under section 12(2) reveal many combinations of circumstances that the
courts have considered sufficient to justify applying section 12(2) to validate an unsigned will. Application of the respective approaches to unsigned wills effectively illustrates the distinction between a judicial doctrine that interprets the wills act requirements functionally in order to
enforce wills executed in substantial compliance with the wills act policies,
and a statutory dispensing power that permits the courts to disregard
the wills act requirements in order to effectuate the testator's intent.
In his 1975 article, Langbein states that substantial compliance does not
require for its application any specific minimum or threshold level of

240. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 518; cf. Langbein, Harmless
Error Rules, supra note 8, at 52-53 (stating that signature is formality that distinguishes
between drafts and wills and is universal requirement of modern legal practice).
241. Id. at 518 (emphasis added).
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formality to have been achieved.2 His 1987 article characterizes as a
'timid measure" a proposed provision requiring all wills to be in writing
and signed as 'threshold requirements" for application of the dispensing
power.2 While a dispensing power limited by such 'threshold requirements" would unquestionably have a much narrower application than
South Australia's broad dispensing power,2 the substantial compliance
doctrine as described in Langbein's 1975 article does not seem in practice
to have a significantly broader scope. The interloper's bullet/coronary
seizure scenario Langbein visualizes as an example of the rare case in
which application of the substantial compliance doctrine to an unsigned
will would be appropriate sets forth an extraordinary chain of events.
Langbein's interloper's bullet/coronary seizure scenario requires not only
a showing that the testator was permanently prevented (by death) from
signing the will, but also that the will attested by his "gathered witnesses" at the time that the "sudden impediment stayed [the testator's]
hand." Whereas a 'threshold requirements" approach contemplates liberal validation of signed but unattested wills,?A6 the substantial compliance

doctrine as originally envisioned by Langbein suggests that total failure
of attestation would almost always be considered "fundamental defect"

247
in any jurisdiction that does not permit unattested holographic wills.

Langbein's conclusion that substantial compliance could rarely, if
ever, validate an unsigned will is logically compelled by his characterization of the signature requirement as the most important of the
intent-verifying (ritual and cautionary) m formalities. 9 This characterization, however, fails to take into account the fact that some additional
implementing act (e.g., attestation or exchange of consideration between parties to a third party beneficiary contract) normally gives
substance to dispositions intended to take effect at death.2 ° Cases in

242. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 513. "The substantial compliance
doctrine is a rule neither of maximum nor of minimum formalities.. . ." Id.
243. Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 47 (discussing recommendation of
British Columbia Report, supra note 19).
244. See Miller, supra note 3, at 337-39 (discussing potential scope of British Columnia's
proposed "threshold requirements" provision as compared to broad dispensing power).
245. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supranote 8, at 518 (quoted supra in text accompanying note 241).
246. Miller, supra note 3, at 339.
247. For discussion, see supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
248. For discussion of the ritual aspect of the intent-verifying function of formality, see
Miller, supra note 3, at 260-61; for discussion of the cautionary aspect, see id. at 261-65.
249. See supra note 238.
250. For discussion, see supra notes 199-204 and accompanying text; Miller, supra note 3,
at 264-65. See generally Fuller, Considerationand Form, 41 COLUm. L. REV. 799 (1941) (stating
that requirement of consideration for contracts is the distinguishing feature serving to evidence
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jurisdictions that permit holographic wills demonstrate that signature
without more is often inconclusive to establish intent to implement a
disposition.21 Thus, Langbein's characterization of signature as a generally indispensable means of establishing finality of intent overlooks
the fact that in practice it is signature accompanied by some other
implementing act manifesting intent that serves to establish a transferor's intent that a donative disposition be given legal effect.
b.

South Australia's Dispensing Power Provision
(1) The signature requirement

In his 1975 article, Langbein states that the proponents of an
unsigned will would bear an "almost hopeless" burden of proof to
establish substantial compliance with the wills act policies, so that
such claims would be unlikely to be litigated.22 In his 1987 article
reviewing the South Australian cases under section 12(2), he concludes
that the South Australian courts have implicitly adopted a functional
(or "purposive") approach to the wills act formalities in applying the
dispensing power, with the result that the courts would excuse the
testator's failure to sign the will only in "extraordinary circumstances." While dicta in some of the earlier section 12(2) cases
suggest that application of the dispensing power to unsigned wills
might be foreclosed- 4 or foreclosed barring compelling circumstances,# 5 the South Australian courts seem ultimately to have
determined that the signature requirement is no less dispensable than
attestation.
Initially, the second reported case under section 12(2), Baumanis
v. Praulin257 seemed to fulfill the suggestion in Graham that the
dispensing power could not be applied to save an unattested or unexecuted will. 9 In Baumanis, the will was neither attested nor signed;

the intent of the parties for the transaction to have legal effect and to identify the transaction
as a contract).
251. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 520; Miller, supra note 3, at
264-65.
252. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 518.
253. Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8, at 52.
254. See, e.g., Baumanis v. Praulin, 25 S.A. St. R. 423 (1980); Graham, 20 S.A. St. R. at
205-06.
255. See, e.g., Estate of Blakely, 32 S.A. St. R. 473, 479-80 (1983).
256. See Estate of Williams, 36 S.A. St. R. 423, 425 (1984) (King, C.J.).
257. 25 S.A. St. R. 423 (1980).
258. Graham, 20 S.A. St. R. at 205-06.
259. See id.; for discussion, see supra text accompanying notes 68-73.
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the will was prepared in accordance with the testator's instructions,
but he died before he could execute it. The testator, a patient in a
hospital, had asked a clergyman to make his will for him. 26° The clergyman had taken down the testator's instructions and prelared a
draft.2 1 After the testator had approved the draft, the clergyman took
the will away to be typed. 2 2 The testator reviewed the typed will,
but requested two minor alterations.m The clergyman wrote the alterations on the typed draft and told the testator that he would re-type
the will to incorporate the alterations. 2 4 The testator died an hour or
two later, before the clergyman could return with the freshly typed
will.=
The South Australian court, in what Langbein considers "an illuminating and fortunate precedent," 2r refused to admit the unexecuted will to probate under section 12(2),267 even though the court
specifically recognized "that the document... represent[ed] what the
deceased intended his will to contain and that he intended to sign as
his last will and testament a document in similarform but with the
The Baumanis court construed the dispensing
minor variations."
power provision "to presuppose some form of execution,"26 9 citing
Graham as well as a decision under an Israeli harmless error rule.2 °
(The Israeli court had concluded that "signature is the sole basis or
indication of the testator's finality of purpose." 1) The Baumanis court
noted that "[s]ection 12(2) does not say that a document may be deemed
to be a will of the deceased 'notwithstanding that it has not been
executed' but 'notwithstanding that it has not been executed with the
formalities requiredby the Act.. ..I would think that some execution
is necessary although it need not be execution in the manner prescribed
by [the wills act]. '' While the judge was convinced by the evidence

260. Graham, 20 S.A. St. R. at 424.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 425. The testator wanted to add a provision bequesting his books to the Latvian
Relief Society and a provision specifically stating that the estate would pay the executor's
expenses. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8,at 23.
267. Baumanis, 25 S.A. St. R. at 426.
268. Id. at 425 (emphasis added).
269. Id.
270. Gitah v. Administrator Gen. of Beer Sheva, Estate 39/70, 76 P.M. 156, 159. Gitah
and the Israeli rule are discussed in Langbein, HarmlessErrorRules, supranote 8, at 48-51.
271. Baumanis, 25 S.A. St. R. at 426 (quoting Gitah, 76 P.M. at 156, 159).
272. Id. at 425.
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that the testator had intended to execute the will as altered,M the
court did not consider that the facts established that the decedent had
intended the particulardocument before the court to constitute his
will.27

The court concluded that "[i]n order to admit [a] document to
probate [under section 12(2)] the court must be satisfied ... that the

deceased intended that document, not a document in similar form, to
'
be his will. 275

Although the Baumanis court's refusal to apply section 12(2) to
an unexecuted will is consistent with the legislative history of the
dispensing power provision,276 its application of section 12(2) on these

facts is problematic. According to the court's own account of the evidence, the altered document presented for probate in Baumanis incorporated the dispositive scheme that the decedent would have wished
the court to implement as his will.27 Although there was perhaps a
possibility that the decedent might have asked the helpful clergyman
to make further alterations to the final draft of the document, the
court was apparently persuaded that the document set out the general
dispositive scheme intended by the decedent.278 Section 12(2) requires

only that the court be satisfied that no reasonable doubt exists as to
the testator's intent.279 Even under a stringent interpretation of the

reasonable doubt standard, the proponent need not prove that the
document was the testator's final will beyond all possibility of dispute.
As this discussion will show, subsequent cases under section 12(2)
reflect a much more liberal view of the dispensing power as applied
to unsigned wills.
Langbein approves the Baumanis decision because he considers
the results consistent with a "purposive" or functional construction of
the South Australian signature requirement. ° Langbein considers that

273. Id.
274. Id. at 426. "The evidence is quite to the contrary. He intended to execute another
document in the like terms to the document but with variations which he required." Id.
275. Id. at 426.
276. See Palk, supra note 45, at 384-94 (discussing the potentially limited scope of provision
as originally proposed). Cf. Graham, 20 S.A. St. R. at 205 (stating, in dictum, that § 12(2)
probably would not extend to unattested wills or wills as to which there had been noncompliance
with the attestation formalities). See generally Miller, supra note 3, at 311-14 (discussing legislative history of § 12(2)).
277. Baumanis, 25 S.A. St. R. at 425-26.
278. Id.
279. See South Australian Wills Act § 12(2), supra note 9.
280. See Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 23-24, 52.
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the Baumanis court appropriately recognized the indispensability of
the signature requirement in distinguishing a draft or memorandum
from a document intended to be given legal effect.2'
Many a testator decides not to execute a will that has been
prepared to his instructions. One of the things you can do
with a draft will is decide you do not want to use it. Signature
is the formality that permits us to distinguish between drafts
and wills. Decide such a case the other way and the risk
arises that any unsigned draft, any scrap of paper, can be
argued to be an intended but unexecuted will.2
The problem with applying this reasoning to Baumanis is that the
evidence in that case points away from the conclusion that the unexecuted will was a mere draft and compellingly suggests that the altered
but unexecuted document represented the dying testator's final wishes
for the disposition of his estate. If the court had limited application
of section 12(2) to the facts of Baumanis, the decision could scarcely
have been interpreted as precedent for extending the dispensing power
to "any scrap of paper."
Langbein's "purposive" reading of the Baumanis case raises some
interesting questions about the potential scope of a harmless error
rule based on a functional interpretation of the formalities. The draft
will in Baumanis was obviously not functionally equivalent to "any
unsigned draft" or "any scrap of paper." Indeed, the Baumanis facts
appear to be only one step removed from Langbein's interloper's bullet/
coronary seizure paradigm for application of substantial compliance to
validate an unsigned will. The Baumanis testator, like the testator
in Langbein's example, doubtless did all that could be done under the
particular circumstances to prepare.to execute his will, though a "sudden impediment stayed his hand." The major difference between the
interloper's bullet/coronary seizure paradigm and the Baumanis facts
is that the testator in Langbein's example dies while actually in the
act of attempting to execute his will and immediately after the will
has been duly attested, while the testator in Baumanis died before
he could take any steps to execute the will.
Although the will in Baumanis was unattested as well as unsigned,
unlike the will in Langbein's interloper's bullet/coronary seizure

281.

Id. at 23-24.

282. Id.
283. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 518 (quoted supra in text
accompanying note 241).
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scenario,2 there was credible testimony, which the court in fact believed,- that the altered will offered for probate reflected the testator's final intent. The Baumanis will therefore arguably did not
raise any unresolvable issues respecting its authenticity or finality
since the court seems to have been persuaded that the testator would
have executed the altered and retyped will if he had lived a few hours
longer. The testator's failure to comply with the wills act does not
seem on the Baumanis facts to have violated any fundamental policy
that would have been served by due execution. If, as Langbein asserts
in his 1975 article, the substantial compliance doctrine does not presuppose any minimum level of formality- 7 (or threshold requirements)2
for its application, the Baumanis will, though never actually executed,
seemingly ought to fall within the range of documents that could be
validated under a functional construction of the wills act.
A troublesome conceptual problem with applying the substantial
compliance doctrine to the Baumanis facts is that such an application
would result in the court's deeming a totally unexecuted will in "substantial compliance" with the purposes of the wills act, a result which
seems illogical on its face. This apparent conceptual limitation on the
scope of the substantial compliance doctrine may not be inherent in
Langbein's functional approach, but instead may be the consequence
of his perhaps unfortunate selection of the term "substantial compliance" to designate what was essentially intended to be a principle
for determining under what circumstances defective compliance with
the wills act may be deemed harmless32°
(2) Mirror wills/switched signatures
In Estate of Blakely,2 1 the South Australian court applied the
284. Id.
285. Baumanis, 25 S.A. St. R. at 425-26.
286. Id.
287. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 513.
288. See Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 47 (criticizing British Columbia's
proposed dispensing power provision limiting application to signed documents as "a timid recommendation").
289. But see Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 515-16. "The substantial
compliance doctrine would admit to probate a noncomplying instrument that the court determined
was meant as a will and whose form satified the purposes of the wills act." Id. (emphasis
added). To the extent that the proponent is required to establish both elements, application of
the rule to unexecuted documents would appear to be foreclosed. See Miller, supra note 3, at
302-08 (discussing purpose, scope, and application of substantial compliance).
290. Miller, supra note 3, at 306-07 (discussing misconceptions produced by Langbein's
choice of terminology).
291. 32 S.A. St. R. 473 (1983).
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dispensing power to validate an unsigned will under circumstances
that Langbein considered entirely appropriate. 292 Blakely was a

switched wills case in which the testator's will had mistakenly been
signed by the testator's wife in a joint execution ceremony, so that
the testator's name appeared on his wife's will and her name on his

will. 293 Such "mirror wills" traditionally have been treated as void
because the law does not permit reformation of a will containing mistaken terms and because "mirror wills" indubitably violate the signa-

ture requirement. 294

292. Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 24.
293. Blakely, 32 S.A. St. R. at 474.
294. In the United States, the switched wills cases have usually been viewed as essentially
involving a problem of reformation rather than a failure of due execution. See Langbein &
Waggoner, Reformation, supra note 13.
The switched-wills cases cause our subject of Wills Act execution blunders to
overlap with an otherwise distinct doctrine, the rule forbidding reformation of wills
afflicted with mistaken terms ....
[There has been some villingness in American
law in recent years to relax the no-reformation rule. There are signs in Australian
law reform circles that the development of a harmless error rule for execution
mistakes is encouraging a rethinking of the no-reformation rule. These developments raise the prospect that Anglo-American law will move to a unitary mistake
doctrine for error of both types - mistake in the execution and mistake in the
terms.
Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 25.
The major innovation in the rules applicable to switched wills in this country was the New
York decision of In re Snide, 52 N.Y.2d 193, 418 N.E.2d 656, 437 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1981). In Snide,
the testator had signed his wife's will at the time of executing the will. Id. at 194, 418 N.E.2d
at 656, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 63. The wife offered for probate the will her husband had actually
signed. Id. at 195, 418 N.E.2d at 656, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 63. The court concluded that the will
could be reformed to substitute the wife's name wherever the husband's appeared. In re Snide,
96 Misc. 2d 513, 516, 409 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (1981) (construing N.Y. Sup. Ct. Proc. Act § 201
(McKinney 1967) as enlarging the surrogate's equity jurisdiction). The surrogate emphasized its
obligation, particularly under a new statute broadening its equity powers, to ensure that the
testator's intentions were not thwarted. Id. at 516, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 206. The will was therefore
admitted to probate. Id. The appellate division reversed, and was reversed in its turn by the
New York Court of Appeals. In re Snide, 52 N.Y. 2d 193, 418 N.E.2d 656, 437 N.Y.S.2d 63
(1981). The court of appeals held that the wills could be read together in order to resolve the
ambiguity created by the mistake. Id. at 196-97, 418 N.E.2d at 657-58, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
The court emphasized that there was no evidence of fraud and that the decedent had fulfilled
all of the formal requirements except that he signed the wrong will. Id. The court indicated
that Snide was to be read very narrowly. Id. at 197, 418 N.E.2d at 658, 437 N.Y.S.2d at 65.
The decision heavily emphasized the fact that there was no evidence of fraud. Id. See Langbein
& Waggoner, Reformation, supranote 13, at 565-66; Note, Mistakenly Signed Reciprocal Wills:
A Change in Tradition After In re Snide, 67 IowA L. REV. 205 (1981).
The South Australian Supreme Court also discussed the switched-wills "no-reformation rule"
problem:
If ever there was.., an obvious mistake, this is it. Mistakes like this have been
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The Blakely court was obviously concerned about the implications
of applying section 12(2) to save an unsigned will. Somewhat uneasily,
the court concluded that. section 12(2) would apply to the defectively
signed will, based on the compelling evidence that the decedent had
intended for the will to be executed and enforced.2 5 The Blakely court
essentially argued that in a "mirror wills" case, the testator has demonstrably attempted to comply with the spirit of the signature requirement, even though the signature is inadvertently affixed to the wrong
document. The Blakely court distinguished the will that is unsigned
because the testator neither attempted nor intended to execute it from
the will that is unsigned because of a bungled attempt to execute it.2
The court was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Blakely
testator intended to sign his will because he in fact had attempted to
meet all of the requirements for due execution.Y9 The court reasoned
that a will signed by a testator in disappearing ink in the presence of
witnesses who could testify credibly that the testator had in fact
signed the will would be admitted under section 12(2).2 In Blakely,

made before but the law has been unable to cope with them. The courts of England
and Australia have refused to recognize unexecuted wills, while the courts of
Canada have performed mental gymnastics to do what they can to recognise them.
The general rule hitherto has been that when a testator executes a will prepared
for another, the document. is not his will, even if some of the provisions therein
were intended by the testator.
Blakely, 32 S.A. St. R. at 474-75.
295. Blakely, 32 S.A. St. R. at 476-77.
296. See id. at 480.
297. See id.
298. The court went to some lengths to rationalize the result.
Let it be assumed that the husband did sign the correct will but with disappearing
ink ... which faded and finally disappeared at some time after the will was placed
in its envelope. Let it be further assumed that witnesses saw him sign the will
and themselves subscribed their names as witnesses by writing their signatures
on the will with the same pen filled with disappearing ink with the result that
their signatures likewise disappeared; and that, on the death of the testator, they
gave evidence, believed by the court, of the fact of the execution by the testator
and themselves. Although no signatures presently appeared on the will, I can see
no reason why the court might nonetheless be satisfied that "there can be no
reasonable doubt that the deceased intended the document to constitute his will."
. . . Let it be assumed that someone, deliberately or inadvertently, placed a
transparent piece of paper or plastic over a will, or over the attestation clause
• . . so that the signatures ... were never actually placed upon the will itself, but
only on the transparent paper or plastic. Let it be further assumed that the unsigned
will and the transparency bearing the signatures were together placed in an envelope until after the testator's death, whereupon they were taken out and submitted for a grant of probate. I would venture to think that, pursuant to s[ection]
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likewise, there were witnesses to the testator's attempt to sign his
will, although the signature ultimately appeared on the wrong will.
The Blakely court remarked that other section 12(2) cases "indicate
that a minimum requirement" for application of section 12(2) is compliance with the signature requirement. 2" Further, the Blakely opinion
contains dicta suggesting that such a fundamental defect as the testator's failure to sign the will at all would in most or perhaps all cases
5 "It may be
fall outside the scope of the court's dispensing power.3
that the court will always or usually look for some signature somewhere in relation to the particular document as part of [the] high
degree of proof [required for section 12(2) to apply].301 The court
concluded, however, that section 12(2) should allow it to enforce a
totally unexecuted will in cases factually similar to Blakely on the
condition that the testator's intent that the particular document constitute his will be established "beyond doubt."302 The court stated that
it would be inappropriate to "fetter in advance the width of the discretion given to it under s[ection] 12(2) by declaring that a signature
physically on the will is always necessary" regardless of the circumstances.m

12(2), there would be ample evidence to satisfy the court that the testator intended
the unsigned document to constitute his will ....
Just as the unsigned will and the signed transparency in the example could be
notionally attached and read together, so here the husband's will and the husband's
signature (on the wife's will but intended for his own will) can be notionally transposed and read together. The witnesses' signatures can be likewise transposed.
Furthermore, the wife's signature can be expunged as irrelevant.
Id. at 476-77.
299. Id. at 474.
300. Id. at 479-80.
301. Id.
Even if some signature by the deceased is thought to be necessary, it was
sufficient, .. .if,as here, he placed his signature in some place from which his
intention to constitute a particular piece of paper his will is beyond doubt. I hold
that his signature on the wife's document (which he thought to be his will) was
such a signature. . . .He wrote his signature; he intended it to be appended to
the engrossed, approved, and physically present will, the document now submitted
for a grant of probate.
Id. at 480 (emphasis added). Baumanis was distinguished on the ground that in that case the
deceased never intended to sign the particularwill presented to probate (which was a draft)
at all. Id.
302. Id. The court stated that § 12(2) "should be wide enough . . .to cover a totally
unexecuted document, at least where the lack of execution is due to circumstances such as this,
provided always that the stringent requirement as to intention to constitute [a particular piece
of paper the testator's] will is [beyond doubt]." Id. at 479 (emphasis added).
303. Id. at 480.
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The Blakely court's decision to apply the dispensing power to
switched wills is completely consistent with Langbein's functional
analysis of the signature requirement in his 1975 article.3 The Blakely
court explicitly suggested that noncompliance with the signature requirement could rarely, if ever, be excused.3 1 5 The court seemed to
suggest that the proponent of an unsigned will would virtually always
need to produce compelling if not overwhelming evidence that the
testator had attempted to comply with the signature requirement in
order to persuade the court that the testator intended the document
to have final effect.306 Similarly to Langbein's substantial compliance
doctrine, the Blakely opinion declined to make signature a threshold
requirement for application of the harmless error rule.23 Instead, the
court tied the fundamental nature of the signature formality to the
proponent's ability to carry the burden of proof in instances in which
the testator has failed to sign the will. 308 The Blakely court emphasized

304. For Langbein's statements that signature is usually indispensable as a means of establishing the finality of the will, see supra note 238.
305. See Blakely, 32 S.A. St. R. at 479-80.
306. See id.
307. Id. For discussion of a harmless error rule making signature a threshold requirement
for application of the dispensing power, see Miller, supra note 3, at 337-39 (discussing British
Columbia's proposal for dispensing power that would apply only to signed documents). Although
the Blakely court rejects the notion that signature is or could be considered indispensable to
application of § 12(2), the opinion suggests that a writing is indispensable, since the wills act
requires a will to be "[1] in writing and [2] executed, subject to this Act (section 12(2))." Blakely,
32 S.A. St. R. at 476. "A will could hardly be admitted to probate if it had not been reduced
to writing of some kind, so the phrase 'Subject to this Act' must refer to the will being 'executed'.
."Id.
308. See Blakely, 32 S.A. St. R. at 478-79.
Section 12(2) provides that a document may be deemed to be a will "notwithstanding
that it has not been executed with the formalities required by this Act." Much
depends upon the emphasis with which all or parts of that passage is read. If
stress is laid upon the words "with the formalities," such stress does tend to
suggest that there must at least be execution by the executor by placing his
signature on the document. However, if no stress is laid on those three words in
the whole sentence, of if an even stress is laid upon the whole sentence, one looks
...to see what "the formalities required by this Act" are .... The Act does not
distinguish between the testator's signature and the witnesses' signatures when
prescribing the formalities of execution. Execution by or at the direction of the
testator at the foot thereof. . . is as much a formality . . . as the signatures of
the witnesses and their presence together with the testator when all sign ....
In addition, the placement of the signature at the foot is not the only formality.
The most important formality is the placement of his signature on the document
by the testator himself.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss4/1

48

Miller: Will Formailty, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative Reform: An Ex
UPC § 2-50S

that the testator had had the exact uill offered for probate before him
in its final form and that he had actually raised his pen in order to
sign it though he had in fact mistakenly signed his wife's willA°9
Fundamental to the Blakely court's reasoning were the facts that
the will had been properly attested under circumstances producing an
overwhelming inference that the testator had intended to comply with
the signature requirement, that he had in fact made every effort to
comply, and that the particular document offered for probate was the
exact will he had attempted to execute. If Blakely represented the
furthest extension of the section 12(2) dispensing power, Langbein's
statement that there is little difference in effect between the "purposive" South Australian rule and his "purposive" substantial compliance
doctrine would be essentially correct.310
(3) Attested, unsigned wills
In Estate of Williams,31' a decision referred to the Full Court as
a case of exceptional importance,312 the three-judge panel applied sec-

tion 12(2) to validate an unsigned will under circumstances that provided no evidence of any attempt by the testator to comply with the
signature requirementala In Williams, the testator and her husband
3
had arranged for a joint execution ceremony at the testator's home. 14
Both wills were duly attested by neighbors; however, although the
testator's husband signed his own will, the testator never signed
hers.315 The evidence set forth in the opinion strongly suggested that

All of... [the Wills Act] is "Subject to this Act."... All of the formalities
required by the Act may be dispensed with under s[ection] 12(2) ....

Id. (emphasis added).
309. Id. at 480.
310.
311.
312.

See Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 53.
36 S.A. St. R. 423 (1984).
Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 13 n.48. For discussion of South

Australian procedure, see supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
313.
314.
315.

See Williams, 36 S.A. St. R. at 427 (Legoe, J.).
Id. at 426 (Legoe, J.).
Id. at 426-27 (Legoe, J.). The wills had been prepared prior to a trip that the testator

and her husband were planning. Id. at 426. The evidence indicated that it had been the testator
herself who had raised the issue of the need to update their wills before departure; however,

she and her husband had decided that there was insufficient time to consult a professional. Id.
The testator and her husband therefore sat down together to write new wills for themselves,
and then asked two neighbors to act as witnesses. Id. The neighbors arranged to meet with

the testator and her husband the following morning. Id. All four sat down together at the
kitchen table to execute the wills. Id. at 426-27. At probate, the witnesses confirmed their
signatures but indicated that they had not noticed at the time of the attempted execution that
the testator had failed to sign her will. Id. at 427. The witnesses stated that they believed that
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the testator had intended to execute the will and perhaps had attempted to execute it, but not that she had actually attempted to sign it.
Her intention to execute the particular document presented for probate
was apparently inferred from her having participated actively in planning the joint execution of the wills, from the circumstances prompting
the preparation of the wills, and from subsequent statements to her
son.1 6 Williams is thus distinguishable from Baumanis, since in

Baumanis the testator died without attempting to execute the particu3
lar document that was actually presented for probate.

17

The Williams court's application of the dispensing power to validate
an unsigned will troubles Langbein,3 18 who seems to suggest that application of section 12(2) to an unsigned will generally be limited to
cases in which the evidence shows more purposive conduct - specifically, that the testator attempted to sign the will319 Langbein is not

fully convinced that the circumstances surrounding the execution of
the Williams will (in contrast to the circumstances in Blakely) compelled the conclusion that the testator intended to execute the will and
that her failure to sign it was inadvertent.32 0 He pointed out that she
might conceivably have intended to "disarm [the will] without upsetting her husband. Under the beyond-reasonable-doubt standard, the
burden of excluding such a possibility rests on the proponents and is
very hard to discharge."' 2'

the testator had intended the document to be her last will and testament. Id. The testator's
son said that subsequent to the execution of the wills and prior to the anticipated trip, his
parents had asked him to read their wills, which his father had produced. Id. The son had not
noticed at that time that the testator's will was unsigned. Id. He confirmed that the envelope
in which the documents were contained had the word "Wills" written on it in his mother's
handwriting. Id. He testified that when his father showed him the wills and the place where
they were kept, his mother was present. Id. In contrast to the typical mirror wills case, the
wills did not contain identical terms but were substantially different. Id.
316. See id. at 426-27, 434 (Legoe, J.). Judge King stated that "[ilt is clear from the
deceased's subsequent conduct that she believed that the document was her will." Id. at 424
(King, J.).
317. Baumanis, 25 S.A. St. R. at 426. For discussion, see supra notes 257-90 and accompanying text.
318. See Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 26.
319. See id. at 26-27. Langbein does not suggest that in all cases absence of signature
would place the will beyond the reach of § 12(2) (for example, he approved the Blakely decision,
see id. at 24), but thought that in a case such as Williams in which there had been no attempt
to sign at all, the burden of showing that the failure was not intentional ought to be extremely
difficult to discharge under the "no reasonable doubt" standard. Id. at 26-27.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 27.
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Although Langbein expresses discomfort with the Williams result,
he accepts the narrow holding based on the evidence set forth in Judge
Legoe's opinion.-a Although not absolutely convinced that the evidence
in Williams established beyond a reasonable doubt that the testator
had intended to execute the will, Langbein apparently interprets the
case as limiting application of the dispensing power to unsigned wills
to cases in which there is compelling evidence of testamentary intent.m
He considers that Baumanis would further limit Williams,m since he
interprets Baumanis as barring application of section 12(2) to unsigned
and unattested "draft wills."M
Langbein reads the South Australian signature and attestation
cases as collectively producing an implicit ranking of the wills act
formalities in order of importance, with attestation treated as readily
dispensable and the testator's signature treated as generally indispensable. m Langbein notes that in Williams Judge Legoe gave careful
attention to the conduct of the testator that tended to show testamentary intent. Langbein interprets Judge Legoe's painstaking analysis
of the Williams facts as indicating an implicit recognition that the
fundamental importance of signature makes it necessary for the proponent of the will to produce compelling evidence of testamentary
intent in any case in which the will has not been signed by the testator.m

322. See id. at 25-26; Williams, 36 S.A. St. R. at 434. Judge Legoe reasoned that the
testatrix had carried out unequivocal acts which satisfy the criteria of the section.
She had done everything consistent with the formal and conclusive act of making
(in this case writing it out in her own hand) and completing her last will except
that she did not sign it. She set the whole stage for such a complete act. Her
actions in writing out the document, contacting the witnesses, being present at
the time of attestation ... and writing the word "Wills" on the envelope in which
the two documents were placed were in my opinion final and conclusive evidence
of her clear intentions in relation to that document. Furthermore she was present
and silently confirming the existence and the probative effect of the document
which she believed to be her will when her son . . . was shown the will by her
husband ....
Id. at 434 (Legoe, J.).
323. See Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 26-27.
324. Id. at 27, 52.
325. Id. at 52.
326. Id.
327. See id. at 26. 'Thus, the [Williams] court concluded that the testatrix, in an addled
moment, omitted to sign a will that she meant to sign, in circumstances in which her conduct
was deliberate enough to satisfy the purposes of the formality." Id.
328. Id. at 52 (Baumanis limits application of § 12(2) except in compelling circumstances,
such as the switched-wills cases).
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That Judge Legoe intended to suggest that the signature requirement was intrinsically more "purposive" and less dispensable under
section 12(2) than the other formalities is, however, debatable. Significantly, in Estate of Vauk, a later case, he indicated that in appropriate
circumstances, a completely unexecuted will might be admitted to
probate under section 12(2).3- In Williams, he states that on those
facts, the testator's failure to sign the will was "one step removed
from complete compliance."0 The determination whether doubt as to
the testator's intentions is "substantial" rather than "fanciful" seems
to depend, according to Judge Legoe's analysis, not upon the nature
of the formality omitted (which would be consistent with a functional
or "purposive" approach), but upon "the degree or extent of nonexecution of the document in accordance with the formalities."'- Judge
Legoe in Williams thus suggested that it is not the nature or quality
of particular defect, but the overall degree (quantity) of noncompliance,
that ultimately determines whether the evidence of intent adduced by
the proponent is sufficient to establish testamentary intent beyond a
reasonable doubt.- 2 Judge Legoe specifically stated that under section
12(2), the courts may declare that an unsigned will is valid, "provided
the criteria of the section have been otherwise met."
All three opinions in Williams illustrate the flexibility of the South
Australian judges in applying section 12(2) and their readiness to consider evidence of facts and circumstances showing testamentary intent.
A close reading of the three opinions indicates that none of the judges
adopted a functional approach in interpreting the signature requirement.
Judge King seems to have concluded that section 12(2) may be
applied to any defectively executed will if the document purports to
embody the decedent's intended testamentary scheme and the court
is satisfied that there is no reasonable doubt that the decedent intended
329. 41 S.A. St. R. 242, 248 (1986). For discussion, see infra notes 355-75 and accompanying
text.
330. Williams, 36 S.A. St. R. at 434 (Legoe, J.).
331. Id. at 433 (Legoe, J.).
332. See id. at 433-34 (Legoe, J.). Judge Legoe points out that § 12(2) contains three criteria
for its application: "namely a document that (a) embodies testamentary intentions, and which
(b) has not been executed with the formalities required by the Act, and which (c) the court is
satisfied is a document in respect of which there is no doubt that the decedent intended the
document to constitute a will. :In my judgement equal stress should be placed on all these
criteria ....
Id. at 433. Judge Legoe then went on to say that the "circumstances regarding
the contents" of the document "and all other relevant material establishing the testator's intention" could be taken into account in applying § 12(2). Proof required to establish that the
document was a will included "the document itself and ... the extrinsic evidence." Id.
333. Id. at 434.
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it to be enforced.3 Application of section 12(2) depends on the proponent's ability to prove that the document was intended to be effective
as a will, not on the nature of the particular defect. 83 Judge King
specifically rejected the argument that application of section 12(2)
ought to be limited to signed wills,36 along with the notion that signature is somehow more fundamental and therefore less dispensable than
the other formalities.
To execute a document is to do what the law requires to be
done to give validity to the document. [The Wills Act] sets
out the legal requirements or formalities for execution of a
will. If those formalities are not complied with, there is no
execution. Execution and signature are, of course, not
synonymous ....Execution is the validation of a document
by going through the formalities required by law for that
purpose. The notion of execution of a will other than in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by [the Wills Act],
is therefore a self-contradictory notion. It follows that the
saving effect of s[ection] 12 is only required and is only
operative when the will has not been executed. Signature
is simply one of theformalitiesrequired by the Act for execution. There is no reason, as a matter of construction or
logic, to differentiate between signature and any of the other
formalities for execution required by [the Wills Act].- 7
Judge King thus characterized the signature requirement as merely
one aspect of execution.
Judges Legoe and Cox seem to have reached similar conclusions
in Williams by somewhat different routes. After an extended analysis
of section 12(2) and the cases applying it, Judge Legoe concluded that
under section 12(2), "[t]he Court may ...

declare [that an unsigned]

document should be a will provided the criteria of the section have
been otherwise met."' Judge Legoe, more than the other two judges,
analyzed the extent to which the circumstances in Williams could be
considered to present a sufficiently objective manifestation of testamentary intent to compensate for the lack of a proper signature.3 9

334. Id. at 425 (King, J.).
335. Id.
336.
337.

Id.
Id. (emphasis added). Cf. Estate of Ryan, 40 S.A. St. R. 423, 425 (1986) (adopting

Judge King's reasoning).
338.

Williams, 36 S.A. St. R. at 434.

339.

See quote from Judge Legoe's opinion, supra note 322.
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Moreover, Judge Legoe carefully reviewed opinions in prior cases
under section 12(2) that had addressed the question of whether or to
what extent the dispensing power could be applied to save an unsigned
will.- ° Based on this analysis, Judge Legoe concluded that the critical
question in any section 12(2) case is whether the facts satisfy the
criteria for application of the dispensing power.Y' Judge Legoe's
analysis in Vauk- is consistent with the insistence in Williams on
careful attention to the facts, in applying section 12(2). 3 Neither case
seems to support Langbein's view of signature as generally indispensable.
Judge Cox considered the language of section 12(2) ambiguous with
respect to whether the dispensing power may be applied to unexecuted
documents or whether its application requires "that the document
must have been executed even though the execution did not meet the
requirements of [the wills act]."' 4 In contrast to Judge King,35 Judge
Cox considered that in the law of wills, "execution" has usually meant
that the will should be signed by the testator3 4 Judge Cox concluded,
however, that since section 12(2) was intended to be a remedial provision, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of a liberal construc7
tion of the scope of the dispensing power.3

340. Williams, 36 S.A. St. R. at 428-33.
341. For the three "criteria" identified by Judge Legoe, see supra note 332.
342. Vauk, 41 S.A. St. R. at 242.
343. For discussion of Vauk, see infra notes 355-75 and accompanying text.
344. Williams, 36 S.A. St. R. at 437 (Cox, J.).
345. See id. at 425 (King, J.).
346. Id. at 437 (Cox, J.).
347. Judge Cox stated:
To execute something is to complete it or to carry it into effect, and in the law
relating to wills the requirement of execution has generally meant that the intended
will should be signed . . . The words "notwithstanding that it has not been
executed with the formalities required by this Act" . . . have been interpreted in
different ways by different members of this Court. They may be read as implying
that the document must have been executed even though the execution did not
meet the requirements of'.. . [the Wills Act], but they would also be, I think, an
accurate way of referring compendiously both to a document that had not been
executed at all and also to a document that, though executed, had not been executed
with the formalities required by the Act. . . . I think this ambiquity should be
resolved by giving a liberal construction to section 12(2).
No doubt this goes a good way towards nullifying the effect of. . . the Wills
Act. However, . . . [mlany years of experience with the old law led to the rules
being tightened in the first half of the last century, and now all the years of
experience under that regime has persuaded Parliament that much of the statutory
rigidity should now be relaxed.
Id. at 437 (Cox, J.).
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I do not see any reason for supposing that Parliament intended to give relief where.., there was an informality in
the attestation clause but to deny it where.., the would-be
testator inadvertently omitted to sign the document. In my
opinion, the availability of s[ection] 12(2) is not confined...
to a document that bears the signature [of the testator].M
Judge Cox's view, more than that of the other judges is consistent
with Langbein's notion of signature as more "fundamental" than the
other formalities. Judge Cox's focus on the remedial purpose of section
12(2) suggests, however, a more liberal notion than Langbein's of the
dispensability of the testator's signature under a broad dispensing
power.
Despite language in Williams suggesting a contrary interpretation,
Langbein apparently reads Williams and Blakely together with
Baumanis to support his functional interpretation of the signature
requirement as generally indispensable to establish testamentary intent, absent compelling evidence that the unsigned document was
9
intended to have final effect.4
If you leave your will unsigned, you raise a grievous doubt
about the finality and genuineness of the instrument. An
unsigned will is presumptively only a draft, as the landmark
decision in Baumanis v. Praulininsisted, but that presumption is rightly overcome in compelling circumstances such as
0
in the -switched-wils cases.3
(4) Unexecuted wills
Since Langbein's 1987 article reviewing the South Australian case
law and its early decision in Baumanis, 1 the South Australian courts
have addressed the issue of whether the dispensing power can be
applied to validate an unexecuted will. In Estate of Vauk3 2 and Estate
of Richardson,m the court concluded that section 12(2) could be applied
to wills that had been neither signed nor attested if the evidence
established that the documents in question were intended to have
testamentary effect. 4
348. Id. (Cox, J.).
349. See Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 52.
350. Id.
351. Baumanis, 25 S.A. St. R. at 423. For discussion of Baumanis, see supra notes 257-90
and accompanying text.
352. Vauk, 41 S.A. St. R. at 242.
353. 40 S.A. St. R. 594 (1986).
354. Vauk, 41 S.A. St. R. at 248; Richardson, 40 S.A. St. R. at 596.
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Vauk arose as the result of an application by the Registrar of
Probate, who was seeking instruction as to whether a will prepared
by the decedent and subsequently altered by him without wills act
formalities should be admitted to probate.35 Judge Legoe concluded
that the alterations to the 1971 will did not appear to be made with
the requisite intent,5 6 but instead pointed to a draft will.Y7 "I would
consider that there is little if any evidence to support an application
for the admission of the 1971 will as amended in pencil to be admitted
to probate." Instead, after carefully considering the facts surrounding the making of a later unexecuted will, Judge Legoe concluded that
the executor should apply under section 12(2) to have the unexecuted
will admitted to probate. If on application for admission of the document to probate the court was satisfied that there was no reasonable
doubt of testamentary intent, the unexecuted document could be admitted to probate under the dispensing power.- 9 He therefore directed
that the common form application to admit the altered 1971 will be
36
refused. 0
The unexecuted will in Vauk had been prepared by the "Public
Trustee" shortly before the testator's death in 1985, according to the
testator's instructions 3'1 The testator had committed suicide on the
day before he was scheduled to meet with the Public Trustee to execute
the will.362 When the testator's body was discovered, a writing that
3
appeared to refer to the draft will was found underneath his head. 6
The writing, so badly smudged that it was partially illegible, was a
suicide note written in red ink on two pieces of paper. The note
appeared to read: "There
will
the
Pu
Trustee (unsigned
- changed: to be valid!".2 The note was followed by a

355. Vauk, 41 S.A. St. R. at 243-44.
356. Id. at 246.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id.
360. Id. "If the applicants wish to pursue their application for proof of that [1971] document
then I direct that they should do so in solemn form." Id. at 248. For discussion of common form
and solemn form probate, see supra text accompanying notes 46-57.
361. Vauk, 41 S.A. St. R. at 245.
362. Id. at 245, 248. The testator had given the wills office of the Public Trustee detailed
handwritten instructions for preparing the will. Id. at 245. It was the usual practice of the
Public Trustee not to require such instructions to be signed or executed, id., a practice roundly
criticized by Justice Legoe in this case. Id. at 250-51.
363. Id. at 245.
364. Id.
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line drawn down the page with the word "Hans," the testator's name,
written on the right side of the line. 36
Judge Legoe determined that the 1971 will that the testator's sister
and executor had found in a box containing his personal papers36 was
beyond the reach of section 12(2) because the pencilled alterations
"point in the direction of a draft will rather than a final will."367 Judge

Legoe was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the alterations,
which would have substantially affected the terms of the will, represented the final testamentary intention of the testator 5 6
Judge Legoe ultimately concluded that section 12(2) could potentially be applied to the unexecuted draft will that had been prepared
by the Public Trustee based on the testator's handwritten instructions. 9 Judge Legoe considered that the suicide note found with the
decedent's body was "a clear indication of what the deceased intended," 70 and that what he had intended was for the unexecuted will
prepared by the Public Trustee to be enforced.3 71 "It clearly emerges
that the underlining of the words 'to be valid' all point to his intentions
that that will which he knew he was due to sign on the following day
...was the will that he wished to provide for his estate .... "3 For
these reasons, Judge Legoe concluded that the executors should apply
for admission of the unexecuted will to probate under section 12(2). 73
Judge Legoe, in reaching this conclusion, reiterated that the application of the dispensing power is not limited to documents bearing the
signature of the testator3 4 Although Judge Legoe was not making a
final determination of testamentary intent in Vauk, the opinion seems

365. Id. The paper found under the testator's head was in two pieces. Id. The first piece
was scribbled over on one side, apparently by a child, and had several pictures of animals glued
to it. Id. On the other side was written "Give my love to Ingrid" (the testator's daughter) as
well as the language set forth in the text. Id. Underneath these words was written "Des,"
followed by a comma. Id. The other piece of paper contained some lines, circles, and triangles
marked "To Ingrid from Alix." Id. On the other side of the paper was written "so many things
wrong, sorry I am a misfit sorry Serena I can't live up to your values." Id.
366. Id. at 244.
367. Id. at 246.
368. Id. For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 544-48.
369. Id. at 248.
370. Id. at 247.
371. Id. at 248.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 247 (quoting In re Ryan, 40 S.A. St. R. 305, 310 (1986)). Relatively little of
the Vauk opinion is devoted to analysis of the signature requirement.
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unequivocally to support application of the dispensing power to unexe3 7
cuted wills in appropriate circumstances.
In Estate of Richardson,376 as in Vauk, the decedent had committed
suicide without executing his will, but had left a suicide note that
referred to the unexecuted will. 377 In Richardson,in contrast to Vauk,
section 12(2) was actually applied to validate the unsigned and unattested Will. 3 s In Richardson, the handwritten will had been found in
the testator's abandoned car after his death. 37 9 Although unexecuted,
the document was captioned "Last will and testament, etc. [sic] of
Nicholas Richardson." Along with the unexecuted will was a suicide
note, stating: "I have left a will with this. I hope things are taken
care of with as little fuss as possible."' 1 The opinion does not mention
whether the suicide note was signed. The court concluded:
A sequence of events has been established to my satisfaction
beyond a reasonable doubt by the affidavits which are before
me and from that sequence of events the only inference open
is that, upset by a number of things which had happened to
him, [the testator] decided to terminate his own life and in
connection with that decision and in anticipation of carrying
out that decision the [testator] wrote [this] document .. .
Significantly, the court stated that its finding that the decedent intended for the unexecuted will to be implemented '"fows from the
nature and content of the document itself and from the extrinsic
evidence of the circumstances in which it was found."
Whether Vauk or Richardsonwould support application of section
12(2) in less convincing circumstances is unclear. Both cases, in contrast to Baumanis, in which the court refused to apply section 12(2)
to an unexecuted will, were uncontested.3 (Langbein has suggested
that the quality of the case law under section 12(2) may be tainted
by the fact that South Australian probate law makes no provision for

375. Id. at 24748.
376. 40 S.A. St. R. 594 (1986).
377. Id. at 595.
378. Id. at 596.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 595.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 596 (emphasis added).
384. Compare Richardson, 40 S.A. St. R. at 596; Vauk, 41 S.A. St. R. at 248-49 with
Baumanis, 25 S.A. St. R. at 426. See Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 13 n.46.
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consensual suppression of a purported will.) Both cases, moreover,
involve circumstances tending to reinforce the finality of the unexecuted will. In both Vauk and Richardson, the apparent references to
the "vills" in the suicide notes strongly supported the inference that
at the time of preparing the documents immediately prior to their
deaths, the respective decedents wished the unexecuted documents
referred to in their notes to be enforced. These references to unexecuted wills thus established their finality. Moreover, the circumstances
under which the suicide notes referring to the wills were discovered
compellingly indicated finality of intent. The will in Richardson was
found with the suicide note in the testator's abandoned car3 and the
note referring to the Vauk will, with the testator's body in the testator's car.8 7 Moreover, the genuineness of the wills was demonstrated
fairly conclusively since the unexecuted will in Richardson was in the
decedent's handwritingm and the provisions of the will prepared by
the Public Trustee in Vauk were consistent with the provisions of the
earlier 1971 will as altered by the decedent.m
The facts in both Vauk and Richardson are similar to those in the
unreported case, Estate of Franks,39 discussed by Langbein in his
1987 article, in which section 12(2) was applied to validate a signed
but unattested will drafted by the testator shortly before his suicide
and referred to in the suicide note. 91 Interestingly, Langbein seems
to approve the application of the dispensing power to the unattested
will in Franks, remarking that "[t]he testator . . . appreciated the
finality of his unwitnessed will," s presumably because the will had
93
apparently been prepared in contemplation of death.3
Neither Vauk nor Richardson devotes much attention to analysis
of the signature requirement. In Vauk, Judge Legoe quoted from the
opinion in Estate of Ryan3P and referred to his own and Judge Cox's

385.

Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 40-41.

386. Richardson, 40 S.A. St.
387. Vauk, 41 S.A. St. R. at
388. Richardson, 40 S.A. St.
389. Vauk, 41 S.A. St. R. at

R. at 595.
245.
R. at 595.
248.

390. Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 19 (citing Estate of Franks, No.
10 of 1983 (S.A. Ct. Aug. 9, 1983)). The will and the letter referring to it were apparently
found in a table in the kitchen, where the testator had committed suicide by rifleshot. Id. In
the letter, the testator remarked: "It may not be a true will in the legal sense but under the

circumstances I think it will be legal and binding." Id.
391.
392.
393.
394.

Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
Vauk, 41 S.A. St. R. at 425 (quoting Ryan, 40 S.A. St. R. at 310).
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opinions in Williams395 as support for his conclusion that application
of section 12(2) is not limited to executed documents. 3 - As in his
Williams opinion, Judge Legoe painstakingly reviewed the Vauk facts.
Implicit in his Vauk opinion is the view that the evidence of testamentary intent is sufficiently compelling to permit application of section
12(2) to the unexecuted will, though he was not actually determining
the final outcome of the Vauk case.3 97 The Richardsoncase, in contrast,
is largely devoid of any analysis of either section 12(2) or of the specific
facts. The court in Richardson unhesitatingly applied section 12(2) to
the unexecuted will, stating that "I am satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that the document in question is in the handwriting of the
deceased, that the deceased intended the document to be an operative
will. "398

Whether Langbein would consider application of section 12(2) to
the unexecuted wills in Vauk and Richardson to be justifiable on the
particular facts of those cases is not clear. In discussing the disposition
of the unreported Franks case, Langbein seems to concede that a
court applying the section 12(2) dispensing power may reasonably
determine that a signed document prepared in contemplation of suicide
is executed with testamentary intent, even if the testator has failed
to have the document attested. 399 In both Vauk and Richardson,however, the wills were totally unexecuted, 400 so that all evidence of testamentary intent had to be gleaned from the circumstances surrounding the preparation of the writings.
The Vauk facts are arguably closer to those of Baumanis than
Franks. In both Baumanis and Vauk, the unexecuted draft will offered for probate was prepared by someone other than the testator
and in both cases, the issue was the finality of the will. 40 The
Baumanis court suggested that section 12(2) should not be applied to
unexecuted wills 4°2 and concluded that in any event, the evidence in
that case was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
the decedent had intended the document actually offered to probate

395. Id.
396. See id. at 246-48.
397. See text accompanying supra notes 355-58.
398. Richardson, 40 S.A. St. R. at 596.
399. Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 19.
400. Vauk, 41 S.A. St. R. at 244-45; Richardson, 40 S.A. St. R. at 595.
401. Compare Vauk, 41 S.A. St. R. at 244-45 with Baumanis, 25 S.A. St. R. at 423-25
(discussed in supra notes 258-91) and accompanying text).
402. Baumanis, 25 S.A. St. R. at 425 (language of § 12(2) seems to "presuppose" some
form of execution).
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to be given final effect. 403 In Vauk, in contrast, Judge Legoe was
apparently convinced that an apparent (but quite equivocal) reference 4"' to the unexecuted will in the decedent's partially illegible suicide
note was evidence that the decedent intended for the unexecuted will
to be given effect. 4 5 To this extent, Judge Legoe's analysis of the
Vauk facts suggests a significantly more relaxed view of both the
quality and quantity of evidence needed to establish testamentary
intent than the opinion in Baumanis.
In contrast to the wills in Baumanis and Vauk, the wills in Franks
and Richardson were apparently prepared by the testator himself in
contemplation of suicide and were actually found with and specifically
referred to in the respective suicide notes. The circumstances of
Franks and Richardson support a stronger inference of finality than
the circumstances of Vauk because of the considerably clearer connection between the preparation of the "wills" and the subsequent
suicides.
Neither the analysis of the court in Vauk nor the opinion in
Richardson seems to square with Langbein's interpretation of
Baumanis. Langbein characterizes Baumanis as a "fortunate" precedent against applying the section 12(2) dispensing power to unexecuted
"draft wills.' 4 6 Although Langbein seems to agree with the decision
in Frankson the ground that the facts of that case sufficiently evinced
finality to justify application of the dispensing power to the unattested
(but signed) will,4 he does not seem to have anticipated Richardson's
unhesitating extension of section 12(2) to a completely unexecuted will.
Contrary to Langbein's assertion that the South Australian courts
implicitly take a purposive or functional approach in applying section
12(2) to particular types of defects, the Richardson decision seems to
treat application of section 12(2) to the unexecuted will almost as a
matter of course. Nor is there any suggestion in Richardson that
application of section 12(2) to an unsigned will should be limited to
factually similar cases. Judge Legoe's opinion in Vauk likewise provides no direct support for Langbein's argument that the South Australian case law under section 12(2) rests on an implicit ranking of
the wills act formalities. 4 0 Vauk, like Richardson, focuses on the cir403. Id. at 426.
404. Vauk, 41 S.A. St. R. at 245 ('There
will
the
Pu
Trustee (unsigned
-changed: to be valid!").
405. Id. at 247-48.
406. Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 23 (quoted in text accompanying
supra note 282).
407. See id. at 19.
408. Id. at 52.
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cumstances tending to show that the testator intended the unexecuted
will to be given effect rather than on the significance to the wills act
purposes or policies of the testator's total failure to comply with the
wills act.
Considered thus, Vauk and Richardson arguably illustrate a point
of divergence between a broad statutory dispensing power and a judicial doctrine of substantial compliance. A broad dispensing power is
a power granted to the courts by the legislature to dispense with the
wills act requirements, even for fundamentally defective wills, if the
facts establish testamentary intent. 40 By contrast, substantial compliance is a judicially adopted rule that permits the courts to dispense
with the strict compliance doctrine and admit a will to probate if the
court determines that the functions, purposes, or policies underlying
the requirements have been substantially served by the testator's
conduct. 410 A judicial doctrine of substantial compliance presumably
cannot reduce to a nonissue the question of whether a will conforms
with the statutory requirements; the most that such a rule can accomplish is to redefine the meaning of "compliance. ' ' 411 Substantial
compliance, in contrast to the dispensing power, can only enforce
testamentary intent through the indirect route of functionally reinterpreting the statutory mandate of due execution so that proof of testamentary intent becomes relevant to the court's determination of
whether the testator has substantively complied - that is, complied
in substance - with the requirements.
c.

New Uniform Probate Code Section 2-503

The drafters of the UPC's new harmless error rule apparently
considered that the dispensing power generally will not save an unsigned will.412 The comment to section 2-503 suggests that application
of section 2-503 to unsigned wills is limited to unusual instances such

409. See Miller, supra note 3, at 305-06. For discussion of development of § 12(2) and other
broad dispensing power provisions, see id. at 311-29.
410. Id. at 305-06. For discussion of the judicial doctrine of substantial compliance, see id.
at 302-11. For discussion of a statute incorporating a substantial compliance standard purportedly
based on Langbein's proposal, but reaching results inconsistent with Langbein's intentions, see
Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8, at 41-45 (discussing Queensland, Australia
rule); Miller, supra note 3, at 329-35 (same).
411. See Miller, supra note 3, at 305-06.
412. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (1990) ("[T]he South Australian and Queensland courts . . . have been extremely reluctant to excuse noncompliance with the signature
requirement.").
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as the Blakely "switched wills" case. 413 The drafters apparently contemplated a considerably narrower scope for the UPC dispensing
power than the South Australian courts have developed for section
12(2).
The drafters of section 2-503 seem to have accepted Langbein's
view of the signature requirement as "fundamental," 414 and therefore
as a generally indispensable marker distinguishing draft wills from
wills intended to be given effect. 415 They also seem to accept his interpretation of the South Australian signature cases, which does not
take into account either Vauk or Richardson and which seems to
overlook or discount language in Judge King's Williams opinion to
the effect that the signature requirement is no more fundamental or
less dispensable than the other formalities.416 As the previous discussion demonstrates, the South Australian courts have liberally applied
417
section 12(2) to unsigned wills.
To the extent that the comment to section 2-503 is considered a
guide to interpretation, the UPC dispensing power would presumably
be more similar in scope to a substantial compliance approach than to
South Australia's section 12(2). The switched wills cases resemble
Langbein's interloper's bullet/coronary seizure scenario.41s First, the
facts in those cases raise no real issue of final testamentary intent.
Second, the proponents are able to establish by overwhelming evidence
of the testator's attempt to execute the will that the failure to sign
was inadvertent. Moreover, as the Blakely court noted, a switched
will is actually not unsigned, but simply signed in the wrong place;
in such cases, the will is attested and otherwise properly executed. 419

413.- Id. (citing Blakely, 32 S.A. St. R. at 473). 'The main circumstance in which the South

Australian courts have excused signature errors has been in the recurrent class of cases in
which two wills are prepared for simultaneous execution . . . and each [testator] mistakenly

signs the will prepared for the other." Id.
Note that the revision to § 2-601 is intended to remove the impediment to reformation of
wills when there is a mistake in the content of the will. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-601 comment
(1990) and discussion in infra notes 604-19 and accompanying text, and supra note 294. See

supra notes 291-310 and accompanying text for discussion of the "switched wills" problem in
South Australia.
414.
415.
416.

See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (1990).
See id.
Id. For Judge King's opinion, see Williams, 36 S.A. St. R. at 425 (quoted supra in

text accompanying note 337).
417.

See supra notes 351-411 and accompanying text for discussion.

418.

Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 518 (quoted in text accompanying

supra note 241).

419. Blakely, 32 S.A. St. R. at 479-80 (quoted in supra note 301); for discussion, see supra
notes 291-310 and accompanying text.
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Proof that the testator actually signed the "mirror will" evidences that
the testator intended to sign his or her own will and in fact attempted
to do so. If available, the witnesses may provide further evidence of
testamentary intent. A "switched will" could be considered a case of
misplaced signature, which the substantial compliance doctrine would
treat as a relatively minor error,40 rather than an omitted signature.
Williams, Vauk, and Richardson, cases in which the testator failed
to sign the will at all, are not mentioned in the 1990 comment to
section 2-503.421 It is therefore unclear whether the drafters would
have considered extending section 2-503 to unsigned or unexecuted
wills in light of these cases. Certainly, nothing in the language of
section 2-503 precludes such a broad application in a case presenting
sufficiently clear and convincing evidence of intent. 4 - As previously
remarked, the text of section 2-503 does not impose any requirement
that the specific formalities be subjected to functional analysis or that
the proponent's burden of satisfying the court vary depending on the
nature of the defect, 423 though the comment seems to assume that
application requires functional analysis.
The comment to section 2-503 does refer to the Graham dictum,
the judicial gloss on section 12(2) that articulates a relationship between the proponent's burden and the testator's "degree of departure"
from the wills act standard. 42 The significance of the drafters' reference to Graham is unclear. As previously discussed, Langbein characterizes the Graham dictum as "a profoundly purposive interpretation
of section 12(2). '' 4 He considers that this dictum requires the courts
applying section 12(2) to "distinguish between a formal breach that
impairs the purposes of the Wills Act and one that does not. '' 4 The
more recent section 12(2) cases in South Australia, however, have not
in fact treated the this dictum as a significant limitation on their power
to dispense with any or all of the formalities in any case in which the
court is satisfied that the defective instrument was prepared with
testamentary intent.
To the extent that the section 2-503 comment incorporates the
Graham dictum as interpreted by Langbein, section 2-503 seems to

420. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 498; for discussion, see infra
notes 427-33 and accompanying text.
421. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (1990).
422. For text of UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (1990), see supra note 2.
423. See id.
424. Graham,20 S.A. St. R. at 205 (quoted in supra text accompanying note 69); Langbein,
Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8, at 17, 52.
425. See Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8, at 17.
426. Id.
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contemplate a limiting functional "spin" on what otherwise appears to
be a dispensing power fully as broad as South Australia's. If the
comment to section 2-503 is disregarded, section 2-503 seems to authorize an equally broad dispensing power, that is, a dispensing power
that could potentially be applied to unsigned or completely unexecuted
wills. UPC section 2-502(a) essentially abolishes technical requirements
for complying with the attestation requirement. Section 2-503 therefore seems moot unless the drafters intended it to be broad enough
to save wills containing "fundamental" defects, including omission of
the testator's signature, total failure of attestation, or (in appropriate
circumstances) both.
2.

Misplaced Signatures

a. Langbein's Substantial Compliance Doctrine
If the testator's signature appears anywhere on a document presented to probate as the testator's will, the substantial compliance
doctrine would presumably permit the proponent to prove that the
misplaced signature does not violate the purposes of the wills act even
if the wills act expressly requires all wills to be signed "at the foot
or end." The original purpose of the subscription requirement was
probably protective;2 that is, the subscription requirement was originally incorporated into the statute of wills to ensure that forged or
fraudulent material was not interpolated after execution between the
signature and the body of the will.4 Misplacement (as opposed to
omission) of the signature is therefore not a fundamental defect in
40
execution, according to Langbein's functional analysis of the wills act.
"The requirement that the will be signed is vastly more purposive
than the requirement that the signature be 'at the end."'1 If the
placement of the signature creates doubt as to the testator's intention

427. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 498.
428. Miller, supra note 3, at 271-74 (discussing the protective function).
429. Nelson & Starck, supra note 19, at 351. Note that this formality has been justified
for its intent-verifying value: "[Slince it is the ordinary human practice to sign documents at
the end, a will not so signed does not give the impression of being finally executed." Gulliver
& Tilson, supra note 34, at 5-6. Nelson and Starck argue that the requirement that the will be
signed "at the end" is an important intent-verifying formality, Nelson & Starck, supra note 19,
at 349-50, but most commentators consider location of signatures to be a relatively minor and
technical formality. See Miller, supra note 3, at 264 n.500 (discussing commentators' application
of functional analysis to the requirement that the will be signed at the foot or end).
430. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 498.
431. Id.
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because it appears within the endorsement, within the body of the
will, or anywhere other than at the end,- the substantial compliance
doctrine would permit the proponents to show, through introduction
of extrinsic evidence, that the testator intended the document to be
enforced. As explained in part one of this article, there is authority
under current law for validating wills signed 4in the wrong place even
in the absence of a harmless error principle. 3
b.

South Australia's Dispensing Power Provision

According to Langbein, professionally drafted wills in South Australia that are longer than one page usually provide a space at the
bottom of each page for the witnesses' and testators' signatures.4 He
discusses certain cases that have arisen under section 12(2) in which
the testator signed some of the pages, but failed to sign at the foot
4
or end of the document, as the South Australian wills act requires. 3
Langbein explains that. prior to enactment of section 12(2) such wills
were either invalidated or, if omission of only the signed portion did
not distort the dispositive scheme, admitted to probate with only the
signed pages enforced. 436 The South Australian courts now use section
7
12(2) to validate these wills, a result that Langbein highly approves.4

432. See Miller, supra note 3, at 232-34 (discussing treatment of improperly signed wills
in the courts).
433. See id.
434. Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8, at 27.
435. South Australian Wills Act § 8, supranote 43; for cases, see, e.g., Estate of Roberts,
38 S.A. St. R. 324 (1985). "The facts are so straight-forward that their very recitation indicates
'there can be no reasonable doubt that the deceased intended the document to constitute his
will."' Id. at 324. In that case, the testator attempted to execute a two-page will, but signed
only the first page, and neglected to sign the second. Id. at 325. The witnesses signed both.
Id. "This was obviously an oversight. He had gathered his witnesses together and he had
embarked on the task of 'execution' of the whole document in an effort to comply with the
Id. The court, following Williams, distinguished
formalities necessary to secure its validity ....
"execution" from placement of the signature on the page. Id. at 326 (citing Williams, 36 S.A.
St. R. at 425 (opinion of King., C.J., quoted supra in text accompanying note 337)). Other
misplaced signature cases and unsigned will cases are cited in Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules,
supra note 8, at 15 n.55.
436. Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 28. For discussion of the traditional
approach of the South Australian courts to technical defects in execution and the rationales
under which such wills were saved prior to § 12(2), see generally Palk, supra note 45; Ormiston,
Formalities and Wills: A Pleafor Caution, 54 AUSTL. L.Q. 451 (1980).
437. Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 28.
I think these cases illustrate one of the great advantages of a harmless error rule:
its tendency to displace sleight-of-hand and to promote candor. When I first wrote
in 1975 about the likely consequences of a harmless error rule, I pointed out that
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c. New Uniform Probate Code Section 2-503

The UPC has never required the testator to sign the will at the
foot or end of the document. The 1990 comment to the revision of
section 2-502 states that "[t]here is no requirement that the testator's
signature be at the end of the will; thus, if he or she writes his or
her name in the body of the will and intends it to be his or her
signature, this would satisfy the statute."' 9 Because the intent of
section 2-502 'isto validate wills that meet the minimal formalities of
the statute" o° and the provision does not mandate placement of the
signature at the end of the will, misplaced signature cases presumably
should not occur under the UPC will provision.
E. Application of the Rules to Noncompliance with
the Writing Requirement
1. Langbein's Substantial Compliance Doctrine
In his 1975 article, Langbein lays great stress on the importance
of the writing requirement. He clearly does not contemplate application
of the substantial compliance doctrine to validate unwritten testamentary dispositions." 1 This limitation is somewhat surprising because
many jurisdictions permit nuncupative wills under certain limited circumstances, along with the gift causa mortis and the oral declaration
of trust in personalty. Although these devices are not widely used in
practice, they do permit enforcement of oral dispositions of personal
property that are essentially testamentary under certain circumstances.
If the goal of the substantial compliance doctrine is to enforce the
testator's intent, logic would seem to require courts to apply functional

the traditional strict compliance rule tended to drive sympathetic courts into
strained interpretations of what constituted compliance with the relevant formality.
. . [The rule of strict compliance may actually promote litigation, by inciting
courts to bend the ostensible rules in ways that make the outcomes hard to predict.
In the South Australian misplaced execution cases, the candid standard of section
12(2) - that is, well-proven testators intent - has displaced.., the devices that
grew up to bend the strict compliance rule.
Id. at 127-28. For examples of such "bending" of the strict compliance rules, see Miller, supra
note 3, at 232-34 (discussing treatment of improperly signed wills in the courts).

438.

See UNIF.PROB. CODE § 2-502 (1969) (discussed in Miller, supra note 3, at 209). For

text of the provision, see id. at 208 n.192.
439. UNIF. PROB.CODE § 2-502(a) comment (1990) (citing Estate of Siegel, 214 N.J. Super.
586, 520 A.2d 798 (App. Div. 1987)).
440. Id.
441. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 518-19.
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analysis to nuncupative will provisions and thus to permit extrinsic
evidence to show that an oral disposition of personal property was
made with testamentary intent, at least in every case in which the
oral disposition would have qualified as a nuncupative will but for
defective compliance with the requirements for a nuncupative will. In
his 1975 article, Langbein notes that the restrictions on nuncupative
'' 2
wills have prevented them from "achieving any practical importance 1
and that the substantial compliance doctrine "is not a back door to
nuncupative testation. ' '14 3 Langbein argues that the policy supporting
the continued recognition of nuncupative wills in limited circumstances
is that the amount of property that can be passed by this device is
so small that the legislature is willing to forego "truly purposive"
formalities." With respect to nuncupative wills, therefore, Langbein
states that functional analysis "has no sphere.""'
To the extent that the nuncupative will is recognized, however,
application of the substantial compliance doctrine seemingly should
require the court to address the policies supporting the legislature's
decision to permit nuncupative wills in limited circumstances. The
argument for extending functional analysis to oral testaments of personal property are even more compelling in jurisdictions that enforce
oral declarations of trust in personalty or the gift causa mortis, since
recognition of these devices implies judicial willingness to enforce dispositions that are "functionally equivalent" to an oral will. One commentator has recommended recognition of the oral declaration of trust
in personalty as a substitute for delivery in instances in which the
death of a donor prevents delivery of an intended gift.44 6 Similar reasoning arguably ought to extend to enforcement of oral dispositions of
personalty that do not meet the requirements for a nuncupative will
under the substantial compliance doctrine in instances in which the
proponent is able to carry the burden of showing testamentary intent
and the court determines that wills act policies have been substantially
served.
According to Langbein, adoption of the substantial compliance
''
doctrine would not affect the traditional definition of a "writing. 4
"Although some modes of electronic communication can perform some
of the functions of writing . . . they lack the solemnity and finality

442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See
See

at 491.
at 523.

generally Love, supra note 19.
Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 518-19.
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of a signed document." Given contemporary advances in technology
there is substantial ground for arguing that electronic or videotaped
wills can serve all the functions of a written will and possibly even
improve the intent-verifying and authenticating aspects of the traditional attested will.44 The Indiana legislature specifically permits videotaped recordings of the execution ceremony to be admitted as evidence of due execution, 450 thus implicitly recognizing the value of electronic documentation as evidence of testamentary intent and the
genuineness of the disposition. 451 Outside the backward-looking law of
wills, in fact, there is clearly a movement toward admitting videotapes
452
into evidence in a variety of judicial proceedings.
At the time of Langbein's 1975 article, the technology for preparing
tamper-resistant electronic wills was not widely available. Technological limitations may therefore have been a factor in Langbein's reluctance to consider electronic wills as falling within the potential scope
of substantial compliance.45 In his 1975 article, Langbein indicates
that only in extremely narrow circumstances could such a document
fulfill the wills act policies, even in jurisdictions that routinely enforce
unattested holographic wills, 4- though he conceded that substantial
compliance could "conceivably" apply to electronic wills.
Consider the dying testator who dictates testamentary provisions on a dictabelt, declaring that if he does not live to
sign the transcript he wishes the dictabelt to serve as his
last will. Suppose further that he is in a holograph jurisdiction which permits handwriting to substitute for attestation;
or that he dictates the will in the presence of sufficient witnesses whom he asks to attest on the dictabelt. The testator's
recorded voice evidences authenticity as well as handwriting
and signature would; the dictabelt has the permanence of
writing; and his language shows unambiguous finality of intent. The purposes of the writing requirement have been
achieved in a rare
case where it would be unjust to insist
4
on the formality. 5

448. Id. at 519.
449. Miller, supra note 3, at 299-302 (discussing use of videotapes as evidence of due
execution and of "videowills").
450. See IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-5-3(c) (Burns 1990); Miller, supra note 3, at 302 n.695.
451. Miller, supra note 3, at 301.
452. For discussion of videowills and citations to relevant articles, see id. at 299-300.
453. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 519.
454. Id.
455. Id.
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Like Langbein's interloper's bullet/coronary seizure scenario justifying
application of substantial compliance to an unsigned will, 4 - this situation involves a testator at the point of death and prevented by uncontrollable circumstances from complying with the wills act. Both
scenarios contemplate extremely limited application of the doctrine,
based not only upon unequivocal evidence of testamentary intent but
also apparently upon evidence of the testator's attempted compliance
with the wills act.
Other commentators argue that a videotaped will provides superior
evidence of testamentary intent and authenticity. 457 Under a functional
construction of the wills act, a videotaped will may potentially serve
all of the policies served by a written and attested will.45 Though
Langbein suggests that substantial compliance could only be applied
to an electronic will as an alternative to the attestation requirement
(and therefore, only in a holograph jurisdiction),459 the relevance of
such a limitation under a functional interpretation of the attestation
requirement seems problematic. Surely, even in a jurisdiction that
permits only attested wills, a functional construction of the attestation
requirement should permit the court to apply the substantial compliance doctrine to an electronic will that in fact effectively serves the
6
intent-verifying and authenticating functions served by attestation.4 0
Moreover, it can be argued that even under current law, without
resort to any harmless error principle, a court could conceivably validate a videotaped will or other electronic document through a broad
construction of the writing requirement. This theory would treat a
videotaped will as a "writing" based on a quantitatively substantial
fulfillment of the writing requirement, on the theory that a videotape
is in fact a "writing." As one commentator has noted,
[T]he requirement that a will be in writing was created to
assure a discernible record of the testator's intent and to
avoid reliance on verbal reports by survivors. A videotape
is as permanent a record as a paper will, perhaps more so
because the material is less easily destructible . . . At its
best it may prove far superior. The videotape thus clearly
meets the test of a writing and should be construed as such. 461
456. Id. at 518.
457. Miller, supra note 3, at 301-02 (discussing use of videowills); id. at 300 n.681 (citing
to articles arguing in favor of videowills or use of videotape to prove due execution of ordinary
wills).
458. Id. at 301-02.
459. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 519.
460. Miller, supra note 3, at 301-02.
461. Nash, A Videowill: Safe and Sure, 70 A.B.A. J. 87, 88 (1984).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss4/1

70

Miller: Will Formailty, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative Reform: An Ex
UPC § 2-508

In a jurisdiction that permits holographic as well as attested wills,
the authenticating purpose 462 of the handwriting requirement would
be effectively served by having the testator actually appear on the
screen and state his or her testamentary wishes. 46 Even without additional formalities, such a document is unlikely to raise any issues
that courts in holographic jurisdictions are not prepared to address
with respect to informal wills. 4 A videotaped will might be found in
compliance with the writing requirement in a holographic jurisdiction
so long as it effectively resolves any questions respecting the authenticity of the dispositive scheme, so that the minimal standard of formality is functionally served. 46 In a jurisdiction that permits only attested
wills, reinterpretation of the writing requirement to include videotaped
documents would, of course, address only one aspect of the wills act
formalities. The testator presumably would still have to ensure some
form of attestation in order to achieve literal compliance with the wills
act, either by including some form of attestation ceremony as part of
the videotaped execution, by having the videotaped document itself
4
attested, or both. 6
Langbein argues in his 1975 article that electronic wills do not
exhibit the solemnity and finality of written wills. 46 Again, Langbein
may simply have been considering the limitations of the technology
available at the time. His 1975 article focuses primarily on audio recordings, which may indeed be less reliable as evidence of final testamentary intention than a carefully prepared videotaped will, since
audio recordings are so frequently used as a substitute for notes or
memoranda. It seems indisputable, however, that with current
technology an electronic will could be prepared in such a way as to
resolve all doubts as to genuineness and testamentary intent. 46 In
fact, a testator's unequivocal attempt to dispose of property by a
videotaped or other electronic will might actually raise fewer doubts
respecting finality of intention than an informal holographic will.
462. Miller, supranote 3, at 287 (discussing authenticating function of holographic formality).
463. See Nash, supra note 461, at 88.
464. See Miller, supra note 3, at 280-86 (discussing determination of testamentary intent
with respect to problematic holographic "wills"); Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note
8, at 515 (discussing determination of testamentary intent with respect to homemade wills).
465. Cf. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 519-20 (discussing application
of substantial compliance doctrine to unattested documents in jurisdictions that permit holographic wills).
466. Nash suggests the means of accomplishing attestation of a videotaped will. See Nash,
supra note 461, at 88 (quoted in Miller, supra note 3,at 301 n.692).
467. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 519.
468. See Miller, supra note 3, at 299-300 n.681 (citing articles dealing with procedures for
preparing videotaped wills).
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2. South Australia's Dispensing Power Provision
Many of the reported cases in South Australia state in dicta that
section 12(2) does not apply to the requirement of a writing itself, but
only to defective execution of the document; 469 in other words, that
application of the dispensing power presupposes the existence of a
writing (or document) to which the power can be applied. The clear
import of the relevant dicta is that section 12(2) cannot be applied to
an oral disposition of property. 470 Whether the South Australian courts
could conceivably apply section 12(2) to validate an electronic document
is less clear. In Estate of Slavinskyj,471 Judge Legoe noted that in
South Australia 'writing' includes any visible form in which words
may be reproduced or represented472 and that "[tihere is no restriction
on the material used for the purpose of writing,' ' 7 in concluding that
a will written on a plasterboard wall in the testator's house was a
document to which the section 12(2) dispensing power could be
applied. 474 Unless the South Australian courts extend the definition of
"writing" (or "document") to include alternative means of preserving
the terms of the decedent's testamentary plan, section 12(2) would
7
presumably not apply to an electronic Will.4 .
The legislative history of section 12(2) indicates that the scope of
the South Australian dispensing power has been extended considerably
beyond the circumstances envisioned by the Law Reform Commission
that originally proposed it.476 Professor Palk suggests that the committee that proposed section 12(2) did not intend to abolish attestation
as a substantive requirement for due execution, legitimize unsigned
wills, or otherwise eliminate the formal requirements for due execution. On the contrary, section 12(2) was envisioned as a limited re-

469. See, e.g., Blakely, 32 S.A. St. R. at 476.
470. See, e.g., id. "A will could hardly be admitted to probate if it had not been reduced
to writing of some kind ....
" Id.
471. 53 S.A. St. R. 221 (1989).
472. Id. at 230 (emphasis added).
473. Id.
474. Id. at 229-30, 233-34. "'It is the wittiest partition that I ever heard discourse."' Id.
at 233 (quoting Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night's Dream).
475. See id. at 229-30 (explaining the meaning of "writing"). In Blakely, the court construed
the South Australian Wills Act to require that a will be both (1) in writing; and (2) "executed."
See Blakely, 32 S.A. St. R. at 478. The court suggested that "[a] will could hardly be admitted
to probate if it had not been reduced to writing of some kind," so that § 12(2) must be limited
to defectively executed writings. See id. For discussion of Blakely, see supra notes 291-310 and
accompanying text.
476. See generally Palk, supra note 45 (discussing the legislative history of § 12(2)); Miller,
supra note 3, at 311-14.
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form. 47 The history of section 12(2) suggests that the intention of the
South Australian Law Reform Commission was to give the courts
flexibility in enforcing the attestation requirement in those circumstances in which attestation was impracticable or impossible, and
to provide some4 discretion in dealing with minor technical violations
of the wills act. 7
The South Australian courts demonstrably have not allowed the
legislative history of the dispensing power to prevent their interpreting
section 12(2) as authorizing an extremely broad dispensing power.
However, in Slavinskyj, the court did suggest that South Australia
defines a "writing" in a way that may preclude extension of section
12(2) to electronic documents, unless the courts distinguish between
a "writing" for purposes of determining whether there has been compliance with the wills act writing requirement and a "document" (in
the sense of a reliable permanent record of an intended disposition)
for purposes of section 12(2). Though at present "[writing... remains
as the one essential positive formal requirement that cannot be dispensed with in South Australia," 479 the courts could justify extending
the dispensing power to nontraditional documents by distinguishing
the terms "writing" and "document."
It is not clear that the liberal South Australian courts would refuse
application to an electronic document in compelling circumstances,
though certainly the various Australian and Canadian Law Reform
Commissions that have considered the issue have been surprisingly
resistant to proposing a redefinition of the writing requirement to
include electronic documents.480 While these reports do not distinguish
between the definition of "writing" for purposes of determining compliance with the wills act and the meaning of "document" for the
purpose of determining whether the dispensing power may be applied,
the apparent hostility to videotaped or other electronic wills suggests
the intention to limit application of harmless error rules to documents
(however unconventional the materials used) that record the testator's
words in visual form designed to be read and thus to exclude all
documents recording the testator's dispositive plans by any other
means.

477.
478.

Palk, supra note 45, at 394; Miller, supra note 3, at 312-14.
See Palk, supra note 45, at 384-95; Miller, supra note 3, at 311-14.

479.

J. Miller, Execution of Wills, supra note 19, at 572; cf. Langbein, Harmless Error

Rules, supra note 8, at 52.
480.

See, e.g., Miller, supra note 3, at 328 (discussing proposal of Law Reform Commission

of New South Wales); id. at 337 (discussing proposal of Tasmanian Law Reform Commission);
id. at 337-38 (discussing proposal of British Columbia Law Reform Commission).
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New Uniform Probate Code Section 2-503

Like South Australia's section 12(2), UPC section 2-503 may have

been intended to preclude application of the dispensing power to oral
dispositions of property. Section 2-503 applies only to "a document or
writing added upon a document."' 1 It is unclear whether the term
"document" in section 2-503 could be extended to documents other
than those that have been handwritten, typed, or printed on paper
(or some other visual medium), or whether a court applying section
2-503 could legitimately distinguish between the "writing" for purposes
of determining compliance with section 2-502 and "document" for purposes of applying section 2-503 to save a will that does not meet the
writing requirement.
The comment to the 1988 discussion draft of revised section 2-502
stated flatly that videotaped or tape-recorded wills do not meet the
writing requirement for purposes of due execution under section 2502(a) or (b), though the comment went on to remark that a will that
does not meet the section 2-502 requirements might still be valid under
section 2-503.- 2 The comment to section 2-503, however, noted that
the South Australian and Israeli courts "have never excused noncompliance with the requirement that a will be in writing" through
application of their harmless error rules. The drafters apparently
intended to suggest in the 1988 discussion draft that application of
section 2-503 should be similarly limited. In the 1990 version of section
2-503, the drafters seem to have softened their stance on treating an
electronic will as a "writing" under section 2-502(a), merely commenting that there is authority that a videotape is not a writing.'m Arguably, even if a court applying section 2-503(a) were to determine that
an electronic will does not in fact constitute a "writing" for purposes
of compliance with that provision, the section 2-503 harmless error
rule could conceivably be applied to an electronic will on the theory
that it is a "document" for purposes of the section 2-503 dispensing
power. Such a will might be salvageable if its proponent produced
sufficiently clear and convincing evidence of testamentary intent. The
drafters' use of inconsistent terminology in sections 2-502 and 2-503
arguably points to the more liberal interpretation. The comment to

481. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (1990).
482. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a) comment (Discussion Draft, July-Aug. 1988); for discussion, see Miller, supra note 3, at 343-44.
483. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (Discussion Draft, July-Aug. 1988).
484. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a) comment (1990) (citing Estate of Reed, 672 P.2d
829 (Wyo. 1983)). For discussion of this case, see Miller, supra note 3, at 300.
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section 2-503 is equivocal in this respect, however; moreover, it appears that the South Australian courts and the Law Reform Commissions that have proposed harmless error rules use the terms "writings"
and "document" interchangeably.
If the drafters of section 2-503 did intend to limit its application
to traditional writings, their rationale is difficult to discern or justify.
The UPC has always recognized the often problematic and potentially
overinclusive holographic will as an exception to or limitation on the
attestation requirement. Under such a provision, courts may admit
to probate all manner of unconventional documents on the theory that
despite nonstandard form or ambiguous language, they are valid holographic wills intended to settle the disposition of the testator's property at death.4 With the widespread availability of video recorders
today, the same testators who benefit from liberal provisions for holographic wills and from harmless error rules - i.e., testators unassisted
by counsel who contrive to make home-made wills - are very likely
to view a videotaped will as a more reliable means than a conventional
writing of preserving their testamentary wishes. A semiliterate or
illiterate testator, or indeed any layperson with a foolhardy trust in
common sense, might justifiably assume that a videotaped will provides
a more convincing mode of conveying testamentary intent than an
unattested holographic will.
If a legislature were to enact a provision modelled on the UPC
harmless error rule, the scope of the provision would seem to depend
to some extent on the degree to which the legislature or the courts
applying the provision adopted the drafters' interpretation of section
2-502 and section 2-503 as a gloss on the provisions. Nothing in the
language of section 2-502 actually precludes expansion of the writing
requirement to an electronic document.4 7 Moreover, section 2-503 expressly permits the proponent of any "document" that does not meet
the section 2-502 requirements for due execution to attempt to establish testamentary intent and expressly permits the court to dispense
with the section 2-502 execution requirements if satisfied that there
4
is clear and convincing evidence of testamentary intent. 8

485.
486.
487.
488.

See
See
See
See

Miller, supra note 3, at 218-21 (UPC holographic will provision).
id. at 274-96 (discussing probate of holographic wills).
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502 (1990).
id. § 2-503.
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Application of the Rules to Formally Defective Attempts to Alter
the Will
1. Langbein's Substantial Compliance Doctrine

Often a testator seeks to alter the testamentary scheme set forth
in a duly executed attested or holographic will by (1) performing a
physical act on the will; (2) revoking all or a portion of the executed
will through a subsequent inconsistent disposition of the same property
by means of a codicil or a new will; or (3) inserting new terms into
the existing will. The wills acts generally require that additions to a
will and subsequent writings intended to alter the existing testamentary plan be executed with wills act formality.4 Ineffective attempts
to revoke the existing terms and substitute new ones often overlap
in instances in which testators attempt to achieve this result through
deletion and interlineation.
In his 1975 article, Langbein states that the substantial compliance
doctrine could be applied to any failure of the testator to comply with
the wills act requirements for alteration of the will through execution
of a subsequent document or through deletion and interpolation.49° He
describes the requirement that alterations to existing wills be executed
with wills act formality as "an unwise mutuality concept whose
reexamination the purposive substantial compliance doctrine should
facilitate. 4 9' The question for a court applying substantial compliance
to a testator's apparent attempt to alter the existing, duly executed
testamentary scheme without complying with the requirements for
effective alteration is whether the informal document or writing on
the existing document was intended to be effective.492 Langbein recognizes that extending the substantial compliance doctrine to informal
attempts to alter duly executed wills presents a risk that memoranda,
notes, and casual statements in letters will routinely be offered to
probate to vary the testamentary scheme. 493 He points out, however,
that courts in jurisdictions that permit holographic wills and codicils
4
must often address and resolve this issue. 9

489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
text.

See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 522.
Id.
Id. n.117.
See id.
Id.
Id. For discussion of such cases, see Miller, supra note 3, at 523-615 and accompanying
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Langbein considers that the strong presumption against admitting
a subsequent informal document to probate to vary all or part of an
existing will would prevent a flood of cases seeking enforcement of

formally defective alterations. 495 Under current law, potential proponents of such documents in most instances "correctly perceive the

hopelessness of setting them up against formal wills" and do not attempt to convince the probate court that the informal document was
intended to alter the duly executed testamentary scheme. 4 9 The prop-

onent's burden of establishing the alteration is onerous. 497 The presumption against enforcement would be retained under the substantial
compliance doctrine and would limit its application, presumably to
instances in which the proponents were able to produce compelling
evidence that the purported alteration to the existing will was intended
to be given effect.
2. South Australia's Dispensing Power Provision
On its face, South Australia's section 12(2) dispensing power provision applies solely to the defective execution of wills, not to defective
attempts to alter willsA9 In Estate of Standley,49 however, Judge
Legoe concluded that section 12(2) may be applied to validate altera-

tions to part of the will,0 and this precedent has "captured the field." 5°1

495. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8,at 522-23.
496. Id. at 522.
497. Id. (citing In re Estate of Moore, 443 Pa. 477, 277 A.2d 825 (1971)). Langbein points
to Moore as an example of the onerousness of the proponent's burden under current law of
establishing the validity of a subsequent informal document. In that case, the court refused to
enforce as a valid holographic will a handwritten, signed, and dated but unmailed letter found
in the testator's safe deposit box after her death and instructing her attorney with respect to
altering her existing will. Id. at 522-23.
498. See South Australian Wills Act § 12(2), supra note 9.
499. 29 S.A. St. R. 490 (1982).
500. Id. at 494. "In my judgment the provisions of s[ection] 12(2) can apply to a 'part'
only of a document, such as an alteration, provided that part in the form of an alteration
otherwise complies with or comes within the general ambit of s[ection] 12(2)." Id.
501. Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8,at 30. But see Estate of Kurmis, 26
S.A. St. R. 449 (1981), in which the court refused to apply § 12(2) to enforce an addition to an
existing will, even though the court considered that the new language had been added with the
intention that it become part of the will. See id. at 450. The addition was neither signed nor
attested. Id. Relying on Baumanis, 25 S.A. St. R. at 423, the court stated that § 12(2) could
not be applied to the alteration, even though "[e]xtraneous facts . . . leave me with no doubt
that [the alteration] was added ... by the testator with the intention that that addition should
form part of the will." Id.
Langbein considers that the court should have distinguished Baumanis. Langbein, Harmless
ErrorRules, supra note 8,at 30.
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Langbein remarks that in applying the dispensing power to attempted
alterations, the courts have not distinguished between formalities for
revocation and formalities for substitution of new terms.- Typically,
they focus on "the new language being inserted rather than the old
language being struck '10 3 in determining whether the alteration was
intended to have testamentary effect.
In Standley, the altered will, written by the testator on a printed
will form, was not in fact executed in accordance with the wills act
because the testator had not complied with the presence requirements. 5°0 After preparing the will, she had subsequently attempted to
alter it by (1) lining through the name of the person originally named
as executor and substituting the name of a different person; °5 and (2)
lining through the surname of one of the beneficiaries and inserting
a different name. 0'- The first alteration did not comply with the requirements for altering the will or for obliterating existing provisions.The second alteration was initialled by the testator and attested by
one witness. 5°8 Judge Legoe determined that the will should be enforced as altered under section 12(2). 50 9
Langbein approves of the result in Standley and the extension of
the precedent to subsequent alterations cases51 0 on the ground that
section 12(2) appropriately applies in those instances in which the
testator intended the alteration to "relate back" to the prior executed
will in form as well as in substance.511 In such cases, the error is in

[Tihere is a material difference between a case like Baumanis, where the testator
never signs the will, and Kurmis, where he attempts to amend an instrument that
he has previously executed properly. The testator in Baumanis had never taken
the step of executing his will. He had not crossed the line from draft to will. In
Kurmis, by contrast, the testator had long since taken that step ....
Id. In Williams, Judge Legoe suggested that Kurmis (in contrast to Williams) involved a
situation in which the evidence actually was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt
that the addition made by the testator "in unknown circumstances" was intended to have testamentary effect. Williams, 36 S.A. St. R. at 434 (Legoe, J.). To the extent, however, that
Kurmis was not distinguishable from or reconcilable with the decision in Williams, Judge Legoe
declined to follow it. Id.
502. Id.
503. Id.
504. Standley, 20 S.A. St. R. at 492.
505. Id.
506. Id. at 491.
507. See id. at 493.
508. Id at 491.
509. Id. at 495.
510. See Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8, at 30-31.
511. Id. at 31.
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the testator's belief that the prior execution continues in effect and
such an error is harmless when the circumstances show that there is
52
no fraud or imposition surrounding the alteration. 1

Subsequent alterations cases usually have been consistent with
Standley. In Estate of Bennet,513 the court extended section 12(2) to
an ineffective attempt to partially revoke a will by a physical act, 514
which South Australia does not permit. 515 The testator deleted a devise

in favor of a friend by crossing through it, then wrote the date and
her signature immediately under it.516 She did not have the deletion
5 7
attested1.
Since South Australia does not have a statute permitting

partial revocation by physical act, the revocation would have been
ineffective if not for section 12(2), 518 though the evidence in Bennet of
her intention to alter her will was particularly strong, because the
friend whose gift had been deleted himself produced the altered will
and testified in his affidavit that she had informed him of her intention
to cut him out of her will. 519

Similarly, in Estate of Lynch,5 section 12(2) was applied to prevent
application of the South Australian rule automatically revoking a testator's will at the time the testator marries unless the will is reexecuted.52 ' The testator had executed the original will in compliance with
the wills act. 522 After her marriage, she made several changes to her
name in the will, apparently in an attempt to revive it.52 When she
showed the altered will to her son, he advised her to initial the alteration to the heading, which she accordingly did in his presence. 5 The
court applied section 12(2) in concluding that the original will, which
otherwise would have been revoked by her marriage, was effectively
revived by her alterations.52
512. Id.
513. 40 S.A. St. R. 350 (1986).
514. Id. at 351.
515. Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 32.
516. Bennet, 40 S.A. St. R. at 351.
517. Id. at 352.
518. Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 32.
519. Bennet, 40 S.A. St. R. at 351. "In effect, put very colloquially, the [testator] at one
time thought that she would like to give [her friend] a legacy. She did not like his being away
from home for a long time, long periods. She told him that if he was going to be away for a
long time she would cut him out of her will. He was away from home for a long time. She
made the alteration... when he was in the Middle East." Id. at 352-53.
520. 39 S.A. St. R. 131 (1985).
521. Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 32 n.148.
522. Lynch, 39 S.A. St. R. at 132-33.
523. Id. at 133.
524. Id.
525. See id. at 136.
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In Estate of Possingham,52 the court applied section 12(2) to what
would otherwise have been a botched attempt at partial revocation
through physical act, 52 in a case in which the will form contained "the
standard provisions for revocation of former wills" instructing the

testator as to the proper procedures. 5 - Subsequent to execution, the
testator had attempted to delete certain provisions without complying
with the instructions printed on the will. 52 Instead, he wrote in the

margin, "Deletions authorised by me" followed by his signature, then
initialled these alterations where they occurred.- In determining that
section 12(2) should be applied, the court noted that the testator had
signed the alterations, that the document as altered was left in the
custody of his bank as his last testamentary document, and that "the
alterations give effect to changes in the decedent's lifetime which
affected his original testamentary dispositions."'3 Based on its evaluation of the circumstances, the court reached the "inescapable conclusion that the irregular alterations in fact disclose the testator's final
'' 2
testamentary intentions. 5

In his 1987 article, Langbein discusses an interesting unreported
case in which the South Australian court extended section 12(2) to a
will containing completely unexecuted alterations through cross-out
and interlineation, despite evidence that the testator had had actual
knowledge of the requirement that alterations be signed and witnessed
to be given effect.- In Estate of Sierp,- the testator had attempted
to alter his professionally drafted will without observing the proper
formalities.5 Subsequently, the testator's solicitor warned him that
the alterations were not effective.53 The solicitor had drafted a new
will for the testator, but the testator never had the new will executed
despite the solicitor's repeated reminders

37

Despite the testator's

526. 32 S.A. St. R. 227 (1983).
527. See Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8, at 32.
528. Possingham, 32 S.A. St. R. at 228.
529. Id. at 352.
530. Id. at 228.
531. Id. at 229.
532. Id.; see, e.g., Estate of Ryan, 40 S.A. St. R. 305 (1986) (applying § 12(2) to validate
a form will altered by interlineations without proper formalities).
533. Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 32-33.
534. No. 173 of 1982 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Dec. 13, 1982), cited in Langbein, Harmless Error
Rules, supra note 8, at 32.
535. Id.
536. Id.
537. Id.
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seemingly deliberate noncompliance with the alteration formalities,
the court applied section 12(2) to enforce the altered wi.l.
Langbein finds the result in Sierp troubling, analogizing it to
Kelly,, 9 "that difficult unattested will case." 54o Langbein argues that
the most likely inference from a testator's failure to comply with the
wills act after having been informed that such compliance is necessary
is that the testator did not intend to make an effective alteration. 541
Langbein considers that Sierp is distinguishable from Kelly, however,
because in Sierp the testator did not learn of the wills act requirements
until after he had taken steps to alter his will. Langbein notes that
in the law of wills testamentary intent is determined by the testator's
state of mind at the time of executing the will. In Kelly, in contrast
to Sierp, the testator knew of the requirements for executing a valid
will at the time he prepared the document that was ultimately admitted
to probate under section 12(2), a result which Langbein considers
inconsistent with the high standard of proof required for application
of the dispensing power.
The court in Vauk51 considered whether section 12(2) could be
applied to a will containing substantial pencilled alterations.5 5 Judge
Legoe noted that 'the alterations... point in the direction of a draft
will rather than a final will' 646 There was evidence in Vauk that the
will as altered was intended to be a draft: the changes had actually
been incorporated into a later will, though the testator died before
he was able to execute itA47 Judge Legoe concluded that the application
for admission of the altered will to probate in common form should
be refused, and that if the executors wished to prove the altered will,
the proof would require probate in solemn form.5
In contrast, the court in Estate of Sutton 9 applied section 12(2)
to a will that had apparently been altered to exclude the testator's
538. Id.
539. Kelly, 32 S.A. St. R. 413, affd, 34 S.A. St. R. 370 (1983). For discussion, see supra
notes 104-19 and accompanying text.
540. Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8,at 33.
541. Id. at 32-33.
542. Id. at 33.
543. Id.
544. 41 S.A. St. R. 242 (1986). For discussion, see supra notes 355-75 and accompanying
text.
545. Id.
546. Id.
547. Id.at 248.
548. Id. For discussion of the distinction in South Australia between solemn and common
form probate, see supra text accompanying notes 46-52.
549. 51 S.A. St. R. 150 (1989).
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son from the will, then later altered to reinstate him as a result of a
reconciliation. ° The will, signed and executed, had been handwritten
by the testator on a will form.-1 The earlier alterations were in black
ink; through cross-out the testator had deleted the language in the
original will that would have given his son a share of his estate. The
testator also appended "an emphatic statement" to the end of the
operative clauses that he intended the son to be so excluded. 2 The
exclusionary paragraph was signed and dated, but not attested. The
deletions and interlineations by which the testator reinstated his son
were written in blue ink. In the margins of the will, the testator
placed his signature and a date, but did not have the alterations
attested. 5- Judge White found that by signing his name in the margin,
the testator had intended to sign all of the blue ink alterations.Citing Williams, Judge White pointed out that section 12(2)
might allow enforcement of a will "notwithstanding the absence of any
signature on the document."' 7 Based on the evidence in Sutton, Judge
White was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the signed blue
ink alterations reinstating the son were "a deliberate expression of
testamentary intention and not mere preparation of a draft for further
typing up and execution and not just a sign of irresolution about his
testamentary intentions" and that the testator had "intended these
changes to be the final form of a document which he intended to be
his last will."- Because of the high standard of proof required under
section 12(2), Judge White asked a handwriting expert to evaluate
the printed clause reinstating the son and "after some delay ... was
provided with convincing independent expert evidence that the printing is under the hand of the deceased." 9
In the 1990 case, Estate of Kirs, ° Judge Legoe refused to apply
section 12(2) to enforce as part of the will certain deletions, interlineations, and marginalia apparently made by the testator.6 1 The testator

550.
551.
552.
553.
554.
555.
556.
text.
557.
558.
559.
560.
561.

Id. at 151-52.
Id. at 151.
Id.
Id. at 152.
Id.
Id.
36 S.A. St. R. 423 (1984) (Full Court), discussed supra notes 316-55 and accompanying
Sutton, 51 S.A. St. R. at 153.
Id.
Id.
55 S.A. St. R. 61 (1990).
Id. at 63-64, 68.
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had attempted to delete some of the provisions of the original will
and to substitute new terms. The additions related to the maintenance
of the testator's dog Poiss and the testator's sister, both of whom had
predeceased him. Some of these alterations had been subsequently
altered, presumably to reflect that the dog and the sister had died.5
The testator had made a marginal notation to that effect, had signed
his name, and had crossed out some of his own additions to the will.563
There was no evidence to indicate the time at which the testator had
made the various alterations.64
Quoting extensively from Langbein's 1987 article,5 Judge Legoe
nevertheless distinguished Kirs from Standley and other cases
analyzed by Langbein. He believed that reasonable doubt existed as
to whether the testator intended any of the alterations to modify his
will. Judge Legoe therefore determined that the attempted revocations
and additions were without effect and that the will could be enforced
in its original, unrevoked form.56 "I have no doubt whatsoever that
'' 7
the alterations could not be proved under section 12(2). 5

3. New Uniform Probate Code Section 2-503
New section 2-503 expressly permits the proponent to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the testator intended to alter, revoke, or revive a will, despite the testator's noncompliance with the
formalities required by section 2-502.m
III. THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE HARMLESS ERROR SOLUTION
AND THE UNIFICATION OF THE LAW OF SUCCESSION

A.

The 1990 Revisions and the Unification of the Subsidiary Law
of Wills and Will Substitutes
1. Narrowing the Gap Between Wills and Will Substitutes

Section 2-503 is one of many revisions to UPC article 2 purportedly
designed to clarify the UPC wills requirements and to make the law

of wills and will substitutes more consistent. According to its drafters,

562. See id. at 63-64.
563. Id. at 65.
564. Id.
565. Id. at 66-67 (quoting with approval Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, su.pra note 8,
at 29, 31).
566. Id. at 67.
567. Id. at 69.
568. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (1990).
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section 2-503 attempts to unify the law of wills and will substitutes
by bringing the treatment of defectively executed wills more into line
with the treatment of will substitutes.- 9 The comment discussing the
intended scope and application of the section 2-503 dispensing power
reflects the influence of Langbein's 1987 analysis of the South Australian dispensing power provision. 570 In his 1987 article, Langbein recommends adoption of a dispensing power provision similar to South Australia's as an appropriate solution to some of the persistent problems
in American succession law.571 Langbein bases his recommendation on
his extensive review of the South Australian case law under section
12(2) and of the other forms of harmless error rules (including the
statutory substantial compliance provision enacted in Queensland72).
Langbein considers that one important effect of the adoption or enactment of a harmless error rule would be to foster consistency in the
5
enforcement of wills and will substitutes. 7
In recommending enactment of a harmless error rule modelled on
South Australia's dispensing power, Langbein is chiefly concerned
with eliminating the traditional insistence on strict compliance with
the formalities of transfer set out in the wills act. Langbein persuasively argues that the virtually universal recognition of relatively informal devices for achieving results indistinguishable from a transfer
by will undercuts any policy that might be served by the strict compliance rule for wills, and produces unjust and irrational results in
penalizing transferors who elect to dispose of their property by will,
but who inadvertently
fail to achieve strict compliance with the for4

malities.57

One of Langbein's stated objectives is resolution of some of the
disparities in the subsidiary law applicable to wills and will substitutes.
Langbein points out that "[m]ost rules of the law of wills are rules of

569. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (1990).
570. See id.
571. See Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 51-54. "The abiding lesson that
emerges from the . . . experience with the harmless error rule in South Australia is that the
rule works." Id. at 51.
572. Id. at 41-45; for discussion of the Queensland provision, see Miller, supra note 3, at
329-35.
573. See, e.g., Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8, at 52-53.
574. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 503-04, 523-24; Langbein,
HarmlessError Rules, supra note 8, at 52-53. See generally Langbein, Nonprobate Revolution,
supra note 5 (discussing the increasing popularity and juridical foundations of the will substitutes); Langbein, Family Wealth Transmission, supra note 13, at 722 (discussing changes in
methods of transferring private-sector wealth at death resulting from the rise of the nonprobate
system and fundamental changes in the nature of wealth).
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subsidiary law that apply only when a will is silent or unclear. 575 For
example, most jurisdictions typically provide that the testator's divorce
extinguishes the divorced spouse's interest in the testator's estate,
even if the testator dies without modifying his or her will.576 Similarly,
the law of wills specifically addresses such issues as the status of
adopted children, the effects of lapse or ademption, the rights of creditors to property within the probate estate, and the protection of the
family from disinheritance by the testator from creditors of the estate.5 77 Some of these issues arise with respect to will substitutes;
others do not.578 While some of these principles have been extended
in some jurisdictions to certain of the will substitutes, the law applicable to these devices - all products of judge-created exceptions to
579
the wills acts - is relatively unsystematic and undeveloped.
Neither Langbein nor the drafters of the revised UPC propose
eliminating the most fundamental consequence of the transferor's
choice to dispose of property by wills rather than will substitutes: i.e.,
property disposed of by will is subject to the probate system, while
property disposed of by will substitute is not. The UPC is of course
a probate code, from its inception primarily concerned with simplifying
and streamlining the probate process.8 Langbein sees no inconsistency
in permitting an alternative system for disposing of property at death
without the intervention of the probate courts, and in fact, has consistently supported recognition of the "nonprobate" system. 1 The 1990
revisions to the UPC attempt to bring the law of wills and will substitutes more into line while leaving the probate and nonprobate systems essentially intact and separate.
One of the most important contributions of the UPC to promoting
consistency in the treatment of wills and will substitutes has been the

575. Langbein, Nonprobate Revolution, supra note 5, at 1135.
576. See id.
577. See id. at 1135-39.
578. See id. at 1137 (pointing out, for example: (1) that the financial institutions that primarily operate the nonprobate system typically avoid the lapse problem by encouraging the testator
to name contingent beneficiaries and stipulate payment to the estate if none survive; and (2)
that the "asset-specific" character of the will substitutes obviates the probability of ademption).
579. See Miller, supranote 3, at 180-85 (discussing the development of the will substitutes).
580. See id. at 204-11 (discussing history of UPC and its predecessor, the Model Probate
Code).
581. See, e.g., Langbein, NonprobateRevolution, supra note 5 (discussing increasing popularity of will substitutes and the policies that support them); Langbein, Substantial Compliance,
supra note 8, at 505-09 (discussing the various will substitutes as "functionally equivalent" to
wills).
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development of the augmented estate concept,, giving a surviving
spouse access to assets transferred by will substitutes and, therefore,
outside the probate system. The UPC's forced share scheme "provides
a dramatic example of the integration of probate and nonprobate transfers. The UPC's forced-share scheme ... extends the spouse's elective
share to virtually all the will substitutes, and it charges probate and
nonprobate assets in proportion to their value." The 1990 revisions
have significantly refined the provisions for the protection of the surviving spouse.5 A further step in promoting consistency between the
law of wills and will substitutes has been the UPC's recent extension
of certain principles of construction traditionally applicable to wills to
the will substitutes.
The 1990 revisions to the UPC unquestionably represent considerable progress toward unified, consistent treatment of all donative dispositions that produce essentially testamentary effects, though the
UPC does not and by definition cannot resolve the disparity resulting
from the choice to dispose of property by will rather than by will
substitute.- The limited scope of the UPC both assumes and implies
the existence of a separate, nonprobate system for transferring property at death.
2. Devaluation of the Attestation Requirement
The UPC's proposed section 2-503 harmless error rule was intended
by its drafters to narrow the gap between wills and will substitutes
by "extending to will formalities the harmless error principle that has
long been applied to defective compliance with the formal requirements
for nonprobate transfers. ' ' 5 7 Enactment of a provision modelled on
section 2-503 would permit courts to enforce wills demonstrably intended to be implemented.
As the South Australian case law shows, a side effect of the application of a broad dispensing power provision is the virtual elimination
of attestation - the one distinguishing requirement of the wills for-

582. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-202. For discussion, see Miller, supranote 3, at 249-51.
583. Langbein, Nonprobate Revolution, supra note 5, at 1139.
584. See UNIF. PROB. CODE art. II, pt. 2 (1990) (revised elective share provisions). For
discussion, see Miller, supra note 3, at 249-51.
585. See UNIF. PROB. CODE art. II, pt. 7 (1990) ("Rules of Construction Applicable to
Donative Dispositions in Wills and Other Governing Instruments"). "Some of the sections in
Part 7 are revisions of sections contained in Part 6 of the pre-1990 Code. Although these sections
originally applied only to wills, their restricted scope was inappropriate." Id. general comment.
586. See Langbein, Nonprobate Revolution, supra note 5, at 1139.
587. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (1990).
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malitiesl s - as a substantive requirement for validity. Virtually all
variations of the dispensing power (as opposed to a "substantial compliance" or "attempted compliance" harmless error standard59°) permit
courts to dispense with the attestation requirement if testamentary
intent can be otherwise established5 91 To the extent that a particular
version of the dispensing power permits courts to dispense routinely
with the attestation requirement, the dispensing power effectively
though indirectly redefines the level of formality necessary for due
execution. South Australia's broad dispensing power has in fact been
applied more or less routinely to save completely unattested wills. 5
Even the narrower "threshold requirements" variant proposed in
British Columbia, limiting application of the dispensing power to signed
writings, would permit courts to dispense with the attestation requirement if testamentary intent can be otherwise established.5 93
Application of a dispensing power provision such as UPC section
2-503 may thus have the effect of virtually abolishing attestation as
a meaningful requirement for a valid will. Under such a provision,
the practical effect of the testator's noncompliance with the attestation
requirement is to shift the burden of proof to the proponent to establish
that the unattested will was nevertheless executed with testamentary
intent.5 m As Langbein suggests, consistent enforcement of unattested
wills under a dispensing power effectively reduces the attestation "requirement" to an option. 55 As discussed above, the practical result is
seemingly equivalent to Lindgren's proposed multi-tiered standard of

588. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 493.
589. Cf. Lindgren, supra note 19, at 543, 569.
590. See Miller, supra note 3, at 329-37 (discussing statutory "substantial compliance" and
"attempted compliance" standards).
591. See id. at 319-39 (discussing proposed and enacted variants of harmless error rules
and their consequences). Harmless error rules based on a principle of substantial compliance,
such as the Queensland provision, or upon a principle of attempted compliance, such as Tasmania's
proposed provision, are less likely to permit validation of attested wills. See id. at 329-35
(discussing statutory substantial compliance); id. at 335-37 (discussing attempted compliance
standard).
592. See Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8,at 23, 52. For discussion of South
Australian cases, see supra notes 89-117, 219-27 and accompanying text.
593. See Miller, supranote 3, at 337-39 (discussing application of British Columbia's proposed
"threshold requirements" provision).
594. Cf. Lindgren, supra note 19, at 571. For discussion of Lindgren's proposed abolition
of the attestation requirement, see Miller, supra note 3, at 290-91.
595. Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8,at 23. But "[N]oncompliance [with
the attestation requirement] is hardly an enticing option ... since (if detected) it throws one's
estate into litigation." Id.
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formality for due execution, 596 with failure of attestation operating as
a burden-shifting device.
The revised UPC seems to contemplate a multi-tiered approach to
due execution. At the highest level of formality, execution of a selfproved will in accordance with section 2-504 produces a powerful inference of testamentary intent and authenticityY. At the next level of
formality, a testator's compliance with the attestation requirement
and other formalities of section 2-502(a) produces a strong inference
of testamentary intent, though instances may infrequently arise in
which the duly attested will is challenged as a "sham" will.59s At the
next level down, a valid holographic will complying with section 2502(b) produces a strong inference of the authenticity if the handwriting requirement has been met; 99 however, if the holographic document
is ambiguous with respect to testamentary intent, extrinsic evidence
of testamentary intent may be required to show that the holographic
document was intended to be given effect as a will.6 Finally, section
2-503 may permit the court to enforce as a will a document that does
not comply with section 2-504, section 2-502(a), or section 2-502(b), if
the proponent produces clear and convincing evidence that the testator
intended the document to be enforced as a final disposition of his or
her property.6 1
The section 2-503 dispensing power thus eliminates the strict formalism of the wills acts 602 while retaining the statutory standards for
due execution. Enactment of a dispensing power modelled on section
2-503 would move the treatment of wills in the probate court closer
on the continuum to the relatively informal treatment accorded to will
substitutes. The comment to section 2-503 states that the addition of
the dispensing power strengthens "the purpose of validating wills
whenever possible. '1603 'Enactment of a dispensing power would consequently imply a legislative preference for the policy favoring enforcement of well-intended though formally defective testamentary disposi-

596. Lindgren, supra note L9, at 546-47, 569-71.
597. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-504 (1982). For discussion of self-proving wills, see Miller,
supra note 3, at 294-95.
598. Miller supra note 3, at, 275-76 (discussing "sham wills" cases).
599. See id. at 287.
600. Id. at 282 (discussing determination of testamentary intent in holographic wills cases
in which the document is ambiguous on its face); see Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra
note 8, at 515.
601. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (1990).
602. For discussion of the concept of "formalism," see Miller, supra note 3, at 185-87.
603. See UNIF. PROB. CODE art. II, pt. 5, general comment.
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tions over the policy of preventing increased costs and delay in the
probate process, and avoiding the need for adjudication in the probate
courts.
3. Abrogation of the Rule Forbidding Reformation of Wills
Another major source of disparity between the current treatment
of wills and will substitutes that the 1990 revisions to the UPC attempt
to address is the rule forbidding reformation of wills. Langbein and
Waggoner suggest that this rule reflects some of the same underlying
policies as the strict compliance doctrine.6 They argue that a judicial
reconsideration of the "no-reformation rule," which is "peculiar to the
5
law of wills," is long overdue.6
As Langbein and Waggoner point out, courts in fact routinely
reform mistakes "in deeds of gift, inter vivos trusts, life insurance
contracts and other instruments that serve to transfer wealth to donees
on decedents' death." Their 1982 article proposes a judicial reformation doctrine that would enable a court to rectify material mistakes
in a willw when "the alleged mistake involves a fact or event of particularity''Y6 8 if the proponent of the reformation establishes the mistake
by clear and convincing evidence. Their proposed reformation rule
would apply to wills containing mistakes in execution, such as those
in Blakely and other switched wills cases, 610 and to those wills contain61
ing terms contrary to the testator's wishes. 1
A broad dispensing power such as South Australia's obviates the
need for a judicial reformation doctrine to rectify mistakes in execution. In Blakely,612 the South Australian courts applied the dispensing
power in a switched wills case to cure mistaken execution.613 The
comment to section 2-503 cites Blakely as an appropriate application
614
of the UPC's dispensing power.

604.
605.
606.

See Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation, supra note 13, at 524.
Id.
Id. "Courts have been willing to use their equity powers in these nonprobate situations,

because a case of well-proven mistake necessarily invokes the fundamental principle of the law
of restitution: preventing unjust enrichment." Id.
607. Id. at 578. See id. at 580-81 for discussion.
608. Id. at 578.
609.
610.

Id.
See id. at 580-86. For discussion of Blakely, see supra notes 291-310. For discussion

of the rule forbidding reformation in the American courts, see supra note 294.
611.
612.
613.
614.

Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation, supra note 13, at 580-86.
Blakely, 32 S.A. St. R. at 473.
Id. at 480.
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-203 comment (1990).
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Section 2-503 is likewise directed toward curing harmless errors
in the execution of a will and does not apply to mistakes in the substance of the will. The drafters attempt to address this problem with
a revision to UPC section 2-601.615 Specifically, the drafters delete
from section 2-601 the following language: "The intention of a testator6
'6
as expressed in his will controls the legal effect of his dispositions. '
The provision now states: "In the absence of a finding of a contrary
intention, the rules of construction in this part control the construction
of a will. '' 617 According to the drafters' comment to section 2-601, one

purpose of altering the original language was to make it clear that
evidence extrinsic to the will as well as the will itself is admissible
for purposes of rebutting the part 6 rules of construction.6

8

A further

purpose for the revision was to prevent "a possible, though unintended
reading [of section 2-601] precluding the judicial adoption of a general
reformation doctrine for wills as advocated in the Langbein-Waggoner
article. "619

The Scope of New Uniform Probate Code Section 2-503
1. The Judicial Doctrine of Substantial Compliance
Compared with the Dispensing Power
a. Rationales
Section 2-503 is a dispensing power provision rather than a rule
of substantial compliance.6 ° In his 1987 article, Langbein explains the
difference between the rationales supporting these alternative
"strategies" for excusing harmless error: 62' a court applying the substantial compliance doctrine deems the noncomplying will to be in
compliance with the wills act, while a court applying the dispensing
power excuses noncompliance if the proponent shows testamentary
intent.623 In his 1987 article, Langbein compares the practical effects
of the South Australia's dispensing power and Queensland's statutory
version of the substantial compliance provision. Langbein concludes
that statutory substantial compliance has been "a flop" in Queensland. 623 He is disappointed by the Queensland's courts' interpretations

615.
616.
617.
618.
619.
620.
621.
622.
623.

See id. § 2-601 comment.
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-603 (1990).
Id. § 2-601 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. (citing Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation, supra note 13).
See Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8, at 1.
Id. at 6-8.
Id.
Id. at 1. For discussion of the Queensland provision, see Miller, supra note 3, at 329-35.
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of substantial compliance as a quantitative rather than a functional
standard.m The article ultimately favors the statutory dispensing
power approach,6 which Langbein correctly conjectured would be the
alternative preferred in most jurisdictions. 6
Because it is based on an express legislative grant of authority to
excuse deviation from the requirements with the wills act, the dispensing power would seem by definition to give the courts broader discretion than the judicial doctrine of substantial compliance proposed in
Langbein's 1975 article. In contrast to a dispensing power, substantial
compliance requires the courts to determine whether there has been
functional, substantive compliance with the wills act.2 7 The doctrine
is necessarily premised on construction of the wills act formalities
mandated by the legislature. In his 1987 article, Langbein states that
'in theory there [is] little [difference] between the purposive South
Australian dispensing power and the purposive substantial compliance
doctrine." A review of the South Australian cases, however, suggests
that Langbein's "purposive" interpretation of the South Australian
cases does not invariably comport with what the South Australian
courts appear to be saying and doing. To the contrary, Langbein's
review of the South Australian cases under section 12(2) appears colored by his functional interpretation of the wills act formalities. Like
the 1975 article (proposing a judicial substantial compliance doctrine
founded on functional analysis), the 1987 article (reviewing the impact
of the section 12(2) dispensing power on enforcement of defective wills
in South Australia) seems to focus on the relative "harmlessness" of
various formal defects in execution (such as presence defects, failure
of attestation, lack of signature, and total failure of execution) as a
fundamental issue in applying the harmless error rule.
The South Australian courts, as demonstrated, do not seem to
analyze execution defects in functional terms. While Baumanis and
dicta in some of the other opinions indicate that a signed writing may
be generally indispensable for enforcement of a will even in light of
section 12(2),m the South Australian courts have in most cases focused
on the available evidence of testamentary intent rather than on

624. See Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 44-45.
625. Id. at 7, 45.
626. Miller, supra note 3, at 319-39 (discussing various proposed and enacted harmless
error rules).
627. See Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8, at 6-7; Langbein, Crumbling
Wills Act, supra note 8, at 1194. For discussion, see Miller, supra note 3, at 305-08.
628. Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 53.
629. For discussion, see supra notes 257-350 and accompanying text.
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analysis of the seriousness of a particular defect, and have been liberal
in finding that proponents of even unexecuted wills have met the
burden of proof. As the cases involving unexecuted wills show, the
South Australian courts have not in practice tended to treat any one
formality as less dispensable than any other, but have freely permitted
even defects that Langbein characterizes as "fundamental" to be cured
or excused in instances in which the proponent clearly can prove
testamentary intent.63
b.

Ramifications of Alternative Approaches

The substantial compliance doctrine as Langbein originally conceived it and South Australia's dispensing power are similarly directed
toward enforcing testamentary intent. It appears, however, that the
two approaches would actually require a court to focus on somewhat
different issues in determining whether to apply the rule. In his 1975
article, Langbein seems to identify two issues that must apparently
be addressed in order for a court to deem a defective will in substantial
compliance with the purposes of the wills act. To apply the judicial
doctrine of substantial compliance, the court must apparently determine both that the purported will was intended to have testamentary
effect61 and that "[the] form [of the document] satisfie[s] the purposes
of the Wills Act. '' , 2 To the extent that these factors represent separate
criteria for applying the doctrine, Langbein's harmless error rule contemplates a narrower range of instances in which extrinsic proof of
intent can overcome the presumption of invalidity produced by the
testator's failure to comply with the formalities of the wills act than
a dispensing power approach that looks only to whether the facts
establish testamentary intent. Langbein's emphasis on the distinction
between application of the substantial compliance doctrine in jurisdictions that recognize holographic wills and in jurisdictions that require
all wills to be attested 63 suggests that he considered enforcement of
the wills act policies to be the primarygoal of substantial compliance.
Indeed, it would presumably be inappropriate for a judicially
adopted harmless error rule such as substantial compliance to enforce
testamentary intent without reference to the testator's compliance
with the requirements of the wills act, even if the meaning of "com-

630.
631.
632.
633.
634.

For discussion, see supra notes 352-411 and accompanying text.
Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 513, 514-15.
Id. at 513, 515-16.
See id. at 521-22; for discussion, see supra notes 80-90, 174-84 and accompanying text.
See Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 7.
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pliance" is functionally interpreted by the court applying the doctrine.6 5 The most that a judicially adopted substantial compliance doctrine could seemingly achieve would be substitution of a functional for
a literal construction of the wills act. Such a functional construction
would permit courts to consider conduct other than the actual execution of the will in determining whether the defective document could
be deemed to be in compliance with wills act formalities, 6 though, as
noted, judicial doctrine of substantial compliance would presumably
not permit the court to dispense with the requirement of compliance.
It is instructive to compare Langbein's articulation in his 1975 and
1987 articles of the central issues raised by a testator's failure to
achieve strict compliance with the wills act. In comparing the application of the rule of the traditional strict compliance standard to the
application of a functional substantial compliance standard, he writes
in the 1975 article that "[t]he courts now purport to ask... : did the
particular conduct constitute literal compliance with the formality?
The substantial compliance doctrine would replace that awkward, formalistic question with a more manageable question: did the [testator's]
conduct serve the purpose of the formality?"' 7 The 1975 article discusses the comparative seriousness of various types of common execution
defects, and the extent to which the substantial compliance doctrine
could cure those defectsm in those cases in which the proponent
could adduce sufficient extrinsic evidence of intent to meet the preponderance standard.6 9 Langbein considers that a testator's failure to
frame the testamentary scheme in a traditional writing, to sign the
will, or (in a jurisdiction that does not permit holographic wills as an
exception to the attestation requirement) to have the will attested,
would usually place the defective will beyond the reach of the substantial compliance doctrine. 64 0 In such instances the proponent would usually not be able to carry the burden of persuading the court that the
execution defects are harmless to the wills act policies. 61
In 1987, impressed by the intent-enforcing bent of the South Australian courts, Langbein wrote that

635. See Miller, supra note 3, at 305-06.
636.
637.

Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 6.
Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 525-26 (emphasis added).

638. Id. at 515-24.
639. Langbein, Crumbling Wills Act, supra note 8, at 1194; Langbein, Harmless Error
Rules, supra note 8, at 37.
640. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 518 (failure to sign will); id. at

518-19 (failure to set out scheme in traditional writing); id. at 521-22 (failure to have will attested
in jurisdiction that does not permit holographic wills).
641. Id.
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[w]hen presented with a defectively executed will, South
Australian courts are now allowed to ask the right question,
which is whether the document embodies the unequivocal
testamentary intent of the decedent. As so often happens in
the law, if you get the question right, it is much easier to
get the answer right.6
Based on his review of the South Australian cases, Langbein seems
more inclined to concede that extrinsic evidence might overcome even
serious defects in execution (such as total failure of attestation or
failure of the testator to sign the will)6 though he expresses discomfort
with the application of section 12(2) in hard cases such as Kelly,Williams,6and Sierp. 6 On the other hand, he concludes that despite
such "quibbles," the section 12(2) case law has been "overwhelmingly
successful. "7
The cases under the section 12(2) dispensing power generally turn
on the proponent's ability to establish testamentary intent beyond a
reasonable doubt. As Langbein's analysis reflects, the South Australian courts have been disposed to be satisfied of testamentary intent
in most cases, despite the extremely high level of proof contemplated
by section 12(2). Even in Hodge6s and Kelly,6 9 two relatively early
cases involving total failure of attestation, the courts were convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that the respective testators intended the
documents to be given effect, though the evidence indicated deliberate
noncompliance with the wills act formalities. o° As Langbein remarks,
"The courts would not have imposed serious criminal sanctions on
evidence of the quality seen in Kelly . . . . " Langbein suggests that

642. Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8,at 34 (emphasis added).
643. See id.at 18-23 (discussing application of § 12(2) to unattested wills) and id. at 23-27
(discussing application of § 12(2) to unsigned wills).
644. See id. at 20-22 (discussing Estate of Kelly, 32 S.A. St. R. 413, affd, 34 S.A. St. R.
370 (1983)); for discussion, see supra notes 102-17 and accompanying text.
645. See Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8,at 25-27 (discussing Estate of
Williams, 36 S.A. St. R. 423 (1984)); for discussion, see supra notes 311-55 and accompanying
text.
646. See Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8,at 32-33 (discussing Estate of
Sierp, cited id. at 32)); for discussion, see supra notes 534-43 and accompanying text.
647. Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8,at 34.
648. 40 S.A. St. R. 398 (1986); for discussion, see supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
649. 32 S.A. St. R. 413, affd, 34 S.A. St. R. 370 (1983); for discussion, see supra notes
102-17 and accompanying text.
650. For discussion, see supra notes 95-117 and accompanying text.
651. Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8,at 35.
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the extreme liberality of the South Australian courts may be due to
the fact that most of the cases arising under section 12(2) are uncontested. 52
Although continuing to consider the nature of the defect in compliance with the wills act highly relevant to the issue of intent, Langbein seems to acknowledge in the 1987 article (though somewhat reluctantly) that the proponent of a defectively executed will might conceivably succeed in establishing testamentary intent even in some instances
in which the testator had deliberately failed to comply with fundamental requirements of the wills acts.m Influenced by the South Australian
case law, he appears to extend his conception of the appropriate scope
for a harmless error rule based on a dispensing power significantly
beyond the limits he had envisioned for the substantial compliance
doctrine in his 1975 article.
2. Application of Section 2-503
a. Specific Defects in Execution
A legislature which enacts the UPC's new section 2-503 without
modification impliedly endorses a policy of enforcing testators' intentions at the expense of an increased burden on the probate system.
Section 2-503 appears to embody a broad dispensing power. The language of section 2-503 closely resembles the language of the Manitoba
provision,6 which one commentator characterized as "the most radical" of the various forms of dispensing power provisions. Arguably,
the scope of the section 2-503 dispensing power is as broad or broader
than the South Australian provision and arguably could be extended
even to unexecuted or nontraditional (i.e., electronic) documents in
appropriate circumstances.66 In any case in which the proponent succeeds in producing clear and convincing evidence of testamentary intent, section 2-503 on its face grants the court power to dispense with
any or all of the wills act formalities.6 7
The comment to section 2-503 seems to reflect a more limited
intention. While section 2-503 may be applied to excuse such defects
as failure of attestation, defective attestation, defective compliance

652. Id. at 40-41.
653. See id. at 20-21; but see id. at 32-3.
654. The Wills Act, 1982-83, MAN. REV. STAT. 387, ch. 31, § 23, Cap. W150 (1983); for
text of the provision, see Miller, supm note 3, at 321 n.800; for discussion, see id. at 319-23.
655. Maxton, supra note 19, at 412.
656. For discussion, see supra notes 481-88 and accompanying text.
657.

See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (1990).
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with the handwriting requirement and defective signature, the comment to section 2-503 indicates that the drafters considered that the
provision would usually not be extended to unsigned wills (whether
attested or unattested). Moreover, both the comment to section 2-503
and the language of section 2-506 suggest that the dispensing power
should only be applied to traditional writings.6
The comment to section 2-503 may indicate that its drafters assumed that courts would apply a functional approach in determining
whether a particular defect in execution, alteration, revocation, or
revival would invalidate the will. The drafters may have assumed that
application of the power would turn upon the nature of the defect and
its harmlessness to the wills act purposes in light of the available
evidence of testamentary intent.6 9 Specifically, the comment to section
2-503 states that "[t]he larger the departure from Section 2-503 formality, the harder it will be to satisfy the court that the instrument
reflects the testator's intent." The comment thus incorporates the
language derived from Graham61 relating the proponent's burden of
persuading the court that a defective will was executed with testamentary intent to the degree of the testator's departure from the wills
act.r 2 As previously discussed, Langbein interprets this language as
a judicial gloss on section 12(2) imposing a functional or purposive
limit on the scope of the dispensing power.6 If the comment is construed as incorporating a functional standard, the UPC's section 2-503
dispensing power presumably would only in unusual and compelling
circumstances excuse a fundamental deviation from the wills act (such
as failure of the testator to sign the will at all) because the proponent
would be unable to persuade the court of the harmlessness of the
error.
Another reading of the Graham dictum than that suggested by
Langbein is indicated by the South Australian courts' actual application
of section 12(2). A review of South Australia's section 12(2) case law,

658. See id. § 2-503 comment; id. § 2-506 (dealing with choice of law). For discussion of
the drafters' position with respect to unsigned wills, see supra notes 412-26 and accompanying
text. For discussion of their views on electronic wills, see supra notes 481-88 and accompanying
text.
659. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (1990).
660. Id.
661. Graham, 20 S.A. St. R. 205. For discussion of Graham, see supra notes 58-75 and
accompanying text.
662. For relevant language from Graham, see supra text accompanying note 69.
663. Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 17, 52.
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especially those cases involving unexecuted wills,6 suggests that the
South Australian courts have interpreted the language in Graham
flexibly rather than functionally. In Williams, for example, Judge
King expressly declined to construe the dispensing power as requiring
the court to consider any particularformality (other than the requirement of a "document") as intrinsically more essential and therefore
less dispensable than any other formality.6 Judge King's interpretation has in turn been incorporated into a number of other section 12(2)
opinions. The language incorporated into section 12(2) seems to be
interpreted in South Australia to mean that the evidence of testamentary intent must be more compelling in order to convince the court
that the testator intended to create a will in cases in which the overall
level of formality observed by the testator departs significantly from
the South Australian wills act requirements. In any event, the Graham
dictum obviously has not hindered extension of section 12(2).
Although in his 1987 article Langbein comes down in favor of the
dispensing power approach, he seems to consider that the scope of
even a broad dispensing power should be limited. For example, Langbein argues courts only rarely should accept extrinsic evidence of
intent to establish an unsigned document as a completed will.

7

Al-

though Langbein concludes in his 1987 article that only the writing
requirement is treated as indispensable to the purposes of the wills
acts in South Australia ("[fMailure to give permanence to the terms of
your will is not harmless"),m he asserts that omission of the testator's
signature "raise[s] a grievous doubt about the finality and genuineness
of the instrument."6 As previously discussed, Langbein questions the
South Australian court's application of section 12(2) to validate the
unsigned will in the Williams case, even though the unsigned document had been attested by witnesses in the presence of the testator
and her husband in what was intended to be a joint wills execution
ceremony. 70 In analyzing the South Australian cases, Langbein conjectures that Baumanis v. Praulin71 would prevent application of the

664.

For discussion of these cases, see supra notes 352-416 and accompanying text.

665. For discussion of the requirement of a document in South Australia, see supra notes
469-80 and accompanying text.
666. Williams, 36 S.A. St. R. at 425 (King, C.J.) (quoted supra in text accompanying note
337).
667. See Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 52.
668. Id.
669.
670.
671.

Id.
Id. at 26-27. For discussion, see supra notes 311-55 and accompanying text.
25 S.A. St. R. 423 (1980). For discussion, see supra notes 257-90 and accompanying
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dispensing power to save unsigned wills in most cases. 6 7 The comment

to section 2-503 may indicate that the drafters held similarly restrictive
views respecting the appropriate scope of the dispensing power when
applied to an unsigned will and that they in fact accepted Langbein's
interpretation of the South Australian cases as incorporating a functional standard.673 As remarked, the comment to UPC section 2-503
states that the South Australian courts have been "extremely reluctant
to excuse noncompliance with the signature requirement."67 The drafters do not cite Williams, Richardson, or Vauk. 675 The comment states
that the new section 2-503 should be applied to unsigned wills mainly
in "the recurrent class of cases in which two wills are prepared for
simultaneous execution by two testators . . . and each mistakenly
6 76
signs the will prepared for the other.

The UPC drafters cite Langbein's 1987 article as authority for the
proposition that "the South Australian . . . courts lightly excuse
breaches of the attestation requirements. ' ' 677 The comment is, to this

extent, consistent with Langbein's apparent modification of his views
respecting the fundamental nature of attestation in nonholographic
jurisdictions, 67s as exemplified in his ready acceptance of South Aus-

tralia's liberal application of section 12(2) to unattested wills.679 The
South Australian experience in applying the dispensing power to attestation apparently persuaded Langbein that the formality may be dispensable even in jurisdictions that do not recognize unattested holographic wills.6 ° Although, as we have seen, Langbein originally viewed
attestation as serving a fundamental policy in jurisdictions that do not
permit the holographic form,61 he now characterizes South Australia's
attestation requirement as serving a "more modest" function in a context in which "most people do not need protecting."- In this respect,
Langbein's analysis of the role of attestation in South Australia is

672. Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 23-24, 27, 52.
673. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (1990).
674. Id.
675. See id.
676. Id.
677. Id.
678. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 521-22.
679. See Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8, at 23, 52.
680. Compare id. at 52 with Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 521
("Attestation . . . has been nearly as fundamental in the statutory schemes as signature and

writing.")
681.
682.

Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 498, 521-22.
Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 52.
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consistent with Lindgren's argument that attestation is dispensable
as a substantive requirement for due execution,6 despite its effectiveness in serving both the ritual and cautionary aspects of verifying
testamentary intent,6 and in serving the authenticating 6 5and channeling functions.
The drafters of section 2-503 remark in the comment that one effect
of enacting the UPC version of the dispensing power would be to
reduce "the tension between holographic wills and the two-witness
requirement for attested wills under section 2-503(a). Ordinarily, the
testator who attempts to make an attested will but blunders will still
have achieved a level of formality that compares favorably with that
permitted for holographic wills under the Code." The comment to
section 2-503 reflects Langbein's view that insistence on strict compliance with the attestation requirement is inconsistent with the recognition of informal devices for achieving essentially the same result.6
The comment to section 2-503 thus in most respects seems to incorporate Langbein's views respecting the appropriate scope of a harmless
error rule, including his modified view (based on his review of the
South Australian cases) of the indispensability of attestation in a jurisdiction that does not recognize holographic wills and his insistence on
the indispensability of the signature requirement in establishing testamentary intent and authenticity, and in "channeling" the will to the
probate court. The comment also seems to contemplate the essentially
functional approach that Langbein's 1987 article purports to find implicit in the South Australian courts' application of the dispensing
power.s 9 Again, however, although Langbein's interpretation of the
South Australian case law seems reflected in the comment to section
2-503, the actual language used in section 2-503 does not limit its
potential application by incorporating a functional or "purposive"
standard or otherwise than by imposing a "clear and convincing" standard of proof for application of the rule.690 Perhaps the drafters of

683. Lindgren, supra note 19, at 542, 544-40.
684. For discussion of the role of attestation in establishing testamentary intent, see Miller,
supra note 3, at 262 n.496, 274-80.

685. For discussion of the role of attestation in authenticating the will, see id. at 267 n.506.
686. For discussion of the channeling function of attestation, see id. at 274-80.
687.
688.
689.
posive"
690.

UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (1990).
See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 504.
See, e.g., Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 17, 52 (discussing "purdictum from Graham, 20 S.A. St. R. at 205).
See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (1990).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

99

Florida Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 4 [1991], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol, 43

section 2-503, like Langbein, assumed that a functional standard of
formality is inherent in the concept of a power to dispense with formalities in certain instances.
The comment to section 2-503 in fact seems to indicate that the
drafters of section 2-503 not only accepted Langbein's functional interpretation of the South Australian case law, but also perhaps even
considered that such an interpretation must ineluctably flow from the
language of section 2-503. "[N]ew Section 2-503 permits the proponents
of the will to prove that the defective execution did not result from
irresolution or from circumstances suggesting duress or trickery in other words that the defect was harmless to the purpose of the
formality .... "691 As previously explained, the evolution of the South
Australian case law under section 12(2) reveals that such an assumption
is not necessarily correct.
b. Deliberate Noncompliance with the Wills Act
In contrast to the South Australian courts, Langbein seems to
remain convinced that the testator's knowledge of the requirements
for a valid will ought to be relevant to application of a harmless error
rule. In his 1987 article, Langbein remarks that "[w]hen the testator's
blunder is a knowing one, our inclination is to say that the error is
not harmless. If the testator knew that he [or she] was not complying
with the wills act, the likely inference is that he [or she] did not want
to comply. Intentional noncompliance belies testamentary intent."69
As previously remarked, the South Australian courts have not in
practice treated the testator's knowledge of the wills act requirements
as a serious obstacle to application of section 12(2). In both Hodge
and Kelly, 693 the courts applied the section 12(2) dispensing power to
unattested wills in circumstances indicating that the testator was
aware of the attestation requirement, but had made no attempt to
comply. In Sierp,69 an unreported case involving defective alteration

of a will, the court applied section 12(2) even though the testator's
solicitor had informed him that his altered document would not be

691.
692.
693.

Id. § 2-503 comment (emphasis added).
Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8, at 32-33.
Hodge, 40 S.A. St. R.. at 398; Kelly, 32 S.A. St. R. at 413, affd, 34 S.A. St. R. at

370. For discussion, see supra notes 95-117 and accompanying text.
694. Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8 (citing Estate of Sierp, No. 173 of
1982 (S.A. Sup. Ct. Dec. 13, 1982)); for discussion, see supra notes 534-43 and accompanying text.
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enforceable and that he needed to re-execute his will.695 In VaukY6
Judge Legoe suggested that a court could apply section 12(2) to an
unexecuted will even though the testator was obviously aware that
the law required certain formalities for due execution, since prior to
his suicide he had taken his will to the Public Trustee to6 be drafted
and had made an appointment to have the will executed. 9
Consistent with Langbein's analysis, the drafters of section 2-503
apparently considered the testator's knowledge of the wills act requirements to be an important factor for a court applying the dispensing
power. The comment seems to suggest that section 2-503 is appropriately applied when the testator's noncompliance with the wills act
is inadvertent. For example, the drafters interpreted the South Australian dispensing power case law as suggesting that the dispensing
power should be applied to unattested or partially attested wills
"[w]hen the testator misunderstands the attestation requirements of
Section 2-502(a) and neglects to obtain one or both witnesses .... ,698
With respect to the application of section 2-503 to defectively altered
wills, the drafters remark that "[l]ay persons do not always understand that the execution and revocation requirements . . . call for
fresh execution in order to modify a will. ' 699 Similarly, the switchedwills case that the section 2-503 drafters conclude exemplifies sufficiently compelling circumstances to justify application of the dispensing
power to a (technically) unsigned will is a paradigm case of mistaken
execution. 7oo
c. Attempted Compliance as a Threshold Requirement for
Application of the Dispensing Power
It is not clear from the language of section 2-503 or from the
comment whether the provision could be appropriately applied in a
case in which the evidence shows that the testator understood the
requirements of the wills act and intentionally for one reason or
another did not attempt to comply, as in Hodge, Kelly, Sierp, and
Vauk. Langbein suggests in his 1987 article that attempted compliance
with the formalities ought to be "a factor of fundamental importance"
in determining whether the document was executed with testamentary

695.
696.

Langbein, Harmless Errorrules, supra note 8, at 32.
Vauk, 41 S.A. St. R. at 247-48; for discussion, see supra notes 352-411 and accompany-

ing text.
697.
698.
699.

Vauk, 41 S.A. St. R. at 245, 248.
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (1990) (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).

700. For discussion of the switched wills cases, see supra note 294.
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intent701 "Attempt is purposive. Defective compliance is not as good
as perfect compliance, but it is much better than (and much different
from) noncompliance.7 - Langbein notes with approval Judge Legoe's
emphasis in the Williams case on the testator's conduct both before
and after the will was executed. In concluding that the unsigned will
in Williams should nevertheless be enforced, Judge Legoe pointed
out that the testator had "done everything consistent with the formal
and conclusive act of making . . and completing her last will except
°3
that she did not sign it. She set the stage for such a complete act."
Langbein, who acknowledges having reservations about the application
of section 12(2) in Williams, was somewhat reassured by Judge
Legoe's emphasis on the circumstances surrounding the bungled execution tending to show that the testator took steps to execute the will,
though she never attempted to sign.7°0 Similarly, in Vauk, Judge
Legoe's apparent disposition to be convinced that the unexecuted will
was intended by the testator to be enforced was clearly influenced by
the testator's having taken steps to have a new will prepared by the
Public Trustee (though he killed himself without attempting to execute
it),705 and by other circumstances (such as the suicide note apparently
referring to the unexecuted will70) that tended to show that the testator had done all he could do to indicate that he wanted to have the
will enforced.
Although Graham, 70 7 the earliest South Australian case, expressly
rejected attempted compliance as a determinative factor or threshold
requirement for applying the dispensing power, 7° Langbein points out
that proof of attempted compliance with the formalities logically implies testamentary intent.-° Langbein seems to consider attempted
compliance to be a pivotal factor in those cases in which the defect is
fundamental - for example, if the testator fails to sign the document
at all. While he questions the application of section 12(2) in Hodge
and Kelly, cases in which the testators deliberately made no attempt
to comply with the attestation requirement, he appears less concerned about the effect of extending the dispensing power to unat-

701.
702.
708.
704.
705.
706.
707.
708.
709.

Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8, at 26.
Id.
Williams, 36 S.A. St. R. at 434.
See Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 26-27.
See Vauk, 41 S.A. St. R. at 245, 248.
See id. at 245.
20 S.A. St. R. 198 (1978). For discussion, see supranotes 58-75 and accompanying text.
Graham, 20 S.A. St. R. at 205.
See Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 26.
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tested wills in such instances than in the case of an unsigned will.7 10

It is somewhat unclear in any case what Langbein means by "attempted compliance." A soft spot in his 1987 article is his failure to distinguish attempted compliance with the wills act (which might produce
a seriously defective will in the case of an unsophisticated testator)
from attempted compliance with the specific formalities (which could
potentially produce a defectively signed or defectively attested will,
but not an unsigned, unattested, or unexecuted will). The question
raised by Langbein's analysis is whether the proponent of a defective
will should be requiredto prove that the testator attempted to comply
with the wills act in order to establish the validity of a gravely defective will. Langbein apparently considers attempted compliance with
the formalities to be highly relevant to application of any harmless
error rule, though he expressly states in the 1975 article that the
substantial compliance doctrine does not contemplate any minimum or
threshold level of formality for its application. 711
It is unclear whether and to what extent the drafters of section
2-503 intended a court applying a dispensing power based on that
provision to consider the testator's attempted compliance with the
formalities. They may have assumed, based on Langbein's interpretation, that attempted compliance should be considered one factor in
determining the appropriateness of applying the dispensing power. It
is apparent, however, that they did not contemplate any minimum or
threshold requirements for application of section 2-503.712

d. Weighing the Evidence of Testator's Compliance with the
Wills Act Formalities
The comment to section 2-503 states that "[s]ection 2-503 means
to retain the intent-serving benefits of Section 2-502 formality without
inflicting intent-defeating outcomes in case of harmless error. ''17 3 if

one reads section 2-503 in light of both its history and the drafters'
appended comment, it appears that section 2-503 is a hybrid provision
falling somewhere on the continuum between South Australia's broad
dispensing power and Langbein's functional substantial compliance
doctrine.
Section 2-503 raises the standard of proof needed to rebut the
presumption that a defective will was not executed with testamentary

710.
711.
712.
713.

Compare id. at 26-27 (unsigned will) with id. at 20-22 (unattested wills).
Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 513.
See UNIF.PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (1990).
Id.
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intent from the civil preponderance standard Langbein apparently
contemplates in his 1975 article714 to the more onerous "clear and
7 15
convincing evidence" standard he recommends in his 1987 article.
The drafters remark that "by placing the burden of proof upon the proponent of a defective instrument, and by requiring the proponent to
discharge that burden by clear and convincing evidence, section 2-502
imposes procedural standards appropriate to the seriousness of the
issue. 1716

That the South Australian courts have taken a very easy attitude
toward the question of what constitutes sufficient evidence to persuade
them "beyond a reasonable doubt" of the existence of testamentary
intent has presumably been established by review of the case law.
This expansiveness may, as Langbein suggests, be due in part to a
requirement of South Australian probate law disallowing consensual
suppression of the will,717 with the result that even uncontested cases
have to be litigated.71 8 Langbein suggests in his 1987 article that in
applying section 12(2), the South Australian courts have fashioned "an
unconventional meaning" for the reasonable doubt standard of proof
7 19
that is more appropriate to the civil than the criminal context.
Perhaps because so many of the section 12(2) cases have been uncontested,7 ° South Australia's courts seem strongly disposed to enforce
purported wills in any case in which there is sufficient evidence of
testamentary intent to tilt the scales in favor of the proponent. (Williams,-, Vauk,7- and Richardson,72 for example, were all uncontested
cases, while Baumanis7 2 was contested.?)
Langbein points out in his 1987 article that substitution of a "clear
and convincing" standard of evidence for the traditional preponderance
standard would raise the standard of proof beyond that required in
ordinary civil cases without imposing the onerous burden of proof

714. See Langbein, Crumbling Wills Act, supra note 8, at 1194; Langbein, Harmless Error
Rules, supra note 8, at 37.
715. Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8, at 35-37.
716. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (1990).
717. Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8, at 38-41.
718. Id. at 38.
719. Id. at 35.
720. Id. at 13 n.46, 38.
721. Williams, 36 S.A. St. R. at 423.
722. Vauk, 41 S.A. St. R. at 242.
723. Richardson, 40 S.A. St. R. at 594.
724. Baumanis, 25 S.A. St. R. at 423.
725. Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8, at 13 n.46.
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appropriate to a criminal proceeding or requiring the sort of refashioning of the criminal standard that has occurred in South Australia.26
The drafters of the South Australian statute were intentionally seeking
a higher standard of proof than usually applies in civil cases because
they were 'inviting litigation about an issue of great importance;"
Langbein considers the reasonable doubt standard inappropriate to
the context.7 Arguably, however, the "clear and convincing" standard
incorporated into section 2-503 will produce a less liberal application
of-the dispensing power than has actually occurred under South Australia's extremely loose "reasonable doubt" standard. For example, a
problematic case such as Kelly72 might well go the other way under
a conventional "clear and convincing" standard, since in Kelly there
was evidence that the unattested will offered for probate was intended
only as a conditional will.3 ° The drafters of section 2-503 remark that
[b]y placing the burden of proof upon the proponent of a
defective instrument, and by requiring the proponent to discharge that burden by clear and convincing evidence (which
courts at the trial and appellate levels are urged to police
with rigor), section 2-503 imposes procedural standards appropriate to the seriousness of the issue.71
e.

Potential Scope Contemplated for Section 2-503 Compared to Scope of
Other Forms of the Dispensing Power

The section 2-503 comment projects a scope for section 2-503 that
is ultimately more consistent with a functional or qualitative substantial compliance approach than with the primarily intent-enforcing approach of the South Australian courts. To the extent that section 2-503
is viewed as incorporating a functional interpretation of the wills act
formalities, it presumably contemplates a considerably narrower application than either South Australia's or Manitoba's version of the dispensing power. 2 While section 2-503 is potentially broader than the
dispensing power subject to threshold requirements that was proposed
in British Columbia,7 the section 2-503 comment suggests that the

726.
727.

Id. at 36.
Id.

728. Id.
729. Kelly, 32 S.A. St. R. 413, affd, 34 S.A. St. R. 370 (1983).
730. See Kelly, 34 S.A. St. R. at 383.
731.

UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (1990).

732. See Miller, supra note 3, at 339-46.
733. For discussion of British Columbia's 'threshold requirements" approach, see id. at
337-39.
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drafters agreed with Langbein's position that failure to sign or execute
the will at all would normally fall outside the reach of the dispensing
power because such errors raise unresolvable issues of intent or authenticity.3 Despite Langbein's assertion in the 1975 article that substantial compliance is neither a rule of "maximum" nor of "minimum"
formalities, the effect of a functional standard of compliance with the
wills acts appears, as demonstrated, to set a threshold of practicability
for the proponent who wishes to prove that an unsigned or completely
unexecuted will was executed with testamentary intent.
Moreover, the scope of section 2-503 is arguably even narrower
than the substantial compliance doctrine as originally envisioned by
Langbein due to the adoption of the clear and convincing standard
rather than the civil preponderance standard Langbein originally envisioned.- 5 Langbein, however, remarks that "[c]omplying substantially necessarily involves conduct that evinces unmistakable testamentary intent. On the other hand, for precisely that reason, little harm
would be done if an explicit [clear and convincing] standard were
' '736
superimposed upon the substantial compliance doctrine.
IV.

THE HARMLESS ERROR SOLUTION: ISSUES, OBJECTIONS,
AND ANSWERS

A. Litigation of the Issue of Intent in the Probate Courts
It is axiomatic that the adoption of any form of a harmless error
rule either by judicial fiat or legislative enactment must inevitably
have an impact on the probate practice of the jurisdiction in which
the rule is adopted or enacted. The wills act formalities have procedural
as well as substantive aspects. The formalities serve not only to establish testamentary intent and the authenticity of the document, but
also to facilitate identification of the document as a will by the probate
court and to obviate the need for the court to adjudicate issues of
73
intent. 7
Since the Statute of Frauds was enacted in 1677, 7- the law of wills
has had to balance the privilege of free testation739 against the state's

See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (1990).
735. See Langbein, Crumbling Wills Act, supra note 8,at 1194; Langbein, Harmless Error
Rules, supra note 8,at 37.
736. Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8,at 37.
737. For discussion of the functions served by the wills act formalities, see Miller, supra
note 3, at 258-88.
738. Id. at 200. For history of the wills formalities, see id. at 187-221.
734.

739.

See id. at 179-80, 244.
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705

interest in protecting the probate system from burdensome litigation.
The history of the wills act formalities and their construction in the
courts reflects the perpetual tension between the testator's privilege
of free testation and the perceived need to limit the issues that must
be resolved after the testator's death. 40 In a property system mandating judicial intervention for enforcement of testamentary dispositions,
the avoidance of excessive costs and delay is of necessity a fundamental
policy. This policy must inevitably be compromised by the adoption
or enactment of any form of harmless error rule.
The law of succession, as distinct from the law of wills, sometimes
permits property owners to avoid probate and its associated costs and
issues. 41 The will substitutes have evolved into an alternative nonprobate system that does not require judicial intervention unless the
disposition is challenged.74 Moreover, the formalities required to effectuate dispositions by will substitute have been established by business
practice (as in the case of third party contracts with financial institutions or insurance companies), or by reference to the writing and
signature requirements of the statutes of frauds (as in the case of
revocable trusts).74 Depending on the device in question, the formalities typically observed may (though not necessarily) resolve the
question of the transferor's intentions.74 The case law addressing
transferor intent in cases in which dispositions by means of will substitutes have been challenged reveal a degree of flexibility in the
courts' consideration of the nature of the disposition and the intentions
of the transferor that is totally alien to the law of wills. 745 The question
is whether such flexibility is desirable or even obtainable in the very
different context of the probate system, which has traditionally been
designed to avoid the need for courts to engage in fact-finding respecting the intentions of testators.
The drafters of section 2-503 concluded that
[e]xperience in Israel and South Australia strongly supports
the view that a dispensing power... will not breed litigation

740.
741.

See id. at 244-54.
Id. at 180-85. See generally Langbein, NonprobateRevolution, supranote 5 (discussing

the role of the will substitutes and the nonprobate system).
742.
743.
744.

Miller, supra note 3, at 180.
See supra notes 201-04 and accompanying text.
See id.

745.

For discussion of the courts' resolution of intent issues with respect to will substitutes,

see, e.g., McGovern, The Payable on Death Bank Account and Other Will Substitutes, 67 Nw.
U.L. REv. 7, 15-18 (1972); Comment, Texas ProbateCode Section 439(a): Conclusive or Rebuttable Presumption of Survivorship?, 35 BAYLOR L. REV. 837 (1983).
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•.. [but] "actually prevents a great deal of litigation" because
it limits disputes about technical lapses and limits the zone
of the dispute to the functional question of whether
the in746
strument correctly expresses the testator's intent.
It is difficult, however, to see how a harmless error rule could fail to
bring about an initial increase in probate litigation since only through
application by the courts can the precise parameters of such a power
be determined. Adoption of a harmless error rule in one of the jurisdictions in which the probate courts retain their traditional low status
and limited powers 747 would compel the legislature to broaden the
probate courts' powers, since application of even a narrow harmless
error rule forces a court to adjudicate the factual issue of testamentary
intent, a further burden on the probate system.
Only if it is conceded that the primary goal of the property system
is to enforce the intentions of property owners whenever possible is
the so-called "channeling" policy of expediting the probate process an
insufficient justification for the consequences of the strict compliance
doctrine. Great Britain's Law Reform Commission concluded that the
costs to the system of a harmless error rule outweighed the potential
benefits because
by making it less certain whether or not an informally executed will is capable of being admitted to probate, [a harmless
error rule] could lead to litigation, expense and delay, often
in cases where [expense and delay] could least be afforded,
7
for it is the home-made wills which most often go wrong. 4
Langbein suggests that implementation of a harmless error rule
would not present insurmountable channeling difficulties for courts in
jurisdictions that recognize holographic wills, since in those jurisdictions, the channeling policy is routinely compromised by the enforcement of unconventional wills. 49 In those jurisdictions,
the litigation which would occur would for the most part
raise familiar issues which the courts have demonstrated

746. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (1990).
747. See Mann, Self-Proving Wills and Formalismin Wills Adjudication, 63 WASH. U.L.Q.
39, 62-68 (1985). For discussion of the relationship between the strict compliance doctrine and
the inferior status of probate courts in some jurisdictions, see Miller, supra note 3, at 251-54.
748. Law Reform Committee, The Making and Revocation of Wills, 1980, 22d Report,
Comnd. No. 7904, at 4 [hereinafter British Report].
749. Langbein, SubstantialCompliance, supra note 8, at 494, 515; for discussion, see Miller,
supra note 3, at 274-86.
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their ability to handle well.... [T]he elements of the substantial compliance doctrine arise in other contexts in current
litigation when courts examine whether purported wills evidence testamentary
intent and were executed freely and with
°
finality.2
The drafters of section 2-503 remark that one effect of the dispensing
power would be to equalize treatment of holographic and defectively
attested or unattested wills under the Code7 51
B. Disrespectfor the Wills Act Requirements and the
Potentialfor Uncertainty in the Law
A potential objection to a harmless error rule with both institutional
and practical implications is that permitting the courts to validate
defective wills may eventually undercut the standard set by the wills
act.7 52 In response to this argument, Langbein asserts as "a fundamental point" that adoption of a harmless error rule "would have no effect
whatever upon primary conduct" of testators.7 According to Langbein, no testator would deliberately violate the wills act in reliance
on a harmless error rule. 76 Since a harmless error rule doesnot guarantee that the proponents of a defectively executed will will succeed in
establishing testamentary intent, adoption or enactment of such a rule
would not encourage intentional noncompliance with the wills act.
Informed testators and professional estate planners would still do everything possible to ensure due execution of the will by careful adherence to the statutory requirements in order to avoid the potential
expense and delay involved in adjudication of intent.765 "The incentive
for due execution would remain.... Anyone who would know enough
about the probate process to know that the [harmless error rule]
''
5
1 6
existed would know enough not to want to rely on it.
In an article written at a time when only fifteen cases had been
decided under South Australia's section 12(2), J.G. Miller comments

750.

Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 525.

751. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (1990).
752. See J. Miller, Execution of Wills, supra note 19, at 575.
753. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 524.
754. Id. at 524-25.
755. Id.
756. Id. Anyone sophisticated enough to be aware of the harmless error rule would presumably understand that its application means throwing the estate into litigation. See Langbein,
Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8,at 23 (stating noncompliance with the wills act in South
Australia not an "enticing option").
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that South Australia's dispensing power provision "did not seem to
reveal any weakening in the attitude toward formalities. '' 157 Miller
speculates, however, that "increased familiarity may breed some contempt for the prescribed formalities . . . . [although] human instinct
is more likely to lead to a desire to do things properly. '' 75 Miller
concludes that adoption or enactment of even a broad harmless error
rule would not increase uncertainty in the law of wills to an unacceptable extent. 759 He notes that judges often distort the law or facts in
order to enforce intent. 71'0 According to Miller, distortion is more likely
to result from enforcement of a strict compliance rule than from application of a harmless error rule.
[T]here are doubtful documents under the present system.
. . . There are always likely to be doubtful documents, but
a dispensing power would enable the validity of such documents to be determined on the basis of the real issue - the
testator's intention - rather than on whether the formalities
can be stretched to cover the actual facts.761
Like Miller, Langbein concedes that some degree of imprecision
in the law is inevitable under a harmless error rule. Langbein likewise
argues that any such imprecision created by application of a harmless
error rule would ultimately be less damaging to the system than the
imprecision created by the strict compliance doctrine.
It is unthinkable that "millions of estates and billions of
dollars in assets" will invariably pass trouble free. We expect
the channeling function to be impaired in some fraction of
cases. The choice is not between litigation and no litigation.
In cases of defective compliance the important choice is between litigation resolved purposefully and honestly . . . or
irrationally and sometimes dishonestly under the rule of lit762
eral compliance.
In determining to recommend a very broad dispensing power modelled on South Australia's section 12(2), the Manitoba Law Reform
Commission concluded that even a broad harmless error rule would

757.
758.
759.
760.
761.
762.

J. Miller, Execution of Wills, supra note 19, at 575.
Id. at 577.
Id. at 579-80.
Id. at 581.
Id.
Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 526.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss4/1

110

Miller: Will Formailty, Judicial Formalism, and Legislative Reform: An Ex
UPC § 2-503

not unduly impair "performance of all the valuable functions" served
by the formalities. 76 Like Langbein, the Manitoba Law Reform Commission considered trouble-free resolution of all probate matters to be
an unattainable goal.76 In contrast, British Columbia's Law Reform
Commission, considering whether to recommend enactment of a dispensing power, expressed concern that a broad rule would "result in
a multiplicity of forms of wills." 7 The British Columbia Law Reform
Commission considered the potential for undermining the wills act
requirements to be "the most difficult argument to overcome for proponents of a dispensing power." 76 British Columbia's solution was to
propose a rule that limits application of the dispensing power to signed
7
writings.
C.

SubstantialIncrease in Litigated Documents

Arguing in favor of a broad dispensing power, Western Australia's
Law Reform Commission suggested that any increase in litigation
over defectively executed wills under such a provision would be offset
by "a diminution in the number of, or at least in the complexity of,
proceedings brought by persons who would benefit if a will, apparently
valid on its face, could be shown to have been invalidly executed."'' 7
Similarly, in addressing the British Columbia Law Reform Commission's decision not to recommend enactment of a dispensing power,
J.G. Miller contends that over the long term "[t]he literal compliance
approach . .

.

provides an invitation to seize upon some technical

defect to defeat the intention of the testator. This would be less likely
to occur if there was a dispensing power where the parties might be
forced to litigate the real issues between them. . . ,,
"69 though Miller,
nevertheless, concedes that enactment of a harmless error rule would
produce an initial increase in litigation.70

763. Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Report on "The Wills Act" and the Doctrine of
Substantial Compliance 19-20 (1980).
764. See id. at 19-21.
765. British Columbia Report, supra note 19, at 47.
766. Id. The report remarks, however, that experience in South Australia shows that even
where the court may exercise a dispensing power, "a premium is still placed upon executing a
will in the traditional form." Id.
767. Id. at 51-54.
768. Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, Project No. 76, pt. 1, Discussion Paper
on Wills: Substantial Compliance § 4.7 (1984).
769. J. Miller, Execution of Wills, supra note 19, at 578.
770. Id. at 577-78.
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[I]n as much as an application to the court would have to
be made before the dispensing power could be exercised,
this would indeed suggest that there would be an increase
in litigation. Certainly, some documents which are now not
even presented for probate because of some obvious defect
would be made the subject of an application, though it is
probably going too far to say that every defective will is
likely to be propounded. 771
Miller conjectures that requests for application of a harmless error
rule in "hopeless cases" would decrease as the case law under the
statute developed because "[i]n some cases, the necessary evidence
will not be available and, even if some 'hopeless' cases come before
the courts in the early years, the basic limits of the power should
soon become apparent." 772
Langbein concedes that converting the probate process "from
routine administration to routine adjudication" would create an intolerable burden on the system 773 and that such a result, achieved "at the
price of disorder and uncertainty in the patterns of transfer and testation," would not be worth the cost. 774 He argues, however, that the
functional construction of the wills act required by a substantial compliance approach would prevent such a result.
[Bly no means would every defectively executed instrument
result in a contest. On many issues the proponents' burden
of proof would be so onerous that they would forego the
trouble and expense of hopeless litigation; and on certain
other issues the proponents' burden would be so light that
potential contestants would not bother to litigate. 775
Langbein argues that a functional approach "would not simply add to
the existing stock of probate litigation, but would to some extent
substitute one type of dispute for another. . . . The standard would
be more predictable, and the contestants would lose their present
incentive to prove . . . harmless defects. ' 776 Langbein concludes that a
"purposive analysis" would eventually actually decrease litigation about
777
the formalities.

771.
772.
773.
774.
775.
776.
777.

Id. at 577.
Id. at 577-78.
Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 524.
Id. at 523.
Id. at 525.
Id. at 525-26.
See id.; Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8, at 51.
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In his 1987 article, Langbein takes the position that South Australia's experience has refuted the slippery slope argument against
even a broad dispensing power. 8 He suggests that the apparent "litigation boomlet" under section 12(2) has been the result of South Australia's quirky "no-waiver" rule prohibiting suppression of wills in uncontested cases. 9 As he points out, very few of the section 12(2) cases
have actually involved contested wills.7w In a jurisdiction that does
not have such a "no-waiver" rule - that is, most Anglo-American
jurisdictions - such uncontested wills would not be litigated.
D.

Delay and Increased Costs in Probatingthe Will
Miller acknowledges that enactment of a harmless error rule would
inevitably produce delay and increased costs to the probate estate in
some instances.
[I]t has to be acknowledged that where an application for
exercise of the dispensing power [is] contested there [will]
be delay in the administration of the estate .... Again, such
a disadvantage must be balanced against the benefits which
the introduction of a dispensing power would confer - in
particular a distribution which [is] probably more in accord
with the deceased's intentions.781
In mitigation of this argument against enactment of a dispensing
power, Miller remarks that in most cases under a harmless error rule
there would be no undue delay because application to probate would
be by consent.7 mThe British Columbia Law Reform Commission noted
that such a provision would not significantly extend the probate period
in most instances beyond limits considered acceptable in that jurisdiction for protection of other interests or policies. 7 "Even if it does,
we think that the execution of the testator's actual intent is a more
important consideration." 711
The policy favoring avoidance of increased costs and delay in administration traditionally has been subordinated to policies regarded by
the legislatures as more fundamental to the interests of the state. In

778.
779.
780.
781.
782.
783.
784.

See Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 38-39.
Id. at 38-40.
Id. at 37-38, 13 n.46.
J. Miller, Execution of Wills, supra note 19, at 581.
Id.
British Columbia Report, supra note 19, at 48.
Id.
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balancing the policy of avoidances of increased costs and delay in
administration against the policy favoring protection of the family,
legislatures have concluded that the family protection policy takes
precedence. For example, all common law states make some provision
to protect the surviving spouse, despite the fact that implementing
their "forced share" or "forced heirship" provision slows the process
of settling the estate. In states that have adopted the UPC, the inclusion of certain dispositions technically outside the probate system in
the "augmented estate" available to the spouse under the UPC elective
share provisions produces delay not only in the probate system but
in the nonprobate system as well. 7 8 It can be argued that implementation of a harmless error rule merely gives equivalent protection to
the policy favoring freedom of testation.
V.

A COUNTERPROPOSAL TO THE HARMLESS ERROR SOLUTION
A.

Determining Harmless Errorin the Courts

Professor Mann characterizes Langbein's conception of substantial
compliance as an "elegantly simple" solution to excessive formalism
in the courts. 78 If the strict compliance doctrine is considered in the
abstract, Mann's assessment is entirely accurate. Insistence on strict
compliance with the wills formalities has demonstrably produced cases
that seem not only harsh and unfair, but absurd. 787 A prime example
of such a result is the line of Texas cases, such as Boren, invalidating
self-proving wills. 7 Courts in other jurisdictions faced with the same
issue have avoided results reached in Boren and its progeny by tacitly
applying a version of functional analysis- 9 In the self-proving wills
cases, with which Mann is chiefly concerned, functional analysis works
elegantly and reasonably simply because the departure from the statute is trivial and the evidence of testamentary intent, incontrovertible.
Even under a narrow harmless error rule, the self-proving wills
cases would present no real issue of testamentary intent. In all of the
Boren line of cases, the purportedly defective document revealed on
its face that the testator had made every effort to execute a valid will
but had bungled the technical requirements for making an executed

785. For discussion, see Miller, supra note 3, at 249-59.
786. Mann, supra note 747, at 61 n.123.
787. For discussion of such cases, see Miller, supra note 3, at 222-29.
788. For discussion of the Texas cases, see id. at 227-29. For discussion of self-proving
wills generally, see id. at 294-95.
789. For discussion of cases rejecting the Texas rule, see id. at 236-37.
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will self-proving. ° For a court to hold such a document valid requires
little or no reflection on the nature of the defect or the circumstances
indicating testamentary intent.
Functional analysis is less simple and less elegant when the conduct
evincing testamentary intent is more problematic. The flaw in any
harmless error rule (such as substantial compliance) that depends upon
a functional construction of the wills act to assess the proponent's
extrinsic proof of intent is that the "purposes," "functions," or
"policies" served by any particular formality are not as obvious as
many scholars imply. It is not self-evident, for example, which "functions" are served by the attestation requirement or how indispensably.
Any harmless error rule that is tied to a functional construction
of the wills act formalities seemingly contemplates that either the
legislature that enacts the rule or the courts that apply it will rank
the formalities or develop some standard for ranking them in order
to determine their respective functions in promoting the wills act
policies. In applying such a rule to a particular case, a court must
determine whether the bungled or omitted formality in question can
be appropriately dispensed with in light of its importance to the wills
act policies and whether under the particular circumstances dispensation would be appropriate. Reasonable courts or legislatures may differ, however, with respect to the significance of the individual formalities.
Developing a reliable standard for identifying and ranking the functions of the formalities is not essential to scholarly discussion of the
merits of a harmless error rule. A court, however, would be unavoidably and urgently concerned with the practical aspects of functional
analysis if required to apply a harmless error rule that contemplates
such an approach. Since no wills provisions, including those of the
UPC, are phrased in functional terms, interpretation of what on its
face appears to be a mandatory standard for due execution of a will
would depend on the ability of courts applying a functional approach
to determine what each formality is "for."
Unless the legislature sets out threshold requirements for validity
or actually ranks and analyzes the formalities, the courts must be
responsible for making these determinations. British Columbia's proposed rule conditions application of the dispensing power on the testator's compliance with certain 'threshold requirements.'7 91 This re-

790.
791.

For discussion, see id. at 227-29.
For discussion, see id. at 337-39.
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commendation represents a legislative resolution of the problem of
ranking the relative dis-pensability of the formalities. Other proposals
and enactments leave this question for the courts to resolve.
In the past, courts that have tacitly applied a quantitative substantial compliance standard as a means of validating marginal but well-intended wills have tended to focus on the protective character of compliance with the formalities as the means to prevent fraud and imposition.- The advocates of functional analysis have generally rejected
this analysis. 793 Although Langbein seems to assume that the relative
importance of the formalities in relation to one another is self-evident,
he seems to have revised his analysis of the individual formalities
since his 1975 article.
As Langbein suggests, any functional or "purposive" analysis of
the wills act must produce a ranking of the formalities in terms of
their general dispensability as evidence of testamentary intent and
the genuineness of the will.79 A harmless error rule that requires the
courts to analyze the respective functions of the wills act formalities
in order to determine whether the testator's conduct substantially
serves the purposes of the wills act assumes that the court will correctly recognize the implications of the defect. Again, however, the
appropriate ranking of the wills act formalities is subjective rather
than self-evident. Langbein, who seems to assume that the South
Australian courts look at the wills acts requirements purposively in
applying the section 12(2) dispensing power 7 95 nonetheless questioned
their decision to apply the dispensing power in Williams to excuse
noncompliance with the signature requirement79 he characterizes as
fundamental. 79 Langbein's otherwise brilliant exposition of the substantial compliance doctrine is soft on the question of the practical
implications of a court's analysis and ranking of the wills act formalities. At times, he seems to be saying that certain types of defects
(notably noncompliance with the signature and writing requirements)
create such fundamental issues of intent and authenticity as to preclude
any cure through the introduction of extrinsic evidence; 98 at other
points, however, he seems to suggest that the determination of harm-

792. Id. at 223, 226.
793. Id. at 271-74.
794. See Langbein, Harmless ErrorRules, supra note 8, at 52.
795. See id. at 17, 52.
796. See id. at 25.
797. Id. at 23-24, 52.
798. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 8, at 525 (stating that signature
and writing are "all but indispensable").
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less error turns solely on the proponent's ability to produce evidence
of purposive conduct to show testamentary intent. It is unclear in the
article how individual courts applying a substantial compliance doctrine
would go about ranking the formalities and to what extent such ranking
might vary from case to case.
The South Australian courts have addressed the problem of ranking
the formalities without resolving it. As we have seen, even substantial
deviation from the statutory standard has not produced insuperable
difficulties for the proponents of unsigned, unattested, and unexecuted
7
wills, despite lip service to the limiting language in Graham. 9
In analyzing the supposed ranking of the wills act formalities in
South Australia, the drafters of section 2-503 incorrectly imply that
the South Australian courts treat attestation as dispensable under
section 12(2) only when the testator "misunderstands" the requirements ° and that proponents of unattested wills must prove "that the
defective execution did not result from irresolution or from circumstances suggesting duress and trickery."' ° On the contrary, South
Australia's courts have found extrinsic evidence establishing that the
testator deliberately failed to have the will attested sufficient to justify
application of section 12(2) in instances in which the evidence established testamentary intent.m The South Australian courts have
likewise admitted wills to probate in cases such as Vauk, Kelly, and
Williams in which the finality of the testator's decision to execute a
will was at best doubtful.
Similarly, the drafters of the section 2-503 comment incorrectly
state that the South Australian courts have been 'extremely reluctant'
to excuse noncompliance with the signature requirement."'8° Even if
one could argue that in Baumanis,8 the South Australian courts
adopted a narrow functional or purposive approach to the signature
requirement,m they have since opted for a broad intent-enforcing policy.

799.
text.
800.
801.

Graham,20 S.A. St. R. at 205; for discussion, see supranotes 67-75 and accompanying
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (1990).
Id.

802. For discussion, see supra notes 692-700, 707-10 and accompanying text.
803.
804.

UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 comment (1990).
25 S.A. St. R. 423 (1980); see Langbein, Harmless Error Rules, supra note 8, at

23-24, 52.
805. For discussion of Baumanis, see supra notes 257-90 and accompanying text.
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Reforming the Statute of Wills: The UPC's Multi-Tiered
Adaptation of the FunctionalApproach and a
Modest Proposalfor Reform

The UPC's approach is multi-tiered, in that it shifts the burden of
proving testamentary intent based on the level of compliance with the
statutory guidelines. Stich an approach would seem to present a solution to the problem of formalisms if the advocates of the harmless
error approach are correct in thinking that the potential objections
and pitfalls to such an approach are either spurious or outweighed by
the policy favoring enforcement of the property owner's intentions.
Lindgren recommends such an approach in his article proposing
abolition of the attestation requirement as a substantive requirement
for a valid will.- Among other proposals, Lindgren essentially
suggests that the attestation requirement be recast as a burden-shifting device. Whether the testator has complied with the attestation
requirement would determine which party should bear the burden of
establishing the validity of the will, what standard of proof should
apply, or possibly both.' 8
It can be argued that both the South Australian dispensing power
and UPC section 2-503 achieve similar results through less direct
means. The effect, if not the purpose, of both provisions is to reformulate the standard for due execution by converting the formalities from
mandatory requirements for an enforceable disposition into guidelines
for ensuring due execution. UPC section 2-502(a), requiring attestation, is expressly subject to sections 2-502(b) and 2-503, which are
treated as exceptions to the attestation requirement. Likewise, UPC
section 2-506, dealing with choice of law as to execution, states that
a written will is valid if executed in compliance with either section
2-502 or section 2-503, thus treating section 2-503 as if it set out an
alternative standard for determining the validity of a will in cases in
which the document does not meet either of the section 2-502 standards.sl ° To this extent, the testator's departure from the formalities
merely increases the uncertainty of the disposition. Even substantial
departures from the requirements, such as failure to sign the will,

806. For discussion of the UPC's "multi-tiered" approach, see supra notes 594-602 and
accompanying text.
807. See Lindgren, supra note 19, at 546-47, 569-71 (discussing proposals to implement
abolition of attestation requirement). For discussion, see Miller, supra note 3, at 290-91.
808. See Lindgren, supra note 19, at 570-77.
809. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-503 (1990).
810. See id. § 2-506.
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may apparently (in an appropriate case and under sufficiently compelling circumstances) be excused, according to the language of the section
2-503 dispensing power. UPC section 2-503 thus retains the notion of
a consistent statutory standard for due execution while simultaneously
authorizing violations of the standard in certain instances.
The flaw in such a multi-tiered harmless error approach is that it
retains the existing standard for due execution and then invites the
courts to disregard it, without squarely addressing the issue of
whether the standard itself should be revised. A more direct, less
disingenuous approach would be for the legislature to reformulate the
wills act itself along the lines first recommended by Lindgren for
reformulation of the attestation requirement.s" Such a provision might
directly address the relationship between compliance with the statutory guidelines for execution of the will and the burden of proving
the validity of the will. In addition to shifting the burden of showing
testamentary intent to the proponent in cases in which the testator
has failed to observe the guidelines for a self-proving, attested, or
holographic will, such a provision might also vary the standard of
12
proof required depending on the degree of formality achieved.1
C.

Toward a Unified Succession Act: An Immodest Proposal

The recent revisions to the UPC implicitly acknowledge a need to
reform the present law to eliminate some of the existing disparities
between wills and will substitutes that have resulted from the fictional
classification of will substitutes as inter vivos rather than testamentary
dispositions - i.e., as trusts, gifts, or third-party beneficiary contracts. Because the UPC is a probate code, the drafters stop. short of
proposing a unified procedure for dealing with testamentary transfers
other than those made or attempted to be made by wills. Outside the
parameters of a probate code such a unified approach could be achieved
by a legislative formulation of a multi-tiered provision incorporating
all ambulatory and revocable donative dispositions of property - i.e.,
all essentially testamentary dispositions. Such a provision would expressly set out the effects in any context of a transferor's compliance
with the formalities of transfer and would treat the level of formality
actually achieved as determinative of the burden of proof in any instance in which there was a challenge to the validity of the transfer.
Formulation of such a flexible standard would require a principled

811. Lindgren, supra note 19, at 546-47, 569-72. For discussion of Lindgren's proposed
'two-tiered" approach, see Miller, supra note 3, at 291.

812. Cf. Lindgren, supra note 19, at 571.
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determination of what acts are sufficient to establish "testamentary"
intent, specifically whether and to what extent particular patterns of
conduct support an inference of intent. Ranking of the individual formalities would not be necessary under such a standard; instead, the
focus would be on the level of formality observed as objectively manifesting the transferor's intent.
Implementation of a unified guideline for effectuating donative dispositions would not, standing alone, eliminate the distinction between
"probate" and "nonprobate" transfers, though one consequence of its
application would be a blurring of the lines between traditional wills
and will substitutes. The legislature might permit certain simple dispositions to be "self-enforcing" without court intervention, but under
a unified standard, the need for administration of the transferor's
property under a court's auspices would presumably turn on the nature
and extent of the property transferred, rather than on the characterization of the disposition as a will or a will substitute. Ideally, a unified
system would be designed to limit court intervention in the administration and distribution of the transferor's property except to the
extent necessary to address specific issues such as the claims of surviving spouses and creditors, clearing title to real property, ademption,
lapse, subsequent inconsistent disposition, and other matters requiring
application of law to the facts.
A unified approach to formalities of transfer would eliminate the
need to maintain the juridical fiction of the "present interest" test as
a justification for treating the will substitutes as valid transfers despite
their noncompliance with the wills acts. Abolishing the statute of wills
in favor of a flexible provision addressing the consequences of a transferor's compliance with "alternative formality" 813 would effectively
eliminate the need for distinguishing the standard of formality for
wills and will substitutes.
As remarked, formulation of unified guidelines for effective execution of wills and will substitutes would necessarily entail a rethinking
of the probate and "nonprobate" systems, since the form of the disposition would no longer be determinative of its classification. Though
property owners tend to try to avoid probate, the probate process in
some cases benefits the testator's successors in certain respects.8 14
However, to the extent that probate may serve a useful purpose in
administration of the property of some decedents, it seems absurd
that the form of a transfer dictates whether the property is subject

813.
814.

See Langbein, Nonprobate Revolution, supra note 5, at 1131-32.
See id. at 1116-20.
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to probate. Successors of a testator disposing of personal property by
will might actually benefit less from the title-clearing effects of probate
than would successors of a transferor who disposes of real property
in a revocable trust. With the changes in the ways in which wealth
is being held and transmitted,s1s it may be time for a drastic rethinking
of the law of succession that would establish procedures for expediting
post-mortem dispositions in appropriate instances and provide for court
intervention when, but only when, such intervention is needed to
resolve disputes.
The harmless error solution and the movement toward unification
of the subsidiary law of wills and will substitutes contemplated by the
UPC revisions merely continue the process of piecemeal reform of the
law of succession and does not directly address any of the fundamental
issues raised by the existence of two separate systems for disposing
of property at death. In order to eliminate some of the present incongruity in the two systems, the Code's drafters have blurred the
parameters of the law of wills, without dealing with the fundamentals.
The harmless error approach eliminates formalism at the expense of
form by setting up a system for undermining the wills acts, thus
pushing the law of succession further in the direction of amorphism.
The 1990 revisions to the UPC will not eliminate judicial arbitrariness in interpreting the wills acts. In actuality, the UPC revisions
are setting a standard for determining when its "requirements" are
not in fact required.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Much of what could be stated in conclusion has been stated previously in exposition. At the risk of redundancy, I have concluded that
the problem of wills act formality and of judicial formalism is the
product of a system of donative transfers of property that has largely
adapted to, rather than evolved from, a series of statutes enacted as
many as 450 years ago. The result has been a series of disparate and
often unfortunate "developments" in the law of donative transfers of
property in which artifice masquerades as clarity.
Under the current system, the first step in determining the validity
of documents is to distinguish between wills and will substitutes to distinguish between arrangements for the disposition of property

815. See, e.g., Langbein, Family Wealth Transmission,supra note 13 (discussing the changing face of probate law); Lynn, Estate Planning:Good-bye to Wills, Trusts, and FutureInterests,
39 OHIo ST. L.J. 717 (1978) (discussing the effect of societal change on the law of gratuitous

transfers).
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on death which are deemed to be testamentary and therefore which
are "wills," and those which are deemed to effect a pre-death transfer
of a property interest and therefore which are "will substitutes." The
second step is a consequence of the first - to require that wills comply
with wills act formalities as a prerequisite to effectiveness, but to
excuse will substitutes from so complying because by definition the
applicable law is not the law of wills, but the law of contracts, property,
or trusts. The new, progressive, and "unifying" third step is to excuse
certain wills from literal compliance with wills act formalities if those
wills are deemed to be in "substantial compliance" or if defects in
compliance are excused in the light of extrinsic evidence demonstrating
testamentary intent.
Why not come full circle? Under the current system, we are required to pretend that will substitutes are lifetime transfers that fall
outside the ambit of the wills acts, even though most are revocable
by the donor and the donor retains complete control and dominion
over the property. We indulge in this pretense despite the fact that
in some cases the "interest" of the donee is so tenuous that it cannot

'8 6
even be named or may be no more than an "evanescent hope. 1

Through the UPC, the Commission on Uniform State Laws now recommends that the current system be revised to enable us to pretend
that compliance with the wills act is unimportant as long as the proponent of the defective document can establish by "clear and convincing"
evidence of testamentary intent that the error is harmless. Perhaps
it is time just to acknowledge that the present configurations of the
wills acts have outlived their usefulness.
In my opinion, it would be best to finally unify the law of donative
transfers, rather than piecemealing certain of its elements. At present,
the prospects for adoption of such a system by any legislature are
practically nil. After more than twenty years, the UPC, a much less
radical reform, has been enacted in a minority of states. Commentators
and legislatures confronting the formalism problem in the law of wills
are not questioning the necessity of setting out purely formal criteria
for determining the enforceability of wills. Instead, they are focusing
on ways to authorize the courts to interpret the statutory requirements
flexibly so that errors in execution may be excused in appropriate
cases.
The underlying premise of any harmless error rule is that some
uniform standard for valid and enforceable wills is necessary, although
failure to comply with the standard might be excused in individual

816.

See, e.g., Farkas v. Williams, 5 Ill.
2d 417, 422, 125 N.E.2d 600 (1955).
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cases. There is a seeming irrationality to setting a standard for enforceability by statute, but authorizing the courts to disregard it if the
intentions of the testator have been otherwise sufficiently manifested.
This incongruity does not trouble the proponents of harmless error
rules, nor does it lead them to question the standard's necessity or
sufficiency.
In this article I have examined the problem of wills act formality
and judicial formalism and concluded that the approaches proposed or
adopted to alleviate the problems are troubling. During this examination, it has become clear that the fundamental question is really
whether in a contemporary society the traditional wills acts should
continue to play their historically important role in the law of donative
transfers. It has been said that "criticism comes easier than craftsmanship," and my counter proposal is not yet fully developed. What is
fully developed, however, is the clear sense that the proposal is worthy
of full development if for no other reason than because a direct solution
to the problem would be preferable to the indirect approach that
presently dominates our attention.
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